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Abstract 
All over the world, the liberalization of electricity markets, which follows different paradigms, 
has created new challenges for those involved in this sector. In order to respond to these challenges, 
electric power systems suffered a significant restructuring in its mode of operation and planning. This 
restructuring resulted in a considerable increase of the electric sector competitiveness. Particularly, 
the Ancillary Services (AS) market has been target of constant renovations in its operation mode as it 
is a targeted market for the trading of services, which have as main objective to ensure the operation 
of electric power systems with appropriate levels of stability, safety, quality, equity and 
competitiveness. 
In this way, with the increasing penetration of distributed energy resources including 
distributed generation, demand response, storage units and electric vehicles, it is essential to develop 
new smarter and hierarchical methods of operation of electric power systems. As these resources are 
mostly connected to the distribution network, it is important to consider the introduction of this kind 
of resources in AS delivery in order to achieve greater reliability and cost efficiency of electrical power 
systems operation.  
The main contribution of this work is the design and development of mechanisms and 
methodologies of AS market and for energy and AS joint market, considering different management 
entities of transmission and distribution networks. Several models developed in this work consider the 
most common AS in the liberalized market environment: Regulation Down; Regulation Up; Spinning 
Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve. The presented models consider different rules and ways of 
operation, such as the division of market by network areas, which allows the congestion management 
of interconnections between areas; or the ancillary service cascading process, which allows the 
replacement of AS of superior quality by lower quality of AS, ensuring a better economic performance 
of the market. 
A major contribution of this work is the development an innovative methodology of market 
clearing process to be used in the energy and AS joint market, able to ensure viable and feasible 
solutions in markets, where there are technical constraints in the transmission network involving its 
division into areas or regions. The proposed method is based on the determination of Bialek 
topological factors and considers the contribution of the dispatch for all services of increase of 
generation (energy, Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning reserves) in network congestion. The 
use of Bialek factors in each iteration of the proposed methodology allows limiting the bids in the 
market while ensuring that the solution is feasible in any context of system operation. 
Another important contribution of this work is the model of the contribution of distributed 
energy resources in the ancillary services. In this way, a Virtual Power Player (VPP) is considered in 
order to aggregate, manage and interact with distributed energy resources. The VPP manages all the 
agents aggregated, being able to supply AS to the system operator, with the main purpose of 
participation in electricity market. In order to ensure their participation in the AS, the VPP should have 
a set of contracts with the agents that include a set of diversified and adapted rules to each kind of 
distributed resource. 
All methodologies developed and implemented in this work have been integrated into the 
MASCEM simulator, which is a simulator based on a multi-agent system that allows to study complex 
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operation of electricity markets. In this way, the developed methodologies allow the simulator to 
cover more operation contexts of the present and future of the electricity market. In this way, this 
dissertation offers a huge contribution to the AS market simulation, based on models and mechanisms 
currently used in several real markets, as well as the introduction of innovative methodologies of 
market clearing process on the energy and AS joint market. 
This dissertation presents five case studies; each one consists of multiple scenarios. The first 
case study illustrates the application of AS market simulation considering several bids of market 
players. The energy and ancillary services joint market simulation is exposed in the second case 
study. In the third case study it is developed a comparison between the simulation of the joint market 
methodology, in which the player bids to the ancillary services is considered by network areas and a 
reference methodology. The fourth case study presents the simulation of joint market methodology 
based on Bialek topological distribution factors applied to transmission network with 7 buses managed 
by a TSO. The last case study presents a joint market model simulation which considers the 
aggregation of small players to a VPP, as well as complex contracts related to these entities. The case 
study comprises a distribution network with 33 buses managed by VPP, which comprises several kinds 
of distributed resources, such as photovoltaic, CHP, fuel cells, wind turbines, biomass, small hydro, 
municipal solid waste, demand response, and storage units. 
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Resumo 
A liberalização dos mercados de energia elétrica, considerando de diferentes paradigmas, cria 
novos desafios para as entidades que operam neste sector. Em resposta a estes desafios, os sistemas 
elétricos de energia sofreram uma reestruturação significativa no seu modo de operação e 
planeamento. Este processo de reestruturação originou num aumento considerável da competitividade 
do sector elétrico. Como parte integrante dos mercados elétricos, o mercado de serviços de sistema 
tem vindo a ser alvo de constantes remodelações no seu modo de operação, visto ser um mercado 
direcionado para a negociação de serviços que possuem como principal objetivo assegurar a 
exploração dos sistemas elétricos de energia com níveis apropriados de estabilidade, segurança, 
qualidade, igualdade e competitividade.  
Neste sentido, com a crescente penetração de recursos energéticos distribuídos 
nomeadamente a produção distribuída, a gestão da procura (demand response), as unidades de 
armazenamento de energia elétrica e os veículos elétricos, torna-se imprescindível desenvolver novas 
metodologias de operação dos sistemas elétricos de energia, mais inteligentes e hierarquizadas. 
Estando estes recursos maioritariamente ligados à rede de distribuição, é importante considerar a sua 
introdução no fornecimento de serviços de sistema com o objetivo de obter uma maior fiabilidade e 
eficiência nos custos de operação dos sistemas elétricos. 
O principal contributo deste trabalho é a conceção e desenvolvimento de metodologias e 
mecanismos de mercado de serviços de sistema e de mercados conjuntos de energia e serviços de 
sistema, considerando as diferentes entidades de gestão das redes de transmissão e distribuição. Os 
vários modelos desenvolvidos neste trabalho consideram os serviços de sistema mais comuns em 
ambiente de mercado liberalizado: Regulation Down; Regulation Up; Spinning Reserve; e Non-
Spinning Reserve. Os modelos apresentados consideram diferentes regras e modos de funcionamento 
como a divisão do mercado em áreas da rede, que permite uma gestão do congestionamento nas 
interligações entre as áreas, ou o processo de cascata de serviços de sistema (ancillary services 
cascading process), que permite a substituição de serviços de sistema de qualidade superior por 
serviços de sistema de qualidade inferior, assegurando um melhor desempenho económico do 
mercado. 
Um grande contributo deste trabalho reside no desenvolvimento de uma metodologia 
inovadora de encontro de ofertas a ser utilizada no mercado conjunto de energia e serviços de 
sistema, capaz de garantir soluções viáveis e exequíveis em mercados onde existam restrições 
técnicas na rede de transmissão que impliquem a sua divisão em áreas ou regiões. O método 
proposto baseia-se na determinação dos fatores topológicos de Bialek e considera a contribuição do 
despacho da energia e dos serviços de sistema (Regulation Up, Spinning e Non-spinning reserves) no 
congestionamento da rede. O uso dos fatores de Bialek em cada iteração da metodologia proposta 
permite limitar as ofertas existentes no mercado, garantindo sempre que a solução encontrada é 
exequível em qualquer contexto de operação do sistema. 
Outro aspeto importante neste trabalho é a modelação de recursos energéticos distribuídos 
nos serviços de sistema. Neste sentido, um Virtual Power Player (VPP) é considerado a fim de 
agregar, gerir e interagir com os recursos energéticos distribuídos. O VPP gere as necessidades dos 
agentes agregados, podendo fornecer serviços de sistema ao operador do sistema, tendo como 
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principal finalidade a participação no mercado de eletricidade. Para assegurar a sua participação nos 
serviços de sistema, o VPP deverá ter um conjunto de contratos com os agentes agregados que 
incluirão um conjunto de regras diversificadas e adequadas a cada tipo de recurso distribuído. 
Todas as metodologias desenvolvidas e implementadas neste trabalho foram integrados no 
simulador MASCEM. Este é um simulador baseado num sistema multiagente que permite estudar a 
operação complexa dos mercados de eletricidade. Neste sentido, as metodologias desenvolvidas 
permitem ao simulador abranger mais contextos de operação do presente e futuro do mercado de 
eletricidade. Neste ponto de vista, esta dissertação oferece uma enorme contribuição na simulação do 
mercado de serviços de sistema, baseado em modelos e mecanismos utilizados atualmente em vários 
mercados reais, bem como na introdução de metodologias inovadores de encontro de ofertas no 
mercado conjunto de energia e serviços de sistema. 
Nesta dissertação são apresentados cinco casos de estudo, cada um constituído por vários 
cenários. O primeiro caso de estudo ilustra a aplicação de simulação de mercado de serviços de 
sistema considerando várias ofertas de agentes de mercado. A simulação do mercado conjunto de 
energia e serviços de sistema é exposto no segundo caso de estudo. O terceiro caso de estudo 
desenvolve uma comparação entre a metodologia de simulação do mercado conjunto em que as 
ofertas dos agentes para os serviços de sistema é considerado por áreas da rede e uma metodologia 
de referência. O quarto caso de estudo apresenta a simulação da metodologia do mercado conjunto 
com base nos fatores topológicos de distribuição de Bialek aplicado a uma rede de transporte de 7 
barramentos gerida por um TSO. O último caso de estudo apresenta a simulação do modelo de 
mercado conjunto em que considera a agregação de pequenos agentes de mercado a um VPP, bem 
como os contratos complexos associados a estas entidades. Este caso de estudo é constituído por 
uma rede de distribuição de 33 barramentos gerida por um VPP que comtempla vários tipos de 
recursos, tais como: unidades fotovoltaicas, cogeração, células de combustível, eólicas, biomassa, 
mini-hídricas, resíduos sólidos urbanos, demand response, e unidades de armazenamento. 
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Acronyms 
Notation Description 
AC – Alternate Current 
AGC – Automatic Generation Control 
AMES – Agent-based Modelling of Electricity Systems 
AS – Ancillary Services 
ASM – Ancillary Services Market 
BETTA – British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
BGSA – British Grid System Agreement 
BRP – Balance Responsible Parties 
BSC – Balancing and Settlement Code 
CAISO – California Independent System Operator 
CEGB – Central Electricity Generating Board 
CHP – Combined Heat and Power 
CMRI – CAISO Market Results Interface 
CONOPT – CONtinuous global OPTimizer 
CPLEX – Simplex algorithm and C programming 
CRR – Congestion Revenue Rights 
DAM – Day-Ahead Market 
DC – Direct Current 
DER – Distributed Energy Resources 
DG – Distributed Generation 
DICOPT – Discrete and Continuous OPTimizer 
DLC – Direct Load Control 
DNO  Distribution Network Operator 
DR – Demand Response 
DSO – Distribution System Operator 
GCP – Generation Curtailment Power 
EMCAS – Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System 
ERCOT – Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
EV – Electric Vehicle 
FCT – Foundation for Science and Technology 
FERC – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
FPN – Final Physical Notifications 
GAMS – General Algebraic Modeling System 
HASP – Hour-Ahead Scheduling Process 
ICL – Interagent Communication Language 
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IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IFM – Integrated Forward Market 
IPN – Initial Physical Notifications 
ISO – Independent System Operator 
LINDOGlobal – Linear, Integer, Nonlinear, Dynamic Optimization Global 
LMP – Locational Marginal Price 
MASCEM – Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets 
MATLAB – MATrix LABoratory 
MCP – Market Clearing Price 
MIBEL – Mercado Ibérico de Electricidade 
MINLP – Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programming 
MIP – Mixed Integer Programming 
MO – Market Operator 
MPM-RRD – 
Market Power Mitigation & Reliability Requirements 
Determination 
MSW – Municipal Solid Waste 
NERC – North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
NETA – New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
NGC – National Grid Company 
NGET – National Grid Electricity Transmission 
NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NS – Non-Spinning Reserve 
NSD – Non-Supplied Demand 
NYISO – New York Independent System Operator 
N2EX – Nord Pool Spot NASDAQ OMX Commodities 
OAA – Open Agent Architecture 
OASIS – Open Access Same-Time Information System 
OMIclear – Sociedade de Compensação de Mercados de Energia 
OMIE – Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Spanish pole 
OMIP – Operador de Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Portuguese pole 
OPF – Optimal Power Flow 
PS – Power Systems 
RD – Regulation Down 
RMR – Reliability Must-Run 
RTD – Real-Time Dispatch 
RTED – Real-Time Economic Dispatch 
RTM – Real-Time Market 
RTUC – Real-Time Unit Commitment 
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RU – Regulation Up 
RUC – Residual Unit Commitment 
SBP – System Buy Price 
SCED – Security Constrained Economic Dispatch 
SCUC – Security Constrained Unit Commitment 
SEPIA – Simulator for Electric Power Industry Agents 
SESAM – Nord Pool Spot’s day-ahead trading system 
SG – Smart Grid 
SO – System Operator 
SP – Spinning Reserve 
SSP – System Sell Price 
STUC – Short-Term Unit Commitment 
TD – Trading Day 
TH – Trading Hour 
TM – Trading Month 
TSO – Transmission System Operator 
TY – Trading Year 
V2G – Vehicle-to-Grid 
VPP – Virtual Power Player 
WECC – Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
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Nomenclature 
Notation Description Unit 
d
i  
– Set of nodes supplied directly 
from node i 
- - 
u
i  
– Set of nodes which supplying 
directly node i 
- - 
t  – Elementary period hour (h) 
( )c S  – Yield of charge process of the 
electricity network to the 
storage unit S 
- (%) 
( )d S  – Yield of discharge process of 
the electricity network to the 
storage unit S 
- (%) 
i  – Bus index - - 
k  – Market component index (1 – 
Regulation Down; 2 – 
Regulation Up; 3 – Spinning 
Reserve; 4 – Non-Spinning 
Reserve; 5 – Energy) 
- - 
l  – Load index - - 
r  – Resource index - - 
t  – Period index - - 
y
 – Network branch index - - 
z  – Zone index - - 
( )i t  – Voltage angle at bus i in period 
t 
radians (rad) 
max
( )i t  – 
Maximum voltage angle at bus i radians (rad) 
min
( )i t  – 
Minimum voltage angle at bus i radians (rad) 
( )j t  – Voltage angle at bus j in period 
t 
radians (rad) 
uA
 
– Upstream distribution matrix - - 
iiB  
– Imaginary part of the element 
in admittance matrix 
(susceptance) corresponding to 
the i row and i column 
siemens (S) 
ijB  – Imaginary part of the element 
in admittance matrix 
(susceptance) corresponding to 
the i row and j column 
siemens (S) 
max
( , , )AS r k tC  
– Resource r selling bid at market 
clearing price, in ancillary 
service commodity k, for period 
t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
max
( , )b l tC  
– Load l buying at market 
clearing price, for period t 
monetary 
unit per 
(m.u./W) 
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watt 
( , , )Ch S k tC
 
– Charge price of storage unit S, 
in commodity k, in period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , , )Dch S k tC
 
– Discharge price of storage unit 
S, in commodity k, in period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , , )DG DG k tC  
– Distribution generation unit DG 
selling bid price, for commodity 
k, in period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
Re ( )DG m DGC
 
– Minimum remuneration of 
distributed generation unit DG 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
_ ( , , )DR A l k tC  
– DR_A program price, for load l, 
for service k, in period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
_ ( , , )DR B l k tC  
– DR_B program price, for load l, 
for service k, in period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , )GCP DG tC  
– Generation Curtailment Power 
cost coefficient of DG unit, in 
period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , , )NSD l k tC  
– Non-supplied demand cost of 
load l for each commodity k, in 
period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
max
( , , )S r k tC  
– Resource r selling bid at market 
clearing price, in commodity k, 
for period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , , )SP SP k tC  
– Supplier SP selling bid price, for 
commodity k, in period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
Re ( )SP m SPC  
– Minimum remuneration of 
external supplier SP 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
,
g
ij rD
 
– Portion of generation due to 
generator r, that flows in line i-j 
(Topological generation factor 
matrix) 
- - 
( , )BatCap S tE
 
– Battery energy capacity of 
storage unit S, in period t 
watt hour (Wh) 
( , )Stored S tE
 
– Energy stored in storage unit S 
at the end of period t for 
energy, RU, SP and NS 
services. 
watt hour (Wh) 
_ ( , )Stored RD S tE
 
– Energy stored in storage unit S 
at the end of period t for 
energy and RD services. 
watt hour (Wh) 
( , )AS k tF  – Objective function portion 
concerning the ancillary 
services k in period t 
monetary 
unit 
(m.u.) 
_ ( , )AS req z kF  
– Ancillary service k requirement 
percentage factor provided by 
generation units from the 
region z. 
percent (%) 
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( )E tF  – Objective function portion 
concerning the energy service 
in period t 
monetary 
unit- 
(m.u.) 
( , )power DG tF  
– Reactive power percentage 
factor in relation to the active 
power, by distributed 
generation  DG, in period t 
percent (%) 
( , )power r tF  
– Reactive power percentage 
factor in relation to the active 
power, by resource r, in period 
t 
percent (%) 
( , )power SP tF  
– Reactive power percentage 
factor in relation to the active 
power, by external supplier SP, 
in period t 
percent (%) 
iiG  
– Real part of the element in 
admittance matrix 
(conductance) corresponding to 
the i row and i column 
siemens (S) 
ijG  – Real part of the element in 
admittance matrix 
(conductance) corresponding to 
the i row and j column 
siemens (S) 
BN  
– Total number of buses - - 
DGN  
– Total number of distributed 
generation units 
- - 
i
DGN  
– Total number of distributed 
generation units which belongs 
to bus i 
- - 
w
DGN  
– Total number of distributed 
generation units which belongs 
to the region z 
- - 
z
DGN  
– Total number of distributed 
generation units which belongs 
to the region z 
- - 
LN  
– Total number of loads - - 
i
LN  
– Total number of loads which 
belongs to bus i 
- - 
k
LN  
– Total number of loads in 
commodity k 
- - 
w
LN  
– Total number of loads which 
belongs to the region w 
- - 
z
LN  
– Total number of loads which 
belongs to the region z 
- - 
KN  
– Total number of commodity 
services 
- - 
DG
KN  
– Total number of distributed 
generation units in commodity 
k 
- - 
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R
KN  
– Total number of resources in 
commodity k 
- - 
S
KN  
– Total number of storage units 
in commodity k 
- - 
SP
kN  
– Total number of external 
suppliers in commodity k 
- - 
RN  
– Total number of resources - - 
i
RN  
– Total number of resources 
which belongs to bus i 
- - 
w
RN  
– Total number of resources 
which belongs to region w 
- - 
z
RN  
– Total number of resources 
which belongs to region z 
- - 
i
SN  
– Total number of storage units S 
which belongs to bus i 
- - 
SPN  
– Total number of external 
suppliers 
- - 
i
SPN  
– Total number of external 
suppliers which belongs to bus i 
- - 
w
SPN  
– Total number of external 
suppliers which belongs to the 
region w 
- - 
z
SPN  
– Total number of external 
suppliers which belongs to the 
region z 
- - 
YN  
– Total number of lines - - 
ZN  
– Total number of regional zones 
of ancillary services 
- - 
( , , )AS r k tP  
– Resource r scheduled power, in 
commodity k (only ancillary 
services), for period t  
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )AS req z k tP
 
– Active power demand 
requirement for the region z, in 
ancillary services k, in period t 
watt (W) 
max
( , , )AS r k tP  
– Resource r maximum selling 
bid power, in commodity k 
(only ancillary services), for 
period t 
watt (W) 
min
( , , )AS r k tP  
– Resource r minimum selling bid 
power, in commodity k (only 
ancillary services), for period t 
watt (W) 
( , )b l tP  
– Load l scheduled power, for 
period t 
watt (W) 
( , )
i
b l tP  
– Load l scheduled power which 
belongs to bus i, for period t 
watt (W) 
max
( , )b l tP  
– Load l maximum buying bid 
power, for period t 
watt (W) 
min
( , )b l tP  
– Load l minimum buying bid 
power, for period t 
watt (W) 
( , )CAP r tP  
– Maximum power capacity of 
resource r, for period t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , )CAP DG DG tP  
– Maximum power capacity of 
distributed generation unit DG, 
watt (W) 
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for period t 
_ ( , )CAP SP SP tP  
– Maximum power capacity of 
external supplier SP, for period 
t 
watt (W) 
( , , )Ch S k tP  
– Active power charge of storage 
S for commodity k, in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
i
Ch S k tP  
– Active power charge of storage 
S for commodity k at bus i in 
period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )ChMax S k tP  
– Maximum active power charge 
of storage S for commodity k in 
period t 
watt (W) 
( , )ChMax S tP  
– Maximum global active power 
charge of storage S in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )Dch S k tP
 
– Active power discharge of 
storage S for commodity k in 
period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
i
Dch S k tP  
– Active power discharge of 
storage S for commodity k at 
bus i in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )DchMax S k tP  
– Maximum active power 
discharge of storage S for 
commodity k in period t 
watt (W) 
( , )DchMax S tP   Maximum global active power 
discharge of storage S in period 
t. 
watt (W) 
( , , )DG DG k tP
 
– Active power generation of 
distributed generation unit DG 
for each service k, in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
i
DG DG k tP  
– Active power generation of 
distributed generation unit DG 
at bus i, for each service k, in 
period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
w
DG DG k tP  
– Active power generation of 
distributed generation unit DG 
which belongs to the region w, 
for each service k, in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
z
DG DG k tP  
– Active power generation of 
distributed generation unit DG 
which belongs to the region z, 
for each service k, in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )DGMax DG k tP  
– Maximum active power 
generation of distributed 
generation unit DG, for service 
k, in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )DGMin DG k tP  
– Minimum active power 
generation of distributed 
generation unit DG, for service 
k, in period t 
watt (W) 
( )DGMin DGP  
– Total minimum active power 
generation of distributed 
generation unit DG 
watt (W) 
Re ( )DG m DGP  
– Total minimum remuneration of 
distributed generation unit DG 
monetary 
unit 
(m.u.) 
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( )DGVar DGP  
– Generation variation of 
distributed generator unit DG 
between periods 
watt (W) 
( )Di tP  – Active power demand at bus i 
in period t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )DR A l k tP  
– DR_A active power reduction, 
for load l, in service k, in period 
t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )
i
DR A l k tP  
– DR_A active power reduction, 
for load l at bus i, in service k, 
in period t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )
w
DR A l k tP  
– DR_A active power reduction, 
for load l which belongs to the 
region w, in service k, in period 
t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )
z
DR A l k tP  
– DR_A active power reduction, 
for load l which belongs to the 
region z, in service k, in period 
t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )DR AMax l k tP  
– DR_A maximum active power 
reduction, for load l, in service 
k, in period t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )DR B l k tP  
– DR_B active power curtailment, 
for load l, in service k, in period 
t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )
i
DR B l k tP  
– DR_B active power curtailment, 
for load l at bus i, in service k, 
in period t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )
w
DR B l k tP  
– DR_B active power curtailment, 
for load l which belongs to the 
region w, in service k, in period 
t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )
z
DR B l k tP  
– DR_B active power curtailment, 
for load l which belongs to the 
region z, in service k, in period 
t 
watt (W) 
_ ( , , )DR BMax l k tP  
– DR_B maximum active power 
curtailment, for load l, in 
service k, in period t 
watt (W) 
_ lim _ ( , )energy it DG DG tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy dispatch, for distributed 
generation unit DG, in period t  
watt (W) 
_ lim ( , )energy it r tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy dispatch, for resources 
r, in period t 
watt (W) 
_ lim _ ( , )energy it SP SP tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy dispatch, for external 
suppliers SP, in period t 
watt (W) 
_ _ lim _ ( , )energy RU it DG DG tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy and Regulation Up 
dispatch, for distributed 
watt (W) 
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generation unit DG, in period t 
_ _ lim ( , )energy RU it r tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy and Regulation Up 
dispatch, for resources r, in 
period t 
watt (W) 
_ _ lim _ ( , )energy RU it SP SP tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy and Regulation Up 
dispatch, for external suppliers 
SP, in period t 
watt (W) 
_ _ _ lim _ ( , )energy RU Spinning it DG DG tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy, Regulation Up and 
Spinning reserve dispatch, for 
distributed generation unit DG, 
in period t 
watt (W) 
_ _ _ lim ( , )energy RU Spinning it r tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy, Regulation Up and 
Spinning reserve dispatch, for 
resources r, in period t 
watt (W) 
_ _ _ lim _ ( , )energy RU Spinning it SP SP tP  
– Active power limit obtained by 
Bialek factors considering the 
energy, Regulation Up and 
Spinning reserve dispatch, for 
external suppliers SP, in period 
t 
watt (W) 
GP  
– Vector of nodal generations watt (W) 
( , )GCP DG tP  
– Generation Curtailment Power 
by DG unit in period t 
watt (W) 
( , )
i
GCP DG tP  
– Generation Curtailment Power 
by DG unit at bus i, in period t 
watt (W) 
GiP  
– Active power generation in 
node i 
watt (W) 
( )Gi tP  – Active power generation at bus 
i in period t 
watt (W) 
GrP  
– Active power generation of 
resource r 
watt (W) 
grossP  
– Unknown vector of gross nodal 
flows 
watt (W) 
g
iP  
– Unknown gross nodal active 
power flow through node i 
watt (W) 
ijP  
– Active power flow in line i-j watt (W) 
g
ijP  
– Unknown gross line active flow 
in line i-j 
watt (W) 
( )g r
ijP  
– Unknown gross line active flow 
in line i-j of resources r 
watt (W) 
( )g SP
ijP  
– Unknown gross line active flow 
in line i-j of external supplier 
SP resource 
watt (W) 
jP  
– Actual total active flow through 
node j 
watt (W) 
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g
jP  
– Unknown gross nodal active 
power flow through node j 
watt (W) 
( , )
i
Load l tP  
– Active power demand of load l 
at bus i in period t 
watt (W) 
( )loss tP  
– Active power losses in period t watt (W) 
max
( , )Ly i jP  
– Maximum active power flow 
established in line y that 
connect the bus i and j 
watt (W) 
( , , )NSD l k tP  
– Non-supplied demand for load l 
in commodity k in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
i
NSD l k tP  
– Non-supplied demand for load l 
at bus i in commodity k in 
period t 
watt (W) 
( )Rd tP  
– Rigid demand for period t watt (W) 
_ lim ( , , )req it l k tP  
– Active power demand of load l 
for ancillary services k, in 
period t 
watt (W) 
_ lim ( , , )
i
req it l k tP  
– Active power demand of load l 
at bus i for ancillary services k, 
in period t 
watt (W) 
max
_ lim ( , , )req it l k tP  
– Maximum active power demand 
of load l for ancillary services k, 
in period t 
watt (W) 
_ lim ( , , )
z
req it l k tP  
– Active power demand of load l 
which belongs to the region z, 
for ancillary services k, in 
period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )S r k tP  
– Resource r scheduled power, in 
commodity k, for period t  
watt (W) 
( , , )
i
S r k tP  
– Resource r scheduled power, in 
commodity k, at bus i for 
period t  
watt (W) 
max
( , , )S r k tP  
– Resource r maximum selling 
bid power, in commodity k, for 
period t 
watt (W) 
min
( , , )S r k tP  
– Resource r minimum selling bid 
power, in commodity k, for 
period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
w
S r k tP  
– Resource r scheduled power, in 
commodity k, for period t in 
region w 
watt (W) 
( , , )
z
S r k tP  
– Resource r scheduled power, in 
commodity k, for period t in 
region z 
watt (W) 
( , , )SP SP k tP
 
– Active power acquired from 
supplier SP for each service k, 
in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
i
SP SP k tP  
– Active power acquired from 
supplier SP at bus i, for each 
service k, in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )
w
SP SP k tP  
– Active power acquired from 
supplier SP which belongs to 
the region z, for each service 
w, in period t 
watt (W) 
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( , , )
z
SP SP k tP  
– Active power acquired from 
supplier SP which belongs to 
the region z, for each service k, 
in period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )SPMax SP k tP
 
– Maximum active power of 
external supplier SP for service 
k in period t 
watt (W) 
( )SPMin SPP
 
– Total minimum active power of 
external supplier SP 
watt (W) 
Re ( )SP m SPP
 
– Total minimum remuneration of 
external supplier SP 
monetary 
unit 
(m.u.) 
( )SPVar SPP
 
– Generation variation of external 
supplier SP between periods 
watt (W) 
( , )
i
b l tQ  
– Load l scheduled reactive 
power at bus i, for period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )DG DG k tQ
 
– Reactive power generation of 
distributed generation unit DG 
for service k in period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )
i
DG DG k tQ
 
– Reactive power generation of 
distributed generation unit DG 
at bus i for service k in period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )DGMax DG k tQ
 
– Maximum reactive power 
generation of distributed 
generation unit DG for service k 
in period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )DGMin DG k tQ
 
– Minimum reactive power 
generation of distributed 
generation unit DG for service k 
in period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( )Di tQ  – Reactive power demand at bus 
i in period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( )Gi tQ  – Reactive power generation at 
bus i in period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )
i
Load l k tQ  
– Reactive power demand of load 
l at bus i for commodity k in 
period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )
i
NSD l k tQ  
– Reactive non-supplied demand 
for load l in commodity k in 
period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )S r k tQ  
– Resource r scheduled reactive 
power, in commodity k, for 
period t  
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )
i
S r k tQ  
– Resource r scheduled reactive 
power, in commodity k, at bus i 
for period t  
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
max
( , , )S r k tQ  
– Resource r maximum selling 
bid reactive power, in 
volt-
ampere 
(VAr) 
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commodity k, for period t reactive 
min
( , , )S r k tQ  
– Resource r minimum selling bid 
reactive power, in commodity 
k, for period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )SP SP k tQ
 
– Reactive power acquired from 
supplier SP in service k in 
period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )
i
SP SP k tQ
 
– Reactive power generation of 
external supplier SP at bus i, 
for service k, in period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , , )SPMax SP k tQ
 
– Maximum reactive power of 
external supplier SP in service k 
in period t 
volt-
ampere 
reactive 
(VAr) 
( , )AS k tR  
– Ancillary service commodity k 
active power requirement, for 
period t 
watt (W) 
max
( , )AS k tR  
– Ancillary service commodity k 
maximum required power, for 
period t 
watt (W) 
min
( , )AS k tR  
– Ancillary service commodity k 
minimum required power, for 
period t 
watt (W) 
( , )
z
AS k tR  
– Ancillary service in region z for 
commodity k active power 
requirement, for period t 
watt (W) 
max;
( , )
z
AS k tR  
– Ancillary service in region z for 
commodity k maximum 
required power, for period t 
watt (W) 
min;
( , )
z
AS k tR  
– Ancillary service in region z for 
commodity k minimum 
required power, for period t 
watt (W) 
( , )k tRLXD  
– Commodity k relaxation down 
variable to apply violation 
penalties, for period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )z k tRLXD  
– Relaxation down variable to 
apply violation penalties in each 
identified  region z, for each 
ancillary service k, in period t 
watt (W) 
( , )k tRLXU  
– Commodity k relaxation up 
variable to apply violation 
penalties, for period t 
watt (W) 
( , , )z k tRLXU  
– Relaxation up variable to apply 
violation penalties in each 
identified  region z, for each 
ancillary service k, in period t 
watt (W) 
_
( )
RU NS
tSLCK  
– Amount of power which can be 
transferred from Regulation Up 
to Non-Spinning reserve, for 
period t 
watt (W) 
_
( )
RU SP
tSLCK  
– Amount of power which can be 
transferred from Regulation Up 
to Spinning Reserve, for period 
t 
watt (W) 
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– Amount of power which can be 
transferred from Spinning 
Reserve to Non-Spinning 
reserve, for period t 
watt (W) 
_
( , )
RU NS
z tSLCK  
– Amount of power which can be 
transferred from Regulation Up 
to Non-Spinning reserve, in 
each region z for period t 
watt (W) 
_
( , )
RU SP
z tSLCK  
– Amount of power which can be 
transferred from Regulation Up 
to Spinning Reserve, in each 
region z for period t 
watt (W) 
_
( , )
SP NS
z tSLCK  
– Amount of power which can be 
transferred from Spinning 
Reserve to Non-Spinning 
reserve, in each region z for 
period t 
watt (W) 
max
LyS  – Maximum apparent power flow 
established in line y that 
connect the bus i and j 
volt-
ampere 
(VA) 
T  – Total number of periods - - 
( )i tU  
– Voltage at bus i in polar form in 
period t 
volt (V) 
( )j tU  
– Voltage at bus j in polar form in 
period t 
volt (V) 
( , , )AS r k tX  
– Resource r commitment binary 
variable, in ancillary service 
commodity k, for period t 
- - 
( , , )DG DG k tX
 
– Binary variable of distributed 
generation unit DG related to 
accept the power generation in 
service k, in period t 
- - 
( )DGMax DGX  
– Maximum entries in service of 
distributed generation unit DG 
in time horizon T 
- - 
( )DGMin DGX  
– Minimum of period’s t in 
functioning of distributed 
generation unit DG in time 
horizon T 
- - 
_ ( , , )DR B l k tX  
– Binary variable for load 
curtailment l, in service k, in 
period t 
- - 
( , )L l tX  
– Load l commitment binary 
variable, for period t 
- - 
( , , )S r k tX  
– Resource r commitment binary 
variable, in ancillary service 
commodity k, for period t 
- - 
( , )S S tX
 
– Binary variable of storage S to 
power discharge, in period t 
- - 
( )SPMax SPX  
– Maximum entries in service of 
external suppliers SP in time 
horizon T 
- - 
( )SPMin SPX  
– Minimum of period’s t in - - 
_
( )
SP NS
tSLCK
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functioning of external supplier 
SP in time horizon T 
( )i tV  – Voltage magnitude at bus i in 
period t 
volt (V) 
max
( )i tV  
– Maximum voltage magnitude at 
bus i 
volt (V) 
min
( )i tV  
– Minimum voltage magnitude at 
bus i 
volt (V) 
( )j tV  – Voltage magnitude at bus j in 
period t 
volt (V) 
( , )RLXD k tW  
– Relaxation down penalty of 
commodity k, for period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , , )RLXD z k tW  
– Relaxation down penalty of 
region z, in commodity k, for 
period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , )RLXU k tW  
– Relaxation up penalty of 
commodity k, for period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , , )RLXD z k tW  
– Relaxation up penalty of region 
z, in commodity k, for period t 
monetary 
unit per 
watt 
(m.u./W) 
( , )S S tY
 
– Binary variable of storage S 
related to power charge, in 
period t 
- - 
ijy  
– Series admittance of line that 
connect the bus i and j in polar 
form 
siemens (S) 
_Sh iy  
– Shunt admittance of line 
connected in the bus i in polar 
form 
siemens (S) 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter exposes the motivation, the objectives and the contribution of the work 
developed in the scope of this dissertation. The importance of ancillary services in the 
context of the present and future power systems is explained. 
Here it is also presented how the dissertation is organized, as well as its contribution 
to the field of study. 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
The restructuring and consequent deregulation of the electricity sector imposes new 
methodologies in the operation and management of Power Systems (PS) [Shahidehpour-
2002]. Therefore, the collaboration between regions and countries is increasingly crucial for 
the proper functioning of the overall electricity market. In the last decade, there has been a 
continued restructuring of competitive electricity markets based on the electricity sector’s 
restructuring process, which introduced a new paradigm in its functioning, particularly in 
terms of generation and trading, which began to unfold in a competitive environment. Thus, 
the electricity started to be seen as a marketable product resulting in a set of transactions 
between players, managed by coordination entities, namely the Market Operator (MO) and 
System Operator (SO) and regulatory authorities which supervise the functioning of the 
system [Gomes-2007, Shahidehpour-2002]. 
In this context, to guarantee the good functioning of power systems in a market 
environment, adequate Ancillary Services (AS) requirements must be defined. Throughout 
their existence, ancillary services have been defined in several different ways in the USA 
and in Europe according to the evolution of power systems. In 1995 Kirby et al. defined 
ancillary services as “those functions performed by the electrical generating, transmission, 
system-control, and distribution system equipment and people that support the basic 
services of generating capacity, energy supply, and power delivery” [Kirby-1995]. In the 
same year, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) defined ancillary services as 
“those services necessary to support the transmission of electric power from seller to 
purchaser given the obligations of control areas and transmitting utilities within those 
control areas to maintain reliable operations of the interconnected transmission system” 
[FERC-1995]. In 2000, EURELECTRIC stated that ancillary services are “those services 
provided by generation, transmission and control equipment which are necessary to support 
the transmission of electric power from producer to purchaser” [EURELECTRIC-2000]. A few 
years later, the same EURELECTRIC established a definition for AS accepted by most of the 
countries and the wider scientific community: “Ancillary services are all services required by 
the transmission or distribution system operator to enable them to maintain the integrity 
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and stability of the transmission or distribution system as well as the power quality” 
[EURELECTRIC-2004, Braun-2007]. 
Multiple ways to classify the AS have been developed. The more general AS 
classification is based on systems needs in terms of operating requirements. The system 
needs of each ancillary service are determined by the Independent System Operator (ISO) 
in accordance with specific system operation standards of the market [EURELECTRIC-2000]. 
AS are classified into three distinct categories of their contribution to specific system 
requirements, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 – Ancillary services classification [EURELECTRIC-2000]. 
The frequency control consists in maintaining the frequency within the given margins 
by continuous modulation of active power and it can be obtained through the following 
ancillary services [EURELECTRIC-2000, EURELECTRIC-2004]: Automatic Generation 
Control; primary regulation; secondary regulation; high frequency response; spinning 
reserve, non-spinning reserve; and emergency control auctions. 
The voltage control consists in maintaining voltage through injecting or absorbing 
reactive power by means of synchronous or static compensation. In general, the voltage 
control is organized into a three-level hierarchy [Rebours-2007]: primary, secondary, and 
tertiary voltage control. 
The system restart consists in sufficient electricity sources that would be available to 
restart the power system after a partial or complete blackout. This is mainly obtained 
through the restoration capability which is the capability of a generation unit to start up 
without an external power supply [EURELECTRIC-2000, EURELECTRIC-2004]. 
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During the restructuring of the electric sector around the world, several models of 
energy and AS markets have been developed. An aspect shared by several electricity 
markets is the existence of a system operator, which can be an ISO, a Transmission System 
Operator (TSO) or a Distribution System Operator (DSO), responsible for the reliable real-
time operation and control of the transmission / distribution system which enables the 
efficient operation of a competitive energy and AS market [Oren-2001, Papalexopoulos-
2001]. 
Currently, some electricity markets have been adopting the concept of optimizing 
the energy market jointly with the AS market. This optimization model is often called as the 
energy and AS joint market. This model, comparing with the traditional model, promotes 
economic efficiency of the market reaching to interesting results [Soares-2011]. However, 
the joint model used in the real markets does not guarantee a feasible solution. The main 
problem is that the model do not consider the impact that the AS may have on network 
congestion. 
In this context, it becomes essential to develop methodologies to solve the problem 
in order to ensure the smooth operation of the system. The methodologies should ensure 
the feasibility and reliability of the system and guarantee the quality of power service within 
the parameters defined in each market. 
An approach that may partially solve the feasibility of the energy and AS joint 
market is the AS procurement by areas/regions of the network. The consideration of AS 
procurement by network regions allows acquiring and ensuring AS with higher quality at all 
points of the network, especially in consumer locations distant from the point of energy 
generation. In this way, the regional AS procurement is an approach that may results in 
more efficient distribution of reserves, in order to improve the reliability in the event of a 
contingency occurring anywhere in the system [Wu-2004]. 
An approach to solve the problem of feasibility of the energy and AS joint market is 
the use of distribution factors (namely the Bialek topological distribution factors) to limit the 
energy production of generation units that may cause congestion on the network lines. This 
approach involves a complex, sequential and hierarchical analysis of the ancillary services 
traded in the market. This approach presents feasible results of the system, avoiding any 
network congestion which may occur in traditional approaches. 
Based on these assumptions, the operation of electricity and AS markets can 
considers different models which determine the course of action of the players involved. 
Thus, these models are crucial for the strategic management of sellers and buyers who 
operate within each market, particularly for the spot market [Vale-2011]. Decisions on bids 
to be submitted must be supported by adequate decision support systems, such as MASCEM 
– a Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets or EMCAS – Electricity Market 
Complex Adaptive System. These systems are based on simulation and they must be able 
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to model the complex and dynamic nature of the energy and AS market, as well as the 
players who act in them, how they interact and how they react to the rules used and to the 
actions of other players [Praça-2003, Pinto-2011a]. Furthermore, market simulation 
systems must increasingly take into account the players related to new concepts of 
generation and operation in the scope of the Smart Grid (SG) paradigm. In this context, 
power systems have experienced many changes, mainly due to the increasing introduction 
of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) [Thong-2007, Scalari-2008], namely Distributed 
Generation (DG) [Morais-2010a], storage units, Electrical Vehicles (EV) with gridable 
capability (V2G) [Sousa-2011, Luo-2012] and Demand Response (DR) [Schisler-2008, 
Faria-2011]. The introduction of this kind of resources in the distribution systems requires 
new management and new operation methods because the methodologies currently used 
are not able to deal with the challenges resulting from the new paradigm in distribution 
systems operation. In this way, a wide variety of resources may be useful to enable a more 
efficient resources’ management by the ISO, DSO and /or Virtual Power Players (VPP) in the 
demand supply. Moreover, the DER may be useful at the AS provision level. That is, DER 
may participate at a controlled cost in specific conditions, like when there is surplus or 
shortage generation in the power system balance. 
VPPs that aggregate a set of resources in a given network zone, including DG based 
on renewable sources, storage systems, DR and EV, are very relevant players that allow 
midsize, small and micro players to act in a competitive environment of energy and AS 
markets [Pinto-2011a, Vale-2010]. 
The VPP will play a major role in the context of SG, aggregating a set of resources 
with the objective of maximizing their value and the aggregated players’ profit. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the VPP concept and its possible services from a technical and a 
market standpoint. A variety of DER dispersed throughout the distribution network is 
combined via communication networks by an aggregator within the framework of a VPP. A 
set of services can be provided comprising the participation on electricity markets, as well 
as the AS provision. 
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Figure 1.2 – The VPP concept from a technical and market standpoint [Morais-2010b]. 
In the new paradigm of power systems operation, ISO will consider the existence of 
VPPs able to aggregate all kind of small size distributed energy resources, which are unable 
to individually engage themselves on the market. This implies that the AS procurement by 
the VPP is targeted to the distribution systems. Thus, the VPP should consider the 
establishment of complex contracts with the DER in order to ensure reserves levels and 
quality of AS appropriate to the needs of the distribution system. 
In this context, the operation and control of future distribution network and smart 
grid is expected to use the following ancillary services provided by the DSO or by the VPP: 
Frequency Control; Voltage Control; Congestion Management; Optimization of Grid Losses 
and Fault-Ride-Through Capability service [Braun-2007, Buehner-2010]. The Fault-Ride-
Through Capability service is characterized by the use of this kind of resources through the 
VPP management to provide voltage support in case of voltage disturbances in order to 
improve the reliability of supply, resulting in an increase of the power quality levels. 
This dissertation presents a work that addresses some of the AS problems 
mentioned in this subchapter, and it contributes to the continuous development of existing 
and new AS market paradigms. 
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One important point is the development of AS market methodologies, as well as the 
energy and AS joint market based on realistic models. Another important point is the 
development of an innovative methodology to solve the problem of network congestion 
caused by the joint market approach. The inclusion of AS procurement by regions of the 
network is other important approach to solve the network congestion and improve the 
system reliability. 
A main contribution of the work lies on the distribution network AS management by 
a VPP, considering a large penetration of DER. The approach includes complex contracts 
between the VPP and the DER so that these resources may participate in local AS 
management, as well as in AS market. 
The inclusion of the proposed and implemented methodologies in the MASCEM 
simulator is a additional contribution of the work. 
Another benefit of the work is the inclusion of several perspectives of system 
analysis, namely ISO, TSO, DSO and VPP in order to integrate the SG paradigm with large 
penetration of DER. 
1.2. Objectives 
The present and future of power systems depends heavily on the ability of energy 
and AS markets in dealing with the challenges, which have arisen in a competitive 
environment context. The continuous introduction of DER in the energy market through 
VPPs, as well as the energy policies adopted by each country/region, can result in a 
considerable differentiation of the market functioning for each country. This implies the 
need to conduct a continuous development of AS market methodologies in order to ensure 
the smooth operation of the power system. 
In this context, this dissertation offers a huge contribution in AS market simulation, 
based on models and mechanisms used nowadays by many real markets, as well as the 
introduction of new methodologies on energy and AS joint market simulation. The 
consideration of several perspectives of AS market management (namely, in the ISO, TSO, 
DSO and VPP standpoint) is also a contribution of this dissertation. 
In the context of energy and AS joint market simulation, the specific objectives 
defined for this dissertation were the following: 
 Research, design and development of real AS market and energy and AS joint 
market model; 
 Integration of AS bidding regions mechanism in energy and AS joint market 
in order to improve the system reliability; 
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 Development of a innovative methodology in energy and AS management 
based on the distribution factors, in order to solve network congestion 
problems; 
 Design and development of a distribution network AS management 
methodology considering a large penetration of DER. Inclusion of AS 
management in a DSO and VPP standpoint; 
 Establishment of complex contracts between the VPP and the DER in order to 
DER participate in local AS management, as well as in AS market; 
 Inclusion of all proposed and implemented methodologies in the MASCEM 
market simulator. 
1.3. Related Projects and Publications 
The work developed in the scope of this dissertation partially concerns the objectives 
and results of several projects developed in GECAD – the Knowledge Engineering and 
Decision Support Research Center. The projects are: 
 ViP-DiGEM - VIrtual power Producers and DIstributed Generation trading in 
Energy Markets (PTDC/ENR/72889/2006); 
 ID-MAP - Intelligent Decision Support for Electricity Market Players 
(PTDC/EEA-EEL/099832/2008); 
 FIGURE – Flexible and Intelligent Grids for Intensive Use of Renewable 
Energy Sources (PTDC/SEN-ENR/099844/2008); 
 IMaDER – Intelligent Short Term Management of Distributed Energy 
Resources in a Multi-Player Competitive Environment (PTDC/SEN-
ENR/122174/2010). 
The developed work has resulted in several scientific papers, some of which have 
already been published, accepted for publication and/or are under revision. The following 
should be referred: 
 Tiago Soares, Hugo Morais, Bruno Canizes, Zita Vale, “Energy and Ancillary 
Services Joint Market Simulation”, EEM11 - 8th International Conference on 
the European Energy Market, pp. 262-267, Zagreb, Croatia, 25- 27 May, 
2011. 
 Tiago Soares, Hugo Morais, Pedro Faria, Zita Vale, “Smart Grid Market Using 
Joint Energy and Ancillary Services Bids”, IEEE PowerTech, Grenoble, France, 
16-20 June, 2013. 
 Tiago Soares, Gabriel Santos, Pedro Faria, Tiago Pinto, Zita Vale, Hugo 
Morais, “Integration in MASCEM of the joint Dispatch of Energy and Reserves 
Provided by Generation and Demand Resources”, IEEE ISAP2013 – 17th 
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International Conference on Intelligent Systems Applications to Power 
Systems, Tokyo, Japan, 1-4 July, 2013. 
 Tiago Soares, Hugo Morais, Zita Vale, “Energy and Ancillary Services Joint 
Market Considering Different Bidding Regions” Under revision. 
 Hugo Morais, Tiago Soares, Pedro Faria, Zita Vale, “VPP Energy Resource 
Management in Microgrids Considering Complex Contracts”, Under revision. 
1.4. Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. In addition to the present 
introductory chapter, the structure of this dissertation includes four other chapters which 
are described in the following topics: 
Chapter 2 exposes the design of real markets used in some countries/regions, 
namely BETTA, CAISO, Nord Pool and MIBEL markets. In this context, Day-Ahead Market 
(DAM), Real-Time Market (RTM) and Ancillary Service Market (ASM) are addressed, in order 
to expose and analyze in detail the intrinsic rules of each kind of market in the respective 
country/region. The AS market models adopted by each country are idealized according to 
the particular needs and characteristics of each one. In this way, this chapter comprises a 
good description of the AS market operation in each country, in order to realize the most 
significant differences between the models studied. At the end of the chapter, a concise yet 
well-founded comparison of the ancillary services markets studied is presented. 
Chapter 3 presents an assessment of several problems related to energy and 
ancillary services markets. In that chapter, one can find the theoretical basis for solving the 
optimization problems of the energy and AS joint market. Besides the presentation of the 
models studied based on real markets, a new method for solving the joint market is 
proposed. 
Chapter 4 presents a set of case studies concerning the models presented in the 
previous chapter. The presented case studies are based on real data regarding the AS bids 
submitted to the ancillary service market. The last case study is based on a distribution 
network with high penetration of DER, namely DG, storage units, and DR. The obtained 
results are presented and individually discussed for each problem. 
Chapter 5 presents the most important conclusions that resulted from the work 
developed. Also here, some future work is proposed. 
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2. Markets Overview 
In the last decade, the electricity markets evolved under the concept of liberalization 
in a competitive environment and allowing the evolution of the Power Systems (PS) 
operation [Shahidehpour-2002]. The Electricity markets have as main goal the 
improvement of the electricity service efficiency provided to consumers [Kirschen-1997]. 
Such liberalized markets have a high impact on the actual transmission/distribution 
networks, obtaining a reduction of blackouts and a faster response to replace the electrical 
system promoting economic efficiency [Mannila-2000]. 
This chapter presents the structure of the liberalized market in some 
countries/states/regions considered the most interesting from the point of view of this 
thesis. In this way, the chapter also provides a succinct overview of the functioning of the 
United Kingdom (BETTA /N2EX), California (CAISO), Nordic (Nord pool) and Iberian (MIBEL) 
electricity markets. 
2.1. BETTA / N2EX 
The United Kingdom was one of the first countries to restructure its electricity 
industry. Under the terms of the Electric Act of 1989, the state-owned Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) was divided into the National Grid Company (NGC), responsible 
for transmission, and three generating companies [Heffner-2007]. 
The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) is the current 
British electricity market system, which began operating in April 2005 replacing the 
previous New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) in England and Wales, and the 
separate arrangements that existed in Scotland and the British Grid System Agreement 
(BGSA). The present market model has a single System Operator (SO) – the NGC – and 
includes three separate companies owning broadcasting licenses, in particular, the NGC, 
Scottish Power and the Scottish Hydro. Thus, the NGC has a dual function, the owner of a 
part of the transmission network and the SO function. In this way, the national regulator 
must ensure that the NGC as the SO does not discriminate the other companies owners of 
the remaining part of the transmission network for the NGC benefit [Gomes-2007]. 
BETTA power market is strictly an energy commodity market made up of four 
distinct submarkets. The first one is the forward and future market which accommodates 
long-term bilateral contracts that extend from months to years ahead. The second is a 
short-term bilateral contracts market which consists in day-ahead trading of bilateral 
contracts. The third is a balancing mechanism which is the UK real-time market and finally 
the fourth submarket is a small imbalance market which contemplates the settlement of 
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cash flows arising from the balancing process. BETTA market structure and its respective 
stages are represented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 – BETTA market structure overview [NGET-2012a]. 
Currently, over 90% of the wholesale electricity market is bought and sold by 
bilateral contracts between buyers and sellers in over-the-counter markets or in power 
exchanges such as the N2EX. The N2EX is the name of the market for United Kingdom 
energy contracts operated by NASDAQ OMX Commodities and Nord Pool Spot. The NASDAQ 
OMX Clearing is the authorized clearinghouse of the N2EX market [N2EX-2012]. The market 
was launched in January 12th 2010 and comprehends the United Kingdom physical power 
market solution, including technical trading and clearing, a regulatory framework, as well as 
the clearing market procedures and ELEXON approvals of clearinghouse requirements. 
ELEXON is the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) Company established under the 
provisions of the BSC. ELEXON establishes the rules and governance arrangements for 
electricity balancing and settlement in UK and also is responsible for ensuring its proper, 
effective and efficient implementation [NGET-2012a].  In N2EX spot market, the physical 
market is jointly operated by Nord Pool Spot and NASDAQ OMX Commodities, while the 
futures market is operated by NASDAQ OMX Commodities. The N2EX power market can be 
divided into three submarkets [N2EX-2012]: 
 The spot market – A continuous market for half-hour contracts, 1-hour 
contracts, 2-hour blocks and 4-hour blocks, overnight, block 3+4, peak, off-
peak, extended peak and base; 
 The prompt market – A prompt market for physically delivered power 
providing 4-hour blocks, overnight, block 3+4, peak, off-peak, extended peak 
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and base, weekend and weekly contracts for peak and base load. Identical 
contracts in the prompt and spot markets will be moved from the prompt 
market to the spot market at the closing of the prompt market at 07 p.m. on 
Fridays or two days prior to the beginning of the delivery period to avoid 
overlapping contracts; 
 The Day Ahead Market – A day-ahead spot market auction for physically 
delivered power. 
2.1.1. Forward and Futures Contract Markets 
The forward and futures contract markets (see Figure 2.1) consist of bilateral 
contracts markets for firm delivery of electricity which operates from a year or more ahead 
the real-time up to 24 hours ahead of the delivery. The markets provide the opportunity for 
a seller and buyer to enter into contracts to deliver or take delivery, of a given quantity of 
electricity for an agreed price at a specified day and time. The forward and futures contract 
market is intended to reflect the electricity trading over extended periods and it represents 
the majority of trading volumes. Although the market operates typically up to a year ahead 
of real time, trading is possible up to one hour ahead of the delivery (“the gate closure”) 
[Heffner-2007, NGET-2012a]. 
2.1.2. Short-term Bilateral Markets 
The Power Exchanges can operate over similar Forward and Futures contract 
markets timescales, however trading tends to be concentrated in the last 24 hours as 
shown in Figure 2.1. The markets can be fit to the form of exchanges in which participants 
trade a series of standardized blocks of electricity. The power exchanges enable sellers and 
buyers to fine-tune their rolling half-hour trade contract positions as their own demand and 
supply requirements firm up. The markets are firm bilateral markets and participation is 
optional. One or more published reference prices are available to reflect trading in power 
exchanges [Heffner-2007, NGET-2012a]. 
2.1.3. Balancing Mechanism 
The Balancing Mechanism operates from Gate Closure through real-time (as can be 
seen in Figure 2.1) and is managed by the NGC. It was created to ensure that supply and 
demand can be continuously matched or balanced in real-time. The mechanism is operated 
with the SO acting as the sole counter party to all transactions. Participation in the 
balancing mechanism is optional and involves submitting offers and/or bids. This 
mechanism operates on a “pay as bid” basis. NGC purchase offers, bids, ancillary services 
and other balancing services to match supply and demand, to resolve transmission 
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constraints and thereby balance the system. As part of this process, NGC must ensure that 
the system is run within operational standards and limits. In order to ensure that the 
security of supply is effectively and efficiently maintained, the NGC is able to assess the 
physical position of market participants. Therefore, all market participants are required to 
inform NGC of their planned net physical flows to the system. Initial Physical Notifications 
(IPN) are submitted at 11 a.m. of the day-ahead process. These are continually updated 
until the Gate Closure when they become the Final Physical Notifications (FPN) [Heffner-
2007, NGET-2012a]. 
The balancing services include Ancillary Services (AS), offers and bids made in the 
balancing mechanism, and other services available to the NGC which can be used to assist 
it in the transmission system operation in accordance with the Electricity Act 1989. 
2.1.3.1. Ancillary Services 
Ancillary Services are part of the Balancing Mechanism and are procured from the 
authorized electricity operators, who own and operate generators, and other commercial 
entities, generally load customers or aggregators with backup generators and demand 
response resources. 
According to [Heffner-2007, NETS-2011, NGET-2012a, NGET-2012b], the AS that 
are procured by the NGC are the Frequency Response, Regulating Reserve, Fast Reserve, 
Standing Reserve, Warming Reserve and Hot Standby Reserve. 
 Frequency Response – System Frequency is determined by the balance 
between aggregate system demand and total generation in real-time. 
Frequency falls when the demand is greater than the generation and rises 
when the generation is greater than the demand. Frequency Response is the 
first AS used to compensate system frequency deviations. This service 
operates in real-time in a response time between 1 and 30 seconds. Basically 
there are two types of frequency response: the Dynamic Frequency Response 
which is a continuously provided service used to manage the normal second 
by second changes on the system, and Non-Dynamic Frequency Response 
which is usually a discrete service triggered at a defined frequency deviation; 
 Regulating Reserves – are provided by generation units, controlled by the 
system operator that can increase or decrease the generators power output 
on a second-by-second basis; 
 Fast Reserve – provides the rapid and reliable delivery of active power 
through an increased output from generation or a reduction in consumption 
from demand sources, by receiving an electronic dispatch instruction from 
NGC. This service can be supplied by generators and loads, if they meet the 
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following technical requirements: have the capability to delivery within 2 
minutes of instruction; have the delivery rate greater than or equal to 25 
MW/minute; be able to hold output for at least 15 minutes; deliver minimum 
50MW for a single instructable unit or aggregation of more than one unit; 
 Standing Reserve currently defined by the National Grid as “Short Term 
Operating Reserve” – consists in extra power in the form of either generation 
or demand to deal with actual demand being greater than forecast demand or 
generation less than forecast due to plant breakdowns. This requirement is 
met from synchronized and non-synchronized sources. The service provider 
must be able to: offer a minimum of 3MW or more of generation or steady 
demand reduction; deliver full MW within 240 minutes or less from receiving 
instructions from the National Grid; provide full MW for at least 2 hours when 
instructed; have a recovery period after provision of reserve of no more than 
20 hours; be able to provide the service at least 3 times a week. This service 
contemplates two forms of payment: the Availability Payments which service 
providers are paid to make their unit/site available for the service within an 
availability window, and the Utilization Payments which the service providers 
are paid for the energy delivered as instructed by the National Grid, in which 
is included the energy delivered in ramping up to and down from the 
contracted MW level; 
 Balancing Mechanism Start-Up Service – consists of a mechanism which 
allows NGC to access generation in the balancing mechanism that otherwise 
is not planned to run. The service replaces the Warming and Hot Standby 
services. 
o Warming Reserve – This service was established with the objective of 
allowing the NCG to access generation thermal plants that would not 
be available in the balancing mechanism because of their slow cold 
startup time. The main goal of this kind of reserve is to maintain an 
adequate operating margin as contingent reserves. The NCG offers 
“Warming” contractual arrangements to generators to facilitate their 
willingness to provide “energy readiness” capabilities that can be 
converted into timely energy, synchronized reserves or frequency 
response services. Load customers are also allowed to provide this 
service; 
o Hot standby Reserve – are required under certain conditions and 
useful when it is necessary to hold some generation in a “state of 
readiness” to generate at short term. Under these circumstances, fuel 
will be used or energy will be taken to maintain this “state of 
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readiness” capability so that it can be converted into timely energy, 
synchronized reserves or frequency response services. The main 
technical requirements that a generator must fulfill to participate in 
this service are the ability to take on warmth to reduce the time taken 
to synchronize within Balancing Mechanism timescales, and be able to 
maintain such a state of readiness to synchronize for an agreed period 
of time. 
Briefly, the ancillary services system under the Grid Code [NETS-2011, NGET-2012b] 
can be divided into three distinct categories presented below. “Part1 System AS” are those 
AS which are required for system reasons and which must be provided by users in 
accordance with the connection conditions. Frequency Response and Reactive Power are the 
most common AS in this Part1. “Part2 System AS” are those optional services (Fast 
Reserve, black start capability) set out in the Grid Code, which the user has agreed to make 
available, under a bilateral agreement. “Commercial AS” is the third category of AS system 
and are constituted by other optional services (Balancing Mechanism Start-Up service) used 
by the National Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET) in the operation of the total system. 
These optional services are used if these have been agreed to be provided by a player 
under an AS agreement or under a bilateral agreement, with payment being dealt under an 
AS agreement or in the case of externally interconnected system operators or 
interconnector users under any other agreement. 
2.1.3.2. Imbalance Settlement 
The power flows are metered in real-time to determine the actual quantities of 
electricity produced and consumed at each location. The volumes of any imbalance between 
participants contractual positions and the actual physical flow is then determined. 
Imbalance volumes are settled at System Buy Price (SBP) when the measured 
energy is less than the energy traded. On the other hand, the imbalance volumes are 
settled at System Sell Price (SSP) when the measured energy is higher than the energy 
traded [Heffner-2007, NGET-2012a]. 
2.2. CAISO 
The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) is a non-profit organization 
subject to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulation. Throughout its 
existence, the original design of the California market has been continuously subject to a 
process of evaluation and restructuring in order to be improved. The design of the California 
market is a system that integrates four processes related to a Pre-Market, Day-Ahead 
Market (DAM), Real-Time Market (RTM), and a Post-Market based on nodal marginal pricing 
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[CAISO-2010]. The Pre-Market consists in the process of several activities in preparation for 
the DAM. Some of the key activities are related to annual Congestion Revenue Rights 
(CRRs) and to the update, test and release of the full network model, which contains all the 
intrinsic characteristics of the network. The activities of the Pre-Market and its 
characteristics are fully discussed in section 2.2.1. The DAM corresponds to a system which 
includes information of the transmission network allowing the CAISO to adjust the 
production and load programs, as well as imports and exports, alleviating any congestion of 
the transmission network, and ensuring their reliability. This process produces marginal 
prices for electricity at each node of the transmission network. The CAISO can assess 
whether the DAM program includes sufficient resources related production, to meet the 
forecast consumption for the next day and if inadequate, may dispatch other units. The 
Ancillary Services market runs simultaneously with the congestion management and the 
DAM process to obtain the operating reserves and required regulation [CAISO-2011a, 
CAISO-2011b]. The DAM is described in greater detail in section 2.2.2. The RTM runs every 
five minutes through a Real-Time Economic Dispatch (RTED) program including security 
constraints. This process determines the resources dispatch necessary to meet the 
mechanisms of real-time operation. In this market the nodal marginal energy prices are 
determined, which are paid to resources that generate energy. These prices can be used to 
calculate zonal prices for large geographical areas and paid by consumers covered entities 
[CAISO-2011a, CAISO-2011b]. In section 2.2.3 is approached with greater emphasis the 
RTM. The Validation of energy production and demand, as well as the LMP price correction 
are activities related to procedures of the Post-Market, presented and explained in section 
2.2.5. 
Figure 2.2 presents a high level description of the DAM and RTM including market 
bidding timelines and primary activities discussed in section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. 
2.2.1. Pre-Market 
The Pre-Market includes various activities essential for the preparation of the DAM. 
The main activities are described as follows: the annual CRRs are financial instruments that 
may be used by their holders to offset the possible congestion charges that may arise in the 
DAM for energy. This process normally occurs TY-120 (Trading Year-120 days) days before 
the start of the current year and is settled based on the marginal cost of the congestion 
component of Locational Marginal Price (LMPs) from the Integrated Forward Market (IFM) 
[CAISO-2011a]. The full network model is reviewed, updated and tested every three weeks 
and consists in a representation of WECC (Western Electricity Coordinating Council) network 
model including the CAISO balancing authority area that enables the CAISO to produce a 
base market model to use as the basis for formulating the individual market models. 
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Figure 2.2 – CAISO market timeline overview [CAISO-2011a]. 
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The full network model is used to conduct power flow analysis to manage 
transmission constraints for the optimization of each of the CAISO markets [CAISO-2011b]. 
The opening of the DAM occurs in the TD-7 (Trading Day-7 days) days, in which all DAM 
bids are accepted to participate in the DAM market. The pre-market ends in TD-1 until 10 
a.m., in which all proposals are validated and published [CAISO-2011a]. The illustration of 
the pre-market process is shown in Figure 2.2. 
2.2.2. Day-Ahead Market 
The DAM design includes a system-wide optimization of resources which considers a 
large portion of supply necessary to meet the demand which has been self-scheduled as 
price-takers so that it is automatically scheduled in the DAM. The marginal supply needed 
to meet the demand is provided by resources that are bid into and scheduled through the 
market software [CAISO-2010]. This software optimizes the unit commitment and 
scheduling over a 24 hour period using a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) algorithm with 
the objective of minimizing the total bid costs of resources committed and scheduled by the 
market software. In this optimization the generation units may submit start-up costs, 
minimum load costs and bids for energy above minimum operating levels. If a unit is 
started up or scheduled at minimum load during some hours of a day through the DAM, the 
unit is eligible for a bid cost recovery payment to ensure that it recovers the full cost of its 
start-up and minimum load costs, plus any energy bids that are dispatched. Furthermore, 
the market design also considers the co-optimization of energy and AS from resources that 
can provide both of these products, as well as the possibility of the AS cascade optimization 
which allows the substitution of the AS higher quality for the AS lower quality reserves if 
this is a more economic way to meet the minimum requirements for each ancillary service 
[CAISO-2011c]. For example, the regulation up may be procured in place of spinning 
reserve and/or non-spinning reserve, as well as the spinning reserve in place of non-
spinning reserve, but never the opposite. 
The Day-Ahead Market consists in several functions performed in sequence that 
determine the hourly Market Clearing Price (MCP) for energy and AS including physical and 
“virtual bids” (virtual bid is a bid submitted in the DAM which represents a commitment to 
receive revenues for energy at the LMP in the DAM and to make payments), as well as the 
incremental procurement in Residual Unit Commitment (RUC), while also determining 
Reliability Must-Run (RMR) dispatch levels to meet local reliability requirements and 
mitigating bids that may be in excess of local market power mitigation limits. In order to 
get the best day-ahead schedule at the lowest cost ensuring local reliability needs, these 
processes are co-optimized [CAISO-2011a, CAISO-2011b]. 
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The Market Power Mitigation & Reliability Requirements Determination (MPM-RRD) is 
the first market process in the DAM, which consists of two combined processes that run 
simultaneously, the MPM and the RRD [CAISO-2011a]. The MPM function consists of a test 
to determine which bids are subject to mitigation for local market power based on criteria 
pre-specified by the CAISO. On the other hand, the RRD function determines the minimal 
and most efficient schedule of the RMR generation to address local reliability in meeting the 
CAISO forecast of CAISO demand for the next trading day, and to mitigate the submitted 
energy bids from RMR units if they are called to operate under a RMR contract [CAISO-
2011a, CAISO-2011b]. 
The second market process in the DAM is the IFM that is a market for trading 
physical and virtual energy and AS for each trading hour of the next trading day [CAISO-
2011a]. In accordance to [CAISO-2011b], the integrated forward market performs unit 
commitment and congestion management clears mitigated or unmitigated bids cleared in 
the first process, as well as bids that were not cleared in the first process against bid-in 
demand, taking into account transmission limits and honoring technical and inter-temporal 
operating constraints, such as minimum run times and procures AS to meet one hundred 
percent of the CAISO forecast of CAISO demand requirements. In the IFM is used a Security 
Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) algorithm that optimizes start-up costs, minimum 
load costs, transition costs and energy bids along with any bids for AS as well as self-
schedules submitted by scheduling coordinators. 
The RUC is the last market process in the DAM, which consists in a reliability function 
for committing resources and procuring RUC capacity not scheduled in the IFM. RUC 
capacity is procured in order to meet the difference between the CAISO forecast of CAISO 
demand and the demand scheduled in the IFM, for each trading hour of the trading day 
[CAISO-2011a]. In other words, the RUC process is designed to allow the CAISO to procure 
any additional unloaded capacity necessary to ensure that all projected energy 
requirements can be met in real time [CAISO-2010, CAISO-2011c]. This RUC capacity is 
selected by a SCUC optimization similarly to the one used in the IFM, adjusted to help 
ensuring the deliverability of the energy from the RUC capacity. Furthermore, RUC 
anticipates supply and demand over a longer look-ahead time period (default to 72 hours 
but it can be up to 168 hours, compared to 24 hours in the IFM). This allows RUC issue 
advisory commitment instructions for extremely long-start resources (example of traditional 
thermal power plants) which may not be considered in the IFM due to their long-start up 
times. In this way, the RUC objective is to ensure sufficient physical capacity that is 
available and committed at least cost to meet the adjusted CAISO forecast of CAISO 
demand for each hour of the next trading day, subject to transmission and resource 
operating constraints [CAISO-2011a, CAISO-2011b]. 
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The prices resulting from these processes are used for the DAM settlement. The 
detailed DAM timeline is shown in Figure 2.3, showing the execution of the main market 
application functions (MPM-RRD, IFM and RUC). 
 
Figure 2.3 – Day-ahead CAISO market timeline [CAISO-2011a]. 
2.2.3. Real-Time Market 
The RTM is a spot market to procure energy and AS, and manage congestion in the 
real-time after all the other processes of the DAM have run. This market procures energy to 
balance instantaneous demand, reduce supply if demand falls, offer ancillary services as 
needed and in extreme conditions, curtail demand. The RTM market opens at 1:00 p.m. of 
the day before the trading day and closes 75 minutes before the start of the trading hour. 
The results of the RTM are published about 45 minutes before the start of the trading hour 
[CAISO-2011b]. The day-ahead schedules form the basis of energy used in real-time along 
with day-ahead bids and newly submitted real-time bids. The market subjects bids to 
mitigation tests and the Hour-Ahead Scheduling Process (HASP), which produces schedules 
for energy and ancillary services based on submitted bids. It produces ancillary services 
awards, and financially binding intertie schedules [CAISO-2011a]. The HASP is the hour-
ahead process during the real-time which includes a special hourly run of the Real-Time 
Unit Commitment (RTUC). The HASP is also one of the component processes of the RTM, 
and combines provisions for the CAISO to issue hourly pre-dispatch instructions to system 
resources that submit energy bids to the RTM and for the AS procurement on an hourly 
basis from system resources. Furthermore, the process includes provisions for scheduling 
coordinators to self-schedule changes to their day-ahead schedules and submit bids to 
export energy at scheduling points. The HASP also performs the MPM-RRD procedure with 
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regards to the bids that will be used in the HASP optimization and in RTM processes for the 
same trading hour [CAISO-2010, CAISO-2011c]. 
In this context, the RTM market basically consists in three processes. These 
processes are the RTUC, the Short-Term Unit Commitment (STUC) and the Real-Time 
Dispatch (RTD) [CAISO-2011b]. The RTUC runs every fifteen minutes and uses the SCUC 
optimization to commit fast-start and some short-start units and to procure any necessary 
AS on a fifteen-minute basis. In any given trading hour, the RTUC may commit resources in 
the four to seven subsequent fifteen-minute intervals, depending on when the run occurs 
during the hour. The STUC runs once per hour near the top of the hour and uses the SCUC 
optimization to commit medium-start, short-start and fast-start units to meet the CAISO 
demand forecast. The RTD uses a Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) 
algorithm every five minutes throughout the trading hour to determine optimal dispatch 
instructions to balance supply and demand. 
2.2.4. Ancillary Services Market 
The AS market is performed simultaneously with the congestion management 
process and the DAM to obtain the regulation and operation reserves needs. 
According to [CAISO-2009, CAISO-2010, CAISO-2011a, CAISO-2011b, CAISO-
2011c], the four types of ancillary services that are procured in the DAM and RTM are the 
Regulation Down (RD), Regulation Up (RU), Spinning Reserve (SP) and Non-Spinning 
Reserve (NS). 
 Regulation Down is described as the regulation reserve provided by a 
resource that can decrease its actual operating level in response to a direct 
electronic (AGC – Automatic Generation Control) signal from the CAISO to 
maintain standard frequency in accordance with established reliability 
criteria; 
 Regulation Up is a regulation reserve provided by a resource that can 
increase its actual operating level in response to a direct electronic (AGC) 
signal from the CAISO to maintain standard frequency in accordance with 
established reliability criteria, i.e., the RU must be synchronized and able to 
receive AGC signals, and be able to deliver the AS award within 10 minutes, 
based on the regulating ramp rate of the resource; 
 Spinning Reserve is described as the portion of the unload synchronized 
generating capacity that is immediately responsive to system frequency and 
that is capable of being loaded in ten minutes, and capable of running for at 
least two hours, i.e., the SP must be synchronized, and be able to deliver the 
AS award within 10 minutes; 
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 Non-Spinning Reserve is described as the portion of the generating capacity 
that is capable of being synchronized and ramping to a specified load in ten 
minutes or a load that is capable of being interrupted in ten minutes, i.e., the 
resource must be able to increase the generation or reduce demand as 
quickly as possible to its bid value (MW) reaching the indicated value in 10 
minutes or less after issuance of the instruction. The resource must be 
capable of remaining off-line for at least 2 hours. 
The ISO uses the RU and the RD to maintain system frequency by balancing 
generation and demand. While SP and NS resources, collectively known as operating 
reserves, are used to maintain system frequency stability during emergency operating 
conditions and major unexpected variations of the load. However, when economically 
feasible, the market software will procure more of a higher quality reserve, such as 
regulation, to meet the requirement of a lower quality reserve such as the operating 
reserves [CAISO-2010, CAISO-2011c]. The CAISO has a DR program, which allows loads 
and aggregated loads to participate in the energy and AS market. Through the process for 
participating load program provided by the CAISO, individual and aggregated loads of 1 MW 
and above can provide AS, according to the participating load technical standard [CAISO-
2006, CAISO-2007a]. 
2.2.4.1. Ancillary Service Cascading 
Under the market design, the CAISO, whenever possible, will increase its purchases 
of a specific type of AS that can replace for another AS. By doing so it is expected to reduce 
its total cost of procuring AS while meeting reliability requirements. The substitution can 
only occur with the purchase of bid-in AS, i.e., substitution may not involve self-provided 
AS [CAISO-2011b]. 
 
Figure 2.4 – Ancillary services cascading process. 
In a more detailed view, the cascading process consists in the procurement of 
upward AS by replacing a higher quality AS type to meet the requirement of a lower quality 
AS type, if it is economically optimal to do so in the co-optimization process [CAISO-2009, 
CAISO-2011a]. The hierarchy of evaluating AS types in the cascaded AS procurement in the 
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optimization process follows from the highest to lowest and never the opposite way as 
shown in Figure 2.4, where the RU is considered the highest upward quality reserve and the 
NS is considered the lowest quality reserve [CAISO-2010]. 
2.2.4.2. Ancillary Services Regions 
In order to ensure a proper distribution of AS and reliability of the system, referring 
to potential congestion on internal transmission lines to external markets, the CAISO 
defines several AS regions that can resolve the congestion and keep a secure reliability 
system. 
These AS regions consist in networks zones that are used to explicitly impose 
regional constraints in the procurement of AS. These AS regions are defined as a set of 
nodes. The procurement of resources on each node in the AS region is constrained by a 
lower and upper requirement. AS regional constraints reflect transmission limitations 
between AS regions that restrict the use of AS procured in one AS region to cover outages 
in another AS region and constraints between the regions. To ensure reliability, the AS 
regional constraints secure a minimum AS procurement to increase the probability of 
deliverability of AS. To each region it is established a maximum AS procurement target, so 
that the total AS procurement among RU, SP and NS reflects the current system topology 
and deliverability needs [CAISO-2011a]. 
Currently, in the CAISO there are two AS regions and eight AS sub-regions as shown 
in Figure 2.5. The two AS regions are the Expanded System Region that is defined as the 
entire CAISO balancing authority area plus all system resources at scheduling points at an 
outside boundary of the CAISO, and System Region that is defined as the subset of certified 
resources defined in the Expanded System Region that are located internal to the CAISO. 
 
Figure 2.5 – CAISO ancillary services regions map [CAISO-2011d]. 
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The eight identified AS sub-regions are embedded within either the system region or 
the expanded system region. These AS sub-regions are defined to account for expected 
congestion on the transmission interfaces (internal to the CAISO balancing authority area), 
as well as other system conditions, that may impact the ability of the CAISO to convert AS 
reserves into energy without exacerbating congestion on the paths that are internal to the 
CAISO balancing authority area. The eight AS sub-regions are the South of Path 15 sub-
region, the Expanded South of Path 15 sub-region, the South of Path 26 sub-region, the 
Expanded South of Path 26 sub-region, the North of Path 15 sub-region, the Expanded 
North of Path 15 sub-region, the North of Path 26 sub-region and the Expanded North of 
Path 26 sub-region [CAISO-2011a, CAISO-2011d]. 
Figure 2.5 shows the two AS regions and the eight AS sub-regions which are divided 
into two parts. Part a) refers only to those AS regions which include the internal resources 
of each AS region. Part b) refers to AS regions besides their own internal resources which 
contain system resources at scheduling points at an outside boundary of the CAISO. 
2.2.4.3. Ancillary Services Requirements 
The requirements for AS regions are determined by CAISO in accordance with the 
applicable WECC and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability 
standards and any requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to maintain 
the reliability of the CAISO controlled grid [CAISO-2011b]. In this way, the CAISO may 
establish a minimum and maximum procurement limits for each AS region, for each 
ancillary service, as well for each hour, to ensure regional reliability system. According to 
[CAISO-2011a], CAISO can establishes minimum AS requirements for the expanded system 
region for each AS type, taking into account hydro-thermal supply resource proportions, 
path contingency, path operation transfer capability and largest single contingency. 
Generally, the procurement level requirement of RU is around 350 MW, while the 
procurement level requirement for RD stands at 400 MW. With regards to the SP and NS 
reserve the procurement level is calculated as 7% of peak load of CAISO demand forecast 
for each reserve type in the DAM [CAISO-2011e]. 
2.2.5. Post-Market 
The post-market consist in several activities, which the main activities summarize 
the data validation of energy production and demand, as well as the LMPs price correction 
in which the results may be incorrect. The market validation process can be seen as a two-
phase process [CAISO-2011a]: the first phase correspond to the market validation, which 
consists in the opportunity to validate the market results before they are published to Open 
Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) and CAISO Market Results Interface 
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(CMRI). The Day-Ahead Market allows more time to validate market outcomes before 
publishing results. Thus, CAISO expects that invalid Day-Ahead Market result publication in 
OASIS and CMRI would be unlikely. On the other hand, for the Real-Time Market, the 5-
minute dispatch interval timeline provides CAISO analysis limited opportunity to identify 
and resolve invalid market data or solutions before the publication of the invalid market 
prices. In either cases, when prices are determined to be invalid after they are in OASIS, 
they would be corrected following the price correction process. The price correction process 
is precisely the second phase which is an off-line analysis which occurs after the Market 
results are published in OASIS and sent to Market Participants through the CMRI. The 
purpose of the validation is to identify and correct prices in any periods with error 
conditions or incorrect results. The price validation process ensures that the LMPs used for 
Market Settlement are based on the proper data, and that the market solution accurately 
reflects the power system conditions and CAISO Operator actions that should have been 
considered in the relevant market process. This post-publication market validation process 
is completed within a prescribed window of time following each market. All prices published 
in OASIS or in other sources are subject to potential correction during the prescribed price 
correction window. All prices are considered final after the prescribed price correction 
window has expired. 
2.3. NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe/Nord pool 
The Nordic power market known as Nord Pool before 1 November 2010 it is 
constituted by Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Lithuania. Each of the 
Nordic transmission system operators are owners of Nord Pool Spot AS. In recent years, the 
financial part of Nord Pool was acquired by NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe which is a 
trade name of NASDAQ OMX Oslo ASA, and is authorized as a commodity derivates 
exchange by the Norwegian ministry of finance and supervised by the Norwegian financial 
supervisory authority [NASDAQOMX-2010]. 
NASDAQ OMX Clearing is the trade name of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm AB which is 
authorized and supervised as a multi-asset clearinghouse by the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority in Sweden, as well as authorized to conduct clearing operation in 
Norway by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance [NASDAQOMX-2010]. 
The deal between NASDAQ OMX and Nord Pool ASA does not include Nord Pool Spot 
AS, which will continue physical electricity market trading operations independently 
[NASDAQOMX-2010]. 
The Nord Pool Spot AS essentially consists of two distinct markets – the Elspot which 
is a Day-Ahead Market where power is traded for delivery during the next day, and Elbas 
which is a continuous intraday market for trading power across the Nordic region, Germany 
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and Estonia [NordPool-2012i]. These two markets together have about 370 players from 20 
countries trading in the market, and more than 70% of Nordic power consumption is bought 
on Elspot [NordPool-2012a, NordPool-2012b]. However, there are two other markets 
present in Nord Pool. The Financial market which is used for price hedging and risk 
managing, and the balancing market which is a tool for the Nordic TSO’s to keep balance 
between total generation and consumption of power real-time. Figure 2.6 shows the 
components of Nord Pool markets, as well as the temporal scale of operation of several 
markets. 
 
Figure 2.6 –Nord Pool market timeline overview [NordPool-2012a]. 
2.3.1. Financial Market 
In the financial market are used financial contracts for price hedging and risk 
management which is managed by NASDAQ OMX Commodities. The financial contracts 
could be daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual contracts, which may have a max 
time horizon up to six years. The contracts are negotiated based on the reference price 
provided by Nord Pool Spot. Thus, the system price and sometimes the area price 
determinate by Elspot can be used as reference price to the financial contracts trading. 
Figure 2.7 illustrates how a future financial contract works. In [NordPool-2012e] is 
presented a small example which illustrates the financial contract operation. 
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Figure 2.7 – Nord Pool financial contracts functioning [NordPool-2012e]. 
Assuming that a producer and a retailer sign a future contract with an hedge price of 
65 EUR/MWh for the amount of energy of 4 MWh, and the average system price in the 
month concerned turns out to be 66 EUR/MWh, this implies that the producer pays the 
retailer 1 EUR/MWh * 4 MWh. In the case of the average system price in the month 
concerned turns out to be 63 EUR/MWh, the retailer pays the producer 2 EUR/MWh * 4 
MWh. Therefore, the parties have cleared the contract. Hence, the settlement runs via 
clearing house, which is supervised by NASDAQ OMX Clearing. 
2.3.2. Elspot – Day-Ahead Market 
The Elspot consists in a DAM where power is traded for delivery during the next day. 
The players place their bids, hour by hour, through Nord Pool Spot’s web-based trading 
system (SESAM), which calculation method is based on an application of the social welfare 
criteria in combination with market rules. Figure 2.8 show the daily routines timeline of the 
DAM where players can put their bids up to twelve days ahead, while the Gate Closure for 
the bids with the delivery next day at 12 p.m. When all players have submitted their bids, 
the equilibrium between the aggregated supply and demand curves is established for all 
bidding areas. The system and area prices are calculated and published normally between 
12:30 p.m. and 12:45 p.m. [NordPool-2012a, NordPool-2012c]. 
The Elspot calculates the system price based on the sale and purchase bids 
disregarding the available transmission capacity between the bidding areas in the Nordic 
market. The system price is the Nordic reference price for trading and clearing of most 
financial contracts. The market is divided into several bidding areas. Whereas, the available 
transmission capacity may vary and congest the flow of electrical energy between the 
bidding areas, and thereby different area prices are established [NordPool-2012c]. 
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Figure 2.8 – Elspot timeline [NordPool-2012a]. 
The players have the ability to make their bids through three individual bidding 
mechanisms completely distinct, or may choose to make their bids by combining these 
three mechanisms. In this way, the three bidding mechanisms are described below 
[NordPool-2012h]: 
 Single hourly bid – The player specifies the purchase and/or sales volume for 
each hour and may choose between a price dependent and a price 
independent bid. Once the price for each hour is determined, a comparison 
with a player’s bid for that day establishes the delivery for the player; 
 Block bid – The block bid consists in a specified volume and price for at least 
three consecutive hours. This type of bid mechanism has a particular 
condition in which the block bid must be accepted in its entirety, covering the 
all hours and the volume specified; 
 Flexible hourly bid – is a single hour sales bid where the players specify a 
fixed price and volume without specified the hour. This implies that the bid 
can be dispatched at any time of the day, according to the preference of the 
system operator optimization. 
2.3.2.1. Bidding Areas 
The Nordic power market has adopted a zonal approach to manage the grid 
congestion, thus yielding the market split into several areas. The different bidding areas 
created by the TSOs help indicating constraints in the transmission systems, and ensuring 
that regional market conditions are reflected in the price. 
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Due to congestion in the transmission system, the bidding areas may get different 
prices called area prices. When there are constraints in transmission capacity between two 
bidding areas, the power will always go from the low price area to the high price area. Nord 
Pool Spot calculates a price for each bidding area for each hour of the following day. 
Each participating country in the Nord Pool, through its local TSO, establishes the 
number of bidding areas in which the country is splited. In Nord Pool the number of 
Norwegian bidding areas can vary. Currently, there are five bidding areas. Sweden is 
divided into four bidding areas. Denmark is divided into two areas (Eastern and Western 
Denmark). Finland, Estonia and Lithuania constitute one bidding area each one [NordPool-
2012d, NordPool-2012e]. Figure 2.9 presents the map of the Nord Pool, highlighting the 
constituent countries and their different bidding areas. 
 
Figure 2.9 – Nord pool market areas map [NordPool-2012g]. 
In order to correctly originate the bidding areas, one can know that the negotiation 
process runs approximately in accordance with the following steps [Bjorndal-2001]: 
 The market is cleared based on the supply and demand schedule bids given 
by the market participants without any grid constraints limitations. This 
produces market clear price energy (i.e., the average daily price that 
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disregards congestion in the day-ahead market, that is the reference system 
price for the financial market); 
 In case of the resulting power flows induce transmission capacity problems, 
the nodes are partitioned into areas; 
 Assuming that the market is divided into two defined areas, the area with 
greater supply capacity than the demand is defined as the low-price area, 
whereas the area with more demand than the supply is determined as high-
price area; 
 Grid transmission over the zone-boundary is fixed when curtailed to meet the 
violated capacity limit; 
 The zonal markets are now cleared separately giving one price for each area 
– one area with the low-price and other with the high-price. If the power flow 
resulting from this equilibrium still violates the capacity limit and/or if any 
new limits are violated the process will be repeated again, possibly 
generating additional areas; 
 The revenue of the transmission operator (from capacity charges) is equal to 
the price difference times the transmission across the zone-boundary. 
2.3.2.2. System Price 
The system price is the average daily price that disregards the congestion in the 
DAM. For each hour, the system price is determined by the intersection of the aggregate 
supply and demand curves which are representing all bids and offers of the market. In 
Figure 1 illustrates the symmetrical curve from the market used to set the system price 
[NordPool-2012e, NordPool-2012f]. 
 
Figure 2.10 – System price determination through purchase and sale curves intersection [NordPool-2012f]. 
In this way, the system price is an equilibrium market price without consideration of 
the transmission lines capacity constraints between bidding areas. 
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2.3.2.3. Area Price 
The Area price is the price determined for each bidding area, which is considered the 
lines congestion capacity constraints between the bidding areas. However this price is only 
calculated when the power flow between bidding areas exceed the trading capacity. In this 
case, when the need for transmission exceeds the available transmission capacity, the 
prices are lowered in surplus areas and raised in deficit areas, which results in different area 
prices. The main goal of the assignment of area prices is the ability to relieve grid 
congestion between the bidding areas. 
In what concerns the high price in the deficit area, the players will sell more and 
purchase less while in the surplus area it is the opposite. In the area price calculation the 
transmission capacity between the deficit and the surplus area is used to the maximum. In 
this way, the power flow will go from the surplus areas (lower price) to the deficit area 
(higher price). Thereby, in the deficit area the sale will give a parallel shift of the supply 
curve while in the surplus area the additional purchase will give a parallel shift of the 
demand curve [NordPool-2012e, NordPool-2012f]. 
Following the same principle of system price determination through the intersection 
of the supply and demand curve, Figure 2.11 shows the curve of the area pricing 
determination for cases of high (deficit) and low (surplus) price. 
 
Figure 2.11 – Surplus and deficit area price curves determination [NordPool-2012f]. 
As can be seen in the Figure 2.11, through this process one can find a relatively 
balance between the area price in the surplus area and in the deficit area. Thereby, the 
price is relatively lower in the surplus area and relatively higher in the deficit area. 
In the event that power flow in interties in consecutive periods not exceeding the 
maximum limit of transmission capacity of interties, the market price of the areas are the 
same, so there are no differentiation between areas prices. 
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2.3.3. Elbas – Intraday Market 
Elbas is an intraday market for trading power across the Nordic region, Germany, 
Estonia and Lithuania. Elbas supplements Elspot and helps secure the necessary balance 
between supply and demand in the power market, offering opportunities for risk reduction 
as well as increased profit. 
As it is known, when it approaches the delivery time of energy in real-time, the 
necessary energy forecast is improved to accentuate that the energy forecast traded in DAM 
is not adequate for the obtained forecast in real-time. This is due to significant deviations 
from production and/or consumption. In this context, incidents may take place between the 
closing of Elspot and delivery of the next day. For example, a nuclear power plant may stop 
operating, or winds may cause higher power generation than planned at wind turbine 
plants. Therefore, players through the Elbas can trade volumes close to real-time to bring 
the market back in balance. 
After closing of the Elspot auction (at 2 p.m.), capacities available for Elbas trading 
during the 24 hours of the following day are published. In Elbas, the trading takes place 
every day until one hour before delivery. The prices are set based on a first-come, first-
served principle where lowest sell price and highest buy price come first, regardless of when 
a bid is placed [NordPool-2012a, NordPool-2012i and NordPool-2012j]. 
2.3.4. Balancing Market 
The Balancing power market is a tool for the Nordic TSO's to keep balance between 
total generation and consumption of power in real time. The TSO have the responsibility to 
ensure the demand provision and maintain the transmission grid frequency stable, 
according to the limits for the frequency control. 
The balancing market culminates in the power adjustments within hours of delivery 
of energy, i.e., in this market each TSO negotiates individually with each player in order to 
maintain the system balance. In this way, the TSO acquire Ancillary Services, like regulation 
reserve and other services, necessary for the complement of system balance [NordPool-
2012k]. 
The mechanism of balancing of the Nordic electricity market consists in three steps. 
The planning, regulation and settlement balance, which are defined in agreements between 
the market players (Balance Responsible Parties, BRPs) and the TSOs [Nordel-2008], 
described as follows: 
 The balance planning consists in the obligation of the market players to 
balance their portfolios of production and purchase against consumption and 
sales on hourly basis; 
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 The balance regulation consists in the regulating power by the TSOs to 
continuously maintain the overall balance of the power system. The TSOs use 
physical adjustments to generation or consumption to cover the grid 
imbalances of the players. This regulation is conducted using several kinds of 
ancillary services, some of which are shown in Figure 2.12; 
 The balance settlement consists in TSO calculation of the BRP’s imbalance 
(balance power for production and consumption) and the resulting economic 
settlement. The production and consumption balance power is calculated for 
each hour. The calculations are based on measured data, which TSOs are 
obliged to report. 
Figure 2.12 shows the explained mechanisms, and the resources which contribute to 
power system balance. 
 
 Figure 2.12 – Mechanisms for balancing the power system [Nordel-2008]. 
In this context, the main AS traded are [Kristiansen-2007 and Nordel-2008]: 
 Frequency controlled reserves – consists in reserves which are activated by 
frequency deviations. Usually, this service is divided into two different 
categories. The frequency controlled normal operation reserve, which implies 
that TSO shall keep the frequency between 49.9 and 50.1 Hz. The limit puts a 
requirement on availability of 600 MW for these reserves with a frequency 
response of 6000 MW/Hz; and the frequency controlled disturbance reserve, 
which is used for larger frequency deviations down to 49.5 Hz. In this service 
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the reserve available is 1000 MW and the frequency response is 2500 
MW/Hz; 
 Fast reserves is a AS which are activated manually, and must be able to 
restore the automatic reserve within 15 min; 
 Peak load resources are resources which can be used by the TSO for balance 
regulation. Usually, such peak load resources can take several hours to 
activate in situations when the fast reserve should prove insufficient. A peak 
load arrangement should be an exceptional and temporary solution to 
overcome a critical period. Therefore, the implementation of this service is 
supervised by each TSO, because each country has a set of rules adapted to 
the needs of their respective power system. 
2.4. MIBEL 
The Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL – Mercado Ibérico de la Electricidad) is a 
regional electricity market composed by the countries of Portugal and Spain. This market is 
based on setting of a market for daily delivery of energy to the next day, with a format 
similar to the majority in Europe. This way, the MIBEL consists of three distinct markets, 
The Financial market (known as Forward Market) which is used for price hedging and risk 
management, the Day-Ahead Market where power is traded for delivery during the next 
day, and the intraday market which work as a market adjustment of MIBEL. 
The OMIP (Operador de Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Portuguese pole) is responsible 
for managing the trading operations in the futures market whose underlying asset is 
electricity. The financial market is regulated by OMIclear (Sociedade de Compensação de 
Mercados de Energia) which is the Iberian energy clearing house that manages the 
settlement system. 
The OMIE (Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Spanish pole) is the managing 
entity of the DAM and intraday market, which establishes programs for the sale and 
purchase of electricity for the next day. Thus, the OMIE is responsible for conducting 
assessments of the DAM and intraday market. 
The overall management of the electrical system of each zone is the responsibility of 
the respective TSO, which in addition to its usual features, individually manages its own 
market for ancillary services. Sometimes the DAM and intraday market is divided into two 
zones, each zone corresponding to the respective country. This is due to the limited 
capacity of interconnection between the two zones causes interconnection congestion 
[MIBEL-2009]. 
The Ancillary Services market is operated by the TSO of each country. They have to 
ensure the contract and settlement of AS, to ensure the balance between production and 
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consumption, through efficient and competitive mechanisms. The AS to be contracted in the 
market are complementary services (explained in subsection 2.4.4). These services are 
subject to remuneration and should be contracted based on market mechanisms in a 
competitive environment. The adopted model establishes a implicit separation between the 
complementary ancillary services to which the system uses on a regular basis (secondary 
regulation and regulatory regulation) who are contracted on the basis of asymmetric market 
and those which are needed occasionally (synchronous compensation, black start and 
interruptible service) based on bilateral contracts [MIBEL-2009]. 
Figure 2.13 shows the arrangements for procurement existing in MIBEL. 
 
Figure 2.13 – MIBEL market timeline overview, adapted from [Pereira-2009]. 
2.4.1. Financial Markets 
The financial market of MIBEL is an organized market designed for price hedging and 
risk management, which is managed by OMIP. In this market, there are three types of 
contracts available for trading. The futures contracts which admit physical or financial 
settlement, the Forwards contracts which have physical nature and the swaps contracts 
which are of financial nature. The futures contracts use the DAM market price as a 
reference price, with only financial settlement [MIBEL-2009]. 
2.4.2. Day-Ahead Market 
The Iberian DAM is managed by OMIE and consists of electricity transactions for the 
next day, based on the presentation of purchase and sale offers of electric power carried 
out by the market players. In this market each player can submit between 1 to 25 bids for 
each hour. The bids which players present to the Market Operator (MO) can be simple or 
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complex. However, only the sellers can post simple and complex bids, while the buyers can 
only submit simple bids. Simple bids are economical offers for sale energy, in which for 
each hour the player establish the amount of energy and its price. The complex bids are 
based on simple bids with the introduction of some technical and/or economical conditions, 
as described below [OMIE-2012a]: 
 The indivisibility condition enables to set a minimum operation value, which is 
indicated in the first bid of each hour; 
 Voltage gradient condition allows establish the maximum difference between 
the start hour and end hour power of the unit production, which limits the 
maximum energy to confer on the basis of the meeting the previous and the 
following time, to avoid sudden changes in unit’s production that can not 
technically follow the same; 
 The minimum entries condition consists in the minimal entries in service of a 
unit production per day. The unit production refuse to participate in the 
outcome of the meeting of the day, if not obtained for all of their production 
on an entry exceeding a fixed amount established in euro cents; 
 The scheduled stop condition allows performing a scheduled stop time a 
maximum of three hours, in the case of the unit production has been 
removed by the agreement does not meet the condition required for minimal 
entries in service. Thus, avoiding stop from it program in the last hour of the 
day before to zero in the first hour of the next day, by accepting the first bid 
for the first three hours of it offer as simples bids, with the sole condition that 
the energy is provided descending the first bid of each hour. 
2.4.2.1. Market Development Sequence 
The market has a developmental sequence in which the closing hour of the DAM will 
be at 10 a.m. the day before the delivery date. The market is based on the process of 
meeting supply and demand curves from the bids for sale and purchase. The outcome of 
the meeting of the curves will be published at 11 a.m. 
After the process of meeting the supply and demand curve, between 11 and 14 
hours, with the incorporation of bilateral contracts, one can obtain the daily base operation 
dispatch for each system. In this way, the SO analyze and solve possible technical 
congestion constraints arising from the process of meeting the DAM of the interconnections 
between the two systems and the declaration of bilateral contracts, thus deliver their 
programs viable daily duties. After the process of solving technical constraints in the DAM, 
the market relating to secondary regulation starts. In this market, players offer their 
regulation bids with the respective price, for every hour of the next day. Each bid must 
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meet a pre-established relationship between the up and down reserve. The final viable daily 
dispatch of the DAM is published before the 16 hours and includes the result of the Ancillary 
Services (AS) market regarding to the secondary regulation [MIBEL-2009]. 
 
 
Figure 2.14 – Symmetric market clearing price determination [Pereira-2009]. 
2.4.2.2. Market Splitting 
The Iberian market is treated as a single market when there are no violated 
congestion constraints at the interconnections between the two systems corresponding to 
each country. In certain situations where such constraints are violated, the market is 
separated into two distinct price areas, thereby causing the market splitting. In this regard, 
based on the process of determining the price exposed in subsection 2.4.2.1, the market 
splitting process may result in two different processes for determining the market price 
[MIBEL-2009]: 
 In the situation where the meeting of the supply and demand curves, 
resulting in interconnections power flow which not exceeds the 
interconnection capacity, the market price is unique to the Iberian system, 
since the dispatch has technical and economic viability; 
 In the case of the meeting of supply and demand curves, resulting in 
interconnections power flow which exceeds the interconnection capacity, the 
initial market solution is unfeasible, so the two market areas are dealt with 
separate supply and demand curves appropriated to each area. However, the 
demand curve for the export system is placed as a quantity corresponding to 
the interconnection capacity, while the supply curve for the importing system 
consists of an equivalent amount. The meeting of the curves for each of the 
systems results in different market prices for each market. 
 
Electricity Markets Modeling Considering Complex Contracts and Aggregators 
October 2013  41 
This principle of market splitting areas is identical to the market split mechanism of 
Nordpool. This way, subsection 2.3.2.3 describes the mechanism of the separate market 
areas. 
2.4.3. Intraday Market 
The intraday Iberian market is a adjustments market which provides a match 
between supply and demand more accurate and close to real time than the allowed by the 
DAM, solving thus possible mismatches in successive stages of programming. In intraday 
market, and in order to rectify their previous positions, players can also buy and sell 
energy. 
 
Figure 2.15 – Intraday market structure sessions [MIBEL-2009]. 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of schedules per session and their intrinsic activities 
of the intraday market [OMIE-2012b]. 
Table 2.1 – Intraday market session schedules [OMIE-2012b]. 
 1º Session 2º Session 3º Session 4º Session 5º Session 6º Session 
Opening session 16:00 21:00 01:00 04:00 08:00 12:00 
Closing session 17:45 21:45 01:45 04:45 08:45 12:45 
Coordination 18:30 22:30 02:30 05:30 09:30 13:30 
Reception coordination 
breakdowns program 
19:00 23:00 02:45 05:45 09:45 13:45 
Constraints analysis 19:10 23:10 03:10 06:10 10:10 14:10 
End time 
dispatch publication 
19:20 23:20 03:20 06:20 10:20 14:20 
Planning horizon 
(time periods) 
28 hours 
(21-24) 
24 hours 
(1-24) 
20 hours 
(5-24) 
17 hours 
(8-24) 
13 hours 
(12-24) 
9 hours 
(16-24) 
This market is divided into six sessions, taking place at each crossing of a marginal 
nature between supply and demand curves. The first session includes 28 hours (the last 4 
in day D-1 and the 24 in day D). The sixth covering the last nine hours of the day D. Figure 
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2.15 shows schematically the structure of the intraday market covering all session’s 
constituents of the market [MIBEL-2009 and OMIE-2012b]. 
2.4.4. Ancillary Services Market 
In MIBEL, the Ancillary Services market is separated into two markets, individually 
managed by the TSO of each respective country. 
The AS are divided into two categories [MPGS-2008 and MIBEL-2009]: 
 Mandatory services, which are not paid and which are encompassed the 
voltage regulation, frequency regulation and maintenance of stability; 
 Complementary services, such as static synchronous compensation and the 
reserve, secondary regulation, the interruptible rapid and black start, which 
are remunerated through the AS market or through bilateral contracts. 
Currently, only secondary regulation and regulatory reserve are remunerated in the 
form of competitive market. The other AS can be contracted bilaterally. 
 Additionally, there is the process of solving the technical constraints that mainly 
involves the simulation of the network AC power flow based on economical dispatches 
obtained in several electricity markets. In this way, the process of solving the technical 
constraints consists of three levels, relative to the DAM, intraday market and real-time 
energy delivery managed by the respective TSO. 
In the DAM market, the process of solving technical constraints is separated into two 
distinct phases. The first phase consists in modifying the procurement program by security 
criteria and the second phase consists in the rebalancing of the generation/consumer 
system. To this end, the supply units (large groups of thermal and hydro plants) and 
consumption for pumping present energy and price bids for mobilization and demobilization 
of energy. The players associated with the consumption bids of pumping units are paid by 
using the maximum value between the energy bids value given in the process of solving 
technical constraints and the bids made on the DAM. 
In the event of energy mobilization, the players associated with the generation units 
are remunerated by using the minimum value between the energy bids value given in the 
process of solving technical constraints and the value of bids submitted and not matched at 
the DAM. In case of energy demobilization, selling players are required to pay the energy 
price matched at the DAM. 
In several sessions of intraday market where arise technical constraints, these are 
solved through the elimination of bids that arise, without implying any additional cost to the 
system. The costs resulting for the increase in the market clearing price of intraday market, 
due to the elimination of bids is supported by consumers. 
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Finally, the third level of the process of solving the technical constraints consists in 
the technical constraints detected in real-time which are solved by mobilizing the bids of 
regulation reserve. Every hour, any additional costs of resolution of technical constraints in 
real-time are remunerated around the consumption made at this time, in proportion to its 
consumption in DAM [MPGS-2008, MIBEL-2009 and ERSE-2012]. 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the AS in the Iberian market, is shown 
below the detailed definition of the main AS associated with frequency regulation managed 
by the SO of each area [MPGS-2008 and MIBEL-2009]: 
 The primary regulation is associated with generators statism, which is a 
mandatory AS, unpaid for all generators in service. The power variation 
resulting from its action should be effected within 15 seconds before 
disturbance causing the deviation of frequency below 100 mHz and linearly 
between 15 and 30 seconds to deviations in frequency between 100 and 200 
mHz; 
 The secondary regulation (usually known as Spinning Reserve) is a AS 
remunerated by market mechanisms, and its valuation is composed of two 
parts: the reserve price, valued in accordance with the maximum of the 
marginal prices of secondary regulation reserve to “down” and “up” in hourly; 
and energy of secondary regulation, valued at the price of the last energy bid 
of regulation reserve mobilizes in each hour. The onset of action of the 
secondary regulation should take no longer than 30 seconds and its action 
should be completed and may be supplemented by action the regulation 
reserve (tertiary regulation), no longer than 15 minutes; 
 The tertiary regulation consist in the variation of the maximum power 
generation program that can be carried out in a unit production and/or 
balance area in a maximum time of 15 minutes and can be maintained at 
least for 2 hours in a row. This reserve is an additional service, paid by 
market mechanisms and composed of two parts: minimum reserve of tertiary 
regulation and additional reserve. The minimum tertiary regulation is 
established by the SO for each period, taking as reference the maximum 
losses of production caused directly by the failure of a single element of the 
electrical power system, increased by 2% of expected consumption. The 
additional regulation reserve aims to guarantee the coverage of the 
consumption and operating system where the consumption scheduled by the 
SO exceeds by more than 2%, consumption resulting from the production 
markets and when the forecast generation loss due to successive failures 
and/or delays in the connection or increase of thermal groups is greater than 
the tertiary regulation established. The market players present their 
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regulation reserve bids to up and/or down, between 18 and 21 hours, for 
each period of the next day. 
2.5. Conclusion 
All over the world, electricity restructuring placed several challenges to governments 
and to the companies that are involved in generation, transmission and distribution of 
electrical energy. 
The markets discussed in this section are the result of consequent paradigm shift. In 
this regard, special attention was given to the several models and designs of energy and 
ancillary services markets. 
In this section is presented an overview of ancillary services in different markets, in 
which the Table 2.2 represents a summary of the AS adopted by the real market models 
studied in this chapter. 
Table 2.2 – Ancillary services summary. 
Ancillary 
Services 
BETTA CAISO Nord Pool MIBEL 
Frequency 
Regulation 
Frequency 
Response 
Regulation 
Down Frequency 
Controlled 
Reserve 
Primary 
Regulation 
Regulating 
Reserves 
Regulation Up 
Fast Reserve 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Fast Reserves 
Secondary 
Regulation 
Standing 
Reserve 
Warming 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve Peak load 
resources 
Tertiary 
Regulation Hot standby 
Reserve 
Replacement 
Reserve 
Voltage Control 
Obligatory 
Reactive Power 
AGC Regulation 
Obligatory 
Reactive Power 
AGC Regulation 
Enhanced 
Reactive Power 
Enhanced 
Reactive Power 
Synchronous 
Compensation 
Back-Up 
services 
Black Start Black Start Black Start Black Start 
In Table 2.2 it is possible to identify the differentiation of ancillary services in the 
markets studied. However, to describe each service in detail one can realize that in general 
the frequency control services are divided into three parts. 
When comparing the services identified in the CAISO market with relating to MIBEL, 
one can verify that the Regulation Down and Regulation Up refers to the Primary regulation 
of MIBEL, while Spinning Reserve refers to Secondary Reserve and the services Non-
Spinning Reserve and Replacement Reserve refers to Tertiary Reserve. Although it is 
understood that the markets designs are different, the main services are similar, with some 
changes at the level of response time, duration period, as well as the service settlement 
mechanisms. 
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Besides the AS for the frequency control deeply covered in this chapter, the Table 
2.2 emphasizes other ancillary services, such as services related to voltage control and 
Black Start capacity. 
Voltage control consists in maintaining voltage through injecting or absorbing 
reactive power by means of synchronous or static compensation. 
In BETTA the voltage control is divided into two services – the Obligatory Reactive 
Power service which is the provision of varying reactive power output (at any given output 
the generators may be requested to produce or absorb reactive power to help manage 
system voltages close to its point of connection); and the Enhanced Reactive Power service 
which is the provision of voltage support that exceeds the minimum technical requirement 
of Obligatory Reactive Power service (including synchronous compensation) or reactive 
power capability from any other plant or apparatus which can generate or absorb Reactive 
Power (including Static Compensation equipment) that is not required to provide the 
Obligatory Reactive Power service [NGET-2012a]. 
The Black Start service is the capability of a generating unit to start up without an 
external power supply, called on as a means of restoring supplies following a major failure 
on all or part of the network [EURELECTRIC-2004]. This service is common to all markets, 
and in the vast majority it is traded through bilateral contracts between generation’s units 
and system operators. 
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3. AS Market models 
This chapter provides an overview of the proposed and implemented simulation 
models. Most features of the presented simulation models focuses on characteristics of real 
market models. Some of the models consider innovative methodologies for solving the 
optimization problem, namely the introduction of Bialek topological factors in the scope of 
determination of the impact of Ancillary Services (AS) dispatch in network congestion. Most 
of the models are related to the Independent System Operation (ISO) operation. However, 
it is also proposed a complete model that addresses the market simulation from the 
perspective of a Virtual Power Player (VPP) management. In this way, some particular 
characteristics of the VPP management are considered, including the aggregation of several 
kinds of energy generation technologies, as well as the introduction of complex contracts 
between the VPP and players. 
In this chapter five distinct simulating models are available in the scope of the AS 
market, energy and ancillary services joint market, applied to different levels of an ISO and 
a VPP Operation. 
3.1. Introduction 
The design and development of simulation models and tools for AS simulation are 
essential to allow a proper management of the most varied existing energetic resources. In 
that case, the AS procurement by the ISO/VPP must take into account in its simulation 
model the characteristics inherent in each technology, as well as ensure market 
competitiveness in order to get the best possible management of all resources in a market 
environment. 
In order to simulate complex models of markets, market players (ISO, VPP and 
other players) use tools with the capability of simulating electricity market processes. In 
this way, the simulator must be able to deal with the complex reality of the electricity 
market and its dynamics evolution. In this context, multi-agent simulators are appropriate 
for this kind of problems, because it allows a good flexibility in the electricity markets 
simulation, since agents can have different behaviors and interests of each other [Praça-
2003]. Currently, there are several tools which allow simulating the electricity markets 
operation, each one with its own characteristic, for example: the Simulator for Electric 
Power Industry Agents (SEPIA) is based on a plug and play architecture which allows users 
to easily create simulations involving several machines in a network, or in a single machine, 
using various processing units [Harp-2000]; the Electricity Market Complex Adaptive 
System (EMCAS) is a simulator which uses an agent based approach with agents’ strategies 
based on learning and adaptation for electricity markets [Koritarov-2004]; Power Web is a 
Web-based market simulator which allows several participants to interact from very distinct 
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zones of the globe. It is a rather flexible system that allows the definition of simulations 
with a large set of scenarios and rules [Zimmerman-2004]; the Agent-based Modelling of 
Electricity Systems (AMES) is an open-source computational laboratory for the experimental 
study of wholesale power markets restructured in accordance with U.S. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC)’s market design [Li-2009]. An electricity market simulator 
called MASCEM is being developed in GECAD, and all the developed models in this chapter 
will be implemented in MASCEM. MASCEM is a multi-agent based electricity market 
simulator which is a modeling and simulation tool that has been developed with the purpose 
of studying complex restructured electricity markets operation. It provides market players 
with simulation and decision-support resources, being able to give them competitive 
advantage in the market [Praça-2003].  
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Figure 3.1 – MASCEM architecture in [Pinto-2012]. 
Market players are complex and unique entities, having their very own 
characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting with other players. So, 
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MASCEM was developed as a multi-agent based simulation tool, modeling the complex 
dynamic market players, including their interactions and medium/long-term gathering of 
data and experience. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario 
analysis and optimization techniques to model market agents and to provide them with 
decision-support [Vale-2011]. MASCEM includes several negotiation mechanisms usually 
found in electricity markets. It can simulate several types of markets, namely: pool 
markets, bilateral contracts, balancing markets, forward markets. This implies that each 
agent must decide whether to, and how to, participate in each market type. Figure 3.1 
presents MASCEM global architecture, proposed in [Pinto-2012], with the representation of 
its most important entities and interactions. 
As presented in Figure 3.1, there are several entities involved in negotiations in the 
scope of electricity markets; this multi-agent model represents all the involved entities and 
their relationships. MASCEM multi-agent model includes: a Market Facilitator Agent, Seller 
Agents, Buyer Agents, VPP Agents, VPP Facilitator Agents, a Market Operator Agent and a 
System Operator Agent [Praça-2003, Vale-2011]. In order to develop a more realistic 
simulator it is proposed in this thesis a variety of models for energy and AS negotiation to 
be implemented in MASCEM. 
A key objective of the proposed models in this thesis is to provide a better simulator 
intrinsic ability to simulate energy and AS markets, based on real and current models 
functioning of several markets placed on MASCEM. During the models description, some 
important contributions of this work are present, namely the energy and AS joint market 
simulation, in which is considered the power flow for each utility; the introduction of Bialek 
topological factors in solving the network congestion by considering the AS dispatch in the 
network flow; and the ancillary services dispatch in the scope of a distribution network 
operation with a high penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER). To this end, one 
can use a novel method for solving the problem. In this way, a brief description of the 
characteristics inherent in each proposed simulation model is presented. Table 3.1 
summarizes the market models studied in this chapter. The first column of Table 3.1 
presents the highlights that characterize each model. 
The Ancillary Services Market model consists in the simultaneous optimization of 
ancillary services (Regulation Down (RD), Regulation Up (RU), Spinning Reserve (SP), Non-
Spinning Reserve (NS)). Depending on the real market model, these AS may be classified 
differently, but in general they have very similar characteristics. Therefore, these AS are 
designated by the MIBEL as primary, secondary and tertiary regulation reserves. In the 
scope of the simulation, the model includes the possibility of substitution between services 
designated by AS cascading. Thus, this model illustrates the basic operation of the AS 
market, being used as the reference model for the remaining models presented in this 
section. 
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Table 3.1 – Market models characterization. 
Characteristics 
Model 
Ancillary 
Service Market 
Energy and AS 
joint market 
Joint market 
considering AS 
bidding regions 
Joint market 
considering 
Bialek 
coefficients 
Joint Market 
applied by VPP 
Market model AS market Joint Market Joint Market Joint Market Joint market 
AS cascading 
process 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Network 
operation 
No No AC OPF 
AC OPF with 
Bialek 
topological 
factors 
AC OPF with 
Bialek topological 
factors 
Resource 
management 
goal 
Minimization of 
ISO operation 
costs 
Minimization of 
ISO operation 
costs 
Minimization of 
ISO operation 
costs 
Minimization of 
ISO operation 
costs 
Minimization of 
VPP operation 
costs 
AS bidding 
regions 
No No 
AS bids and 
procurement 
by regions of 
the network  
AS bids and 
procurement by 
regions of the 
network  
AS bids and 
procurement by 
regions of the 
network  
Relaxation 
variables 
Ensured by ISO 
through 
bilateral 
contracts 
Ensured by 
ISO through 
bilateral 
contracts 
Ensured by ISO 
through 
bilateral 
contracts 
Ensured by ISO 
through 
bilateral 
contracts 
Ensured by the 
energy resources 
of other regions, 
including external 
suppliers 
Complex 
Contracts 
No No No No 
Developed five 
types of complex 
contracts 
between players 
and VPP 
 
The Energy and AS Joint Market model is based on a principle of energy and AS joint 
market where seller’s agents can make offers simultaneously for the energy and AS 
markets with a global maximum power generation limit. This model fits to the basic 
principle of the joint market, i.e., the co-optimization of energy and ancillary services 
similar to the implemented in several US electricity markets, such as the CAISO, Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), 
in order to obtain the most efficient cost solutions. 
The Joint Market model considering AS bidding regions is based on the methodology 
of CAISO functioning, which considers the co-optimization of energy and AS, where ancillary 
services are procured by network regions. The ISO establishes the AS regions and its 
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respective requirements. The model is able to simulate a regional AS dispatch. Regions are 
areas of the network, which implies that each region will be assigned a set of network 
nodes. In this model the interties between network regions, follow the same principle of 
constraints applied to interties between countries. 
The Joint Market model considering Bialek coefficients introduces a new methodology 
for energy and AS joint market simulation with consideration of the impact of the dispatch 
of all services in the network power flow. This model has the ability to previously analyze 
congestion that each AS implies in the network, rejecting solutions that may cause network 
congestion. To this end, the model uses the topological factors methodology proposed by 
Janusz Bialek in [Bialek-1997]. With this method it becomes possible to know the amount of 
power that each generator is supplying to loads, as well as the congestion in lines caused 
by each generation unit. 
The Joint Market model applied by VPP considers the methodology referred to the 
previous model applied in the scope of distribution network operation with high penetration 
of DER essentially composed of Distributed Generation (DG), Demand Response (DR) and 
storage units, which can be managed by a VPP, as well as the introduction of complex 
contracts between VPP and the players in the resources scheduling process. 
Related to the VPP management and the players’ goals, a major contribution of this 
work lies in the introduction of complex contracts which establish conditions that guarantee 
competitive benefits for both parties. The terms of these contracts, include the advantage of 
setting clear objectives for generation, remuneration, working time, among others, to 
enable the VPP aggregating the most interesting players to their objectives, as well as the 
players getting best benefits in the aggregation to an particular VPP when compared to act 
alone in the same market or aggregate to other VPPs. 
The design, development and application of these methodologies in the simulation 
model of the energy and AS joint market, leads to a more cohesive, feasible and applicable 
to the simulation of real markets, making these models the main contribution of this work 
to the development of MASCEM. The main goal of MASCEM’s is to be able to simulate as 
many market models and types of players as possible so it can reproduce in a realistic way 
the operation of real electricity markets. 
In this way, the implementation of these models in MASCEM makes this a more 
robust and, at the same time, a more flexible simulator regarding the simulation of 
electricity markets.  
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Figure 3.2 – Updated MASCEM architecture. 
The implementation of the proposed models in the new MASCEM structure will be 
similar to the architecture shown in Figure 3.2, in which the part relating to AS refers to the 
contribution of the work developed in this dissertation for the simulator continuous 
improvement. This enables the MASCEM to be used as a simulation and decision-support 
tool for short/medium term purposes. 
Computational tools used in models implementation 
A detailed description of several tools used in the development of simulation models 
of electricity markets are presented below. These tools are used as the basis of operation of 
the MASCEM market simulator. 
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MASCEM is developed in OAA1 [OAA-2012] framework and in Java Virtual Machine 
1.6.0 [JAVA-2012]. The OAA’s ICL2 is the interface and communication language shared by 
all agents, which allows MASCEM to integrate a variety of software modules [Pinto-2011b]. 
The optimization models to be included in MASCEM to simulate the AS markets are 
developed in General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) which is a high-level modeling 
system for mathematical programming and optimization. It consists of a language compiler 
and a stable of integrated high-performance solvers. GAMS is tailored for complex, large 
scale modeling applications, and allows the user to build large maintainable models that can 
be adapted quickly to new situations [GAMS-2008]. GAMS is specifically designed for 
modeling linear, nonlinear and mixed integer optimization problems. The system is 
especially useful with large, complex problems. A large number of solvers for mathematical 
programming models allow users to solve a huge variety of problems [GAMS-2007]. The 
optimization problems related with the proposed models are solved using DICOPT3, CPLEX4, 
CONOPT5 and LINDOGlobal6 solvers. 
The JAVA agents of MASCEM and the optimization process in GAMS were linked with 
the MATrix LABoratory (MATLAB) which is a powerful software of numeric computation, 
developed in 1978 by Cleve Moler and Jack Little, cofounders of MathWorks7. The main 
characteristic of MATLAB is the use of matrixes as the basic data structure [Graham-2005]. 
MATLAB is a high-level technical computing language with an interactive environment, ideal 
for algorithm development, data visualization, data analysis, and numeric computation. 
MATLAB can be used in a wide range of applications, including signal and image processing, 
communications, control design, test and measurement, financial modeling and analysis, 
and computational biology. Thus, MATLAB is used in several applications in the industry, as 
well as in academic activities, and it has been applied to several problems of science and 
engineering. MATLAB has toolboxes that allow obtaining the solution for several types of 
problems such as the ones related to numerical analysis, data analysis, matrix calculus, and 
signal processing. The user can use the available toolboxes or program functions and 
routines to solve the envisaged problem [MATLAB-2010]. In the scope of this thesis, 
MATLAB is used as a tool for preparation of input data, as well as the organization and 
illustration of the results of the optimization. Although via MATLAB it is possible to perform 
the optimizations of the presented models, GAMS was chosen as optimization tool, because 
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of its advantages in solving optimization problems using deterministic methods compared 
with MATLAB. 
3.2. Ancillary Services Market model 
This section presents a simulation model of a generic AS market, which considers 
the optimization of the most common ancillary services in the liberalized market 
environment (RD, RU, SP and NS). This model is based on a principle of AS market design – 
The Rational Buyer, which is an simultaneous AS auction with downward substitution for the 
different commodities (RU, SP, NS) in order to minimize the cost of the AS procurement 
[Papalexopoulos-2001]. 
3.2.1. Problem Description 
This model is designed to perform the dispatch of the AS market, based on an 
asymmetric pool, considering the four most common AS in the liberalized market 
environment. Regulation Down, Regulation Up, Spinning Reserve and lastly the Non-
Spinning Reserve are the AS simulated in this model. In order to be able to understand the 
presented model, Figure 3.3 presents a flowchart representative of the structure simulation 
model of the operation method of the AS market. 
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Figure 3.3 – AS market diagram. 
The players acting on the market can present their bids for any of the four AS 
previously mentioned, with different capacities and prices for each service. 
 
Electricity Markets Modeling Considering Complex Contracts and Aggregators 
October 2013  57 
The proposed flowchart presented in Figure 3.3 illustrates the essential processes of 
the optimization algorithm of the model. The algorithm is initialized by reading the input 
data relating to bids of each AS and the quantities required by ISO for each ancillary 
service. 
The algorithm is divided into two distinct parts. One of the parts refers to the 
Regulation Down, while the other part of the algorithm is relate to the simultaneously 
simulation of ancillary services (Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning Reserve). 
The optimization process is performed by the optimization tool GAMS, which contains 
several solvers capable of solving the optimization process in multiple ways. 
To the RD service, the next step is to select all offers until the service requirement is 
met. In the case where the amount required energy by ISO for the service is not satisfied, 
the algorithm informs the ISO that the solution is infeasible for this service. 
In case the AS requirement have been satisfied, takes place the establishment of the 
market clearing price based on the last offer obtained in the dispatch of this service, ending 
this part of the algorithm. 
With regards to the second part of the algorithm, the next step in the optimization 
process considers two possibilities depending on the results of the optimization process. If is 
no possible solution, the algorithm informs the ISO that the solution is infeasible. In this 
way, the ISO will have to procure, through other trading methods, resources which may 
provide the remaining amount of power necessary to satisfy the requirement. In case of 
obtaining feasible solutions, the algorithm performs the final process in which presents the 
results of market clearing price of all services, as well as the respective dispatches. 
The presented algorithm has a drawback which is the difficulty of determining all 
possible combinations of all services based on the last bid price corresponding to the market 
clearing price. That is, during the optimization, the model should consider the market 
clearing price which may give a different dispatch and more economic advantage to what is 
determined. Regarding the implemented algorithm, the market clearing price is executed 
and the cost that the ISO has to pay is calculated to each player based on the last bid price 
dispatched. 
3.2.2. Mathematical Formulation 
The proposed problem aims to minimize the market clearing price of the AS market. 
This problem can be perfectly modeled as an optimization problem. The characteristics of 
this problem are complex, yet they leading to the need of using a solver capable of solving 
Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programming (MINLP) model. In this regard, the resolution of the 
problem can result in solutions based on local minima optimums and, in global optimal 
solutions, which is the best possible solution. 
 
Tiago André Teixeira Soares 
58  October 2013 
The objective function in (3.1) is formulated with the aim of minimizing the total cost 
which the ISO has to pay for the AS provided by the players who present their bids in the 
AS market. In case of all participants in each ancillary service market can not satisfy the 
requirement of each service, the relaxation variables are activated in order to meet the 
difference between the required and supported by market players. The ISO procure 
resources capable of satisfying the variable through bilateral contracts. These variables 
allow the AS dispatch to be feasible in cases where market participants fail to meet the AS 
requirements. 
Related to these variables, there is a penalty that increases the system operation 
costs. However, this penalty is not supported by the ISO, but by all players participating in 
the respective service which needed the use of this variable. 
 
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(3.1) 
The power required by each ancillary service which must meet between minimum 
and maximum requirements imposed by the ISO for each service k in each period t, is 
represented by equation (3.2). Equation (3.3) represents the constraint concerning the 
minimum and maximum amount of generation offered by each resource r for service k in 
period t. 
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The Regulation Down constraint is represented by equation (3.4), which establishes 
the dispatch of the resources for this service, in period t. 
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The Regulation Up constraint is represented by equations (3.5) and (3.6). These 
constraints have special nonnegative relaxation variables, which have the principle of 
penalties for infringement the equality of the equation. These variables are useful to help 
the equation to converge in some special cases. In this way, these variables are used for 
cases of failure of generators which do not participate in the market, to ensure the 
continuity of RU service in period t, and in cases where the service requirement is less than 
the minimal amount of power of the bid, resulting in an excess of generation. 
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In this mathematical formulation, the ancillary service cascading is considered. RU 
can be used as SP and/or NS after the RU requirement is met. This AS substitution process 
is possible due to the AS hierarchical nature, which allows the replacement of a high quality 
reserve for a lower quality reserve, but not the reverse. The substitution of RU self-
provisions for SP or NS is not allowed. 
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Equations (3.7) and (3.8) represent the Spinning Reserve constraints which follow 
the same principle of the RU constraints. However, SP can only be used in cascade with 
Non-Spinning reserve for each period t, thus following the ancillary service hierarchical 
nature. 
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 (3.8) 
The Non-Spinning constraint illustrated in equation (3.9), allows RU and SP to 
participate in NS service for each period t. 
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(3.9) 
Equation (3.10) represents the maximum upward capacity limit of resources for the 
AS which need the increase of the power generation, in each resource r for period t. 
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(3.10) 
Through the constraints previously explained, the model is able to determine the 
best possible solution for the AS market. This simulation model can be used for an ISO, TSO 
or a VPP. 
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3.3. Energy and AS Joint Market model 
This section presents a joint market simulation model which was published in 
[Soares-2011]. This proposed model is based on a principle of energy and AS market where 
agents can make offers for a simultaneous energy and AS markets with a global maximum 
energy limit. This joint market model allows the ISO to globally optimize all offers and to 
transfer energy between the energy and the AS market. 
3.3.1. Problem Description 
The model is characterized by designing the joint clearing process of the energy and 
AS market. In this way, the market optimization considers the data relating to the supply 
and demand energy curves, as well as the AS bids. The main goal of this model is to 
combine the energy and AS markets in order to obtain the most economically advantageous 
solution. Figure 3.4 shows the diagram of the simulation model. 
Players’ Bids AS Requirements
Joint Market Model
Energy Demand OffersEnergy Supply Offers
RD Offers RU Offers
SP Offers NS Offers
Maximum Power Capacity
RD Forecast
RU Forecast
SP Forecast
NS Forecast
Market Operator
ISO Optimization
Joint Market Dispatch
Energy and AS Dispatch
Energy Dispatch
RD Dispatch
RU Dispatch
SP Dispatch
NS Dispatch
Market Clearing Price (MCP)
Energy MCP
RD MCP
RU MCP
SP MCP
NS MCP
 
Figure 3.4 – Energy and AS joint market diagram. 
The model results from the establishment of the order the market price of each joint 
market commodity. 
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The optimization process of this model is similar to optimization model presented in 
section 3.2.1. The differences consist in the inclusion of energy service in the optimization 
process, in which the algorithm for energy service is based on symmetric market model. 
This model considers the curve relating to the supply by the generation resources, as well 
as the curve relating to the demand. In this algorithm the intersection curves determine the 
energy market clearing price. The energy market simulation is simultaneously performed 
with the AS market, related to RU, SP and NS services. 
3.3.2. Mathematical Formulation 
The objective function in (3.11) is formulated with the objective of finding the total 
minimal cost taking into account the AS and energy markets bids and rules. This model 
simulates a symmetric pool to the energy market, which gets the market system price 
through the intersection of the aggregate supply and demand curve in which are 
represented all bids and offers of the market. The relaxation variables and their penalties 
are used to guarantee the problem convergence. 
 max max( , , ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 1 1 1
min
   
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(3.11) 
The optimization problem includes the power balance and ancillary service capacity 
requirement constraints. Equation (3.12) refers to the power balance constraint for energy 
service (k=5) in each period t. The balance should consider the selling bids and the buying 
bids, plus the forecasted transmission losses. Since the model does not consider the 
technical constraints of the network, it was decided to allocate an amount of power related 
to forecasted losses. This constraint also includes the loads which do not participate in the 
market – designed by “rigid demand” [Soares-2011]. The rigid demand corresponds to 
consumers, in which their only goal is to be fed, regardless of the market clearing price. 
Usually, it is also referred to as consumer of last resource [Soares-2011]. The ISO must 
ensure the supply of the rigid demand. 
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(3.12) 
The constraint referred to the power required by each ancillary service which must 
meet the minimum and maximum requirements imposed by the ISO for each service k in 
each period t, is the same as presented in the previous model represented by equation 
(3.2). Equations (3.13) and (3.14) represent the constraints concerning the minimum and 
maximum amount of generation offered by each resource r for each service k, (3.13), as 
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well as the minimum and maximum quantity of load, that each buying agent submits for 
the energy market (3.14). 
     
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(3.14) 
The AS methodology constraints are the same as in the previous model. In this 
regard, equations (3.4 to 3.9) are valid for this model. 
Equation (3.15) represents the maximum upward limit of generators in energy and 
ancillary service capacity, for each resource r, in period t. 
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3.4. Joint Market model considering AS bidding regions 
An energy and AS joint market simulation model considering different AS bidding 
regions is shown in this section. The model provides the AS dispatch for each AS region. An 
ancillary services region is a set of network buses, in which resources are capable of 
providing AS. All AS regions contemplates the same ancillary services. 
This model contains a co-optimization of energy and AS and the offers exchange 
between services (RD, RU, SP and NS), based on CAISO market rules with an Alternate 
Current Optimal Power Flow (AC OPF). The proposed method considers a new approach to 
the problem in which the ancillary services and energy service compete for the use of the 
network branches, according to the players’ bids. An advantage of this method over others 
is the use of an AC OPF, in which is considered the active and reactive power flow on the 
network to the dispatch problem of joint market. Another advantage of this model is the AS 
dispatch that is considered for regions of the network. This allows the ISO to have an 
increased safety in AS dispatch, by ensuring in case of fault of a large capacity generator. 
That is why there are ancillary services scenarios which can respond more easily to possible 
events of this kind [Soares-2013]. 
In order to solve the proposed problem is used a mixed-integer non-linear 
programming model. 
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3.4.1. Problem Description 
In a simultaneous energy and AS joint market, the ISO optimizes the use of the 
transmission network by both energy and AS capacity. In CAISO, congestion management 
for AS is performed implicitly through the provision of regional AS requirements. The CAISO 
establishes ten AS regions. Each of these regions is a possible scenario for solving network 
congestion. Typically, all these scenarios are not used at the same time, because in most 
cases of network congestion, the congestions may be solved by strategically combining of 
certain scenarios. However, in certain infrequent events there may be network congestion 
in which it is imperative to use all the available scenarios. One part of these scenarios only 
considers the use of internal resources of the region, while other scenarios consider internal 
resources, as well as the inter-ties between other regions [CAISO-2011a]. 
This model proposes an energy and AS joint market, considering different AS bidding 
regions. The objective of the optimization is to minimize the energy and AS costs subject to 
the network and the resources participant in the market. 
Players’ Bids AS by region
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Figure 3.5 – Energy and AS joint market diagram considering AS bidding regions. 
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The model structure proposed to solve the problem is illustrated in detail in Figure 
3.5. The optimization module has a complex optimization process, which considers all the 
constraints necessary to solve the problem. 
The optimization process of this model is an evolution of the algorithm developed in 
section 3.3. The algorithm has the particularity of involving an AC OPF included in the 
optimization of the energy and AS joint market, where the AS procurement performed by 
the ISO is done by network regions. 
The optimization module solves the problem formulated in the following subsection. 
The results refer to the energy and AS dispatch, as well as the Locational Marginal Price, 
which is obtained in each node for each time period from the optimal commitment and 
scheduling results. 
3.4.2. Mathematical Formulation 
The problem presented considers the mathematical formulation described in this 
section and aims the optimization of available resources in the various aspects of the 
energy and AS joint market. Through this mathematical formulation, the ISO is able to 
optimize the energy and AS procurement simultaneously and to use a MINLP model to solve 
the problem. The formulation allows the cascading of a high quality AS for a lower quality 
one (for example, Regulation Up to Spinning Reserve). The rational procurement behavior 
dictates that such substitution should be allowed and should lead to lower overall 
procurement costs. 
The objective function presented in (3.16) is formulated with the objective of finding 
the total minimal cost considering the co-optimization of energy and AS market offers. To 
ensure the problem convergence, the relaxation variables and their respective penalties are 
used. 
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(3.16) 
Equation (3.17) refers to the active power balance constraint (Kirchhoff’s first law) in 
each bus i, for each period t. 
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Equation (3.18) refers to the reactive power balance constraint for energy service 
(k=5) in each bus i, for each period t. 
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(3.18) 
Bus voltage magnitude and angle limits are represented in equation (3.19). To the 
slack bus, the voltage angle and magnitude are fixed and defined to the user. 
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(3.19) 
The line thermal limits constraint is essential to restrict the power flow that flows in 
each network line and is given by equation (3.20). 
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(3.20) 
The constraint concerning the minimum and maximum amount of active power 
generation offered by each resource for service k is the same as presented in the previous 
model represented by equation (3.13). Moreover, equation (3.21) represents the constraint, 
which considers the minimum and maximum amount of reactive power generation that each 
resource must provide depending on the active power generation supplied by himself for 
energy service (k=5).  The constraint which considers the maximum and minimum quantity 
of load that each buying agent submits is the same as the one presented in the previous 
model, represented by equation (3.14). Equation (3.22) represents the active power 
required by each AS region z that must meet the minimum and maximum requirements 
imposed by the ISO for each AS region z and service k, in each period t. 
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Regulation Down constraint is represented by equation (3.23), which establishes the 
regional dispatch of the generators for this ancillary service (k=1) for each period t. For 
every AS requirement related to a specific region z, both internal resources of the region z, 
as well as external resources of the regions w may participate in this service. 
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(3.23) 
Regional Regulation Up (k=2) constraint is represented by equations (3.24) and 
(3.25). The ancillary service cascading is considered. Relaxation variables are used for 
cases where the generators participants in the market cannot meet the AS requirement, to 
ensure the continuity of RU service in period t. Assuming that the service is dispatched in a 
particular region z, the resources of other regions w of the network can participate in the 
dispatch of region z, since the dispatch of region w is ensured and the resource has the 
capacity to provide in the service of region z without violating the network congestion 
constraints. 
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(3.25) 
Equations (3.26) and (3.27) represent the regional Spinning Reserve (k=3) 
constraints. Following the same constraints in the regional RU service, SP constraints are 
similar with the difference that the SP can only be used in cascade with Non-Spinning 
reserve in each region z, for each period t. 
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Equation (3.28) refers to the constraint of Non-Spinning reserve by regions, which 
allows the RU and SP of the same region to participate in the regional NS service for each 
period t. 
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(3.28) 
The maximum upward limit constraint of resources in ancillary service and energy 
capacity, for each resource r and period t is the same as presented in the previous model 
represented by equation (3.15). 
Equation (3.29) illustrates the constraint in which for each region and ancillary 
service, internal resources of a given region and ancillary service must ensure at least 
percentage factor of the regional AS requirement. This rule is ensured by the variable 
percentage factor of the regional AS requirement. 
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3.5. Joint Market model considering Bialek coefficients 
This section proposes energy and AS joint market simulation model which includes 
the use of an AC OPF to determine the network power flow. The power flow considers all 
services available on the market which may cause network congestion (namely, energy, 
Regulation Up, Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve). In order to simulate the 
congestion that each service imposes on the network, a complex and innovative simulation 
method was developed based on the methodology of topological factors developed by 
Bialek. 
This methodology is crucial for the joint market simulation, as that ensures always a 
technically and economically feasible and viable solution. Many real markets, during the 
initial process of day-ahead market do not proceed to the technical validation of the 
economic dispatch obtained for the energy and AS. Only later the technical validation of the 
dispatch and its respective adjustments is undertaken. The developed methodology 
proceeds simultaneously to the energy and AS dispatch, ensuring the viability of technical 
dispatches. Thus, it is ensured that the simulated dispatches are perfectly feasible. 
The proposed model mechanism and its simulation processes are discussed and 
explained in this section. The proposed model consists essentially in four distinct simulation 
phases. The first corresponds to the energy dispatch and consequent determination of 
Bialek factors. The second, concerns the simultaneous energy and RU dispatch, based on 
generation limits calculated via the topological factors in the previous phase. The third step 
is intended for simultaneous simulation of energy, RU and SP services, considering the 
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factors calculated in the previous phase. Finally, the fourth and last phase claims the joint 
simulation of all services based on simulations of the previous phases. 
3.5.1. Problem Introduction 
In a simultaneous energy and AS joint market, the ISO optimizes the use of the 
transmission network by both energy and AS capacity. This model proposes the use of a 
method to solve the network congestion by establishing the energy and AS dispatch in a 
shared way according to the favorable lines congestion. 
This way, the energy service must have greater importance in the use of line 
capacity of the network, i.e., the power flow related to the energy service should have 
greater influence in the use of network branches, followed by the RU reserve, the SP 
reserve service, and finally the NS reserve service. This hierarchical nature refers to the 
importance that each service has on the network. Therefore, the proposed simulation model 
to solve the network congestion will have to understand and respect the hierarchy of the 
system. 
In this context, the method implemented in the model is based on the proportional 
sharing, which is a method for calculating the sharing that each generator has in the 
network lines. The method satisfies the Kirchhoff’s Current Law. It assumes that the 
network node is a perfect mixer of incoming flows. Moreover, the principle is fair as it treats 
all incoming and outgoing flows in the same way [Bialek-1996, Bialek-1997 and Su-2001]. 
The main principle used to trace the flow of electricity is illustrated in Figure 3.6, in which 
two of the four lines are inflows and the other two lines are outflows. 
 
Figure 3.6 – Proportional sharing principle, adapted from [Bialek-1997]. 
The total power flow through bus i is 40 MW + 60 MW = 100 MW of which 70% is 
supplied by outflows to line i-m and 30% to line i-l. It is assumed that each MW leaving the 
bus contains the same proportion of inflows. Hence the 70 MW outflowing in line i-m 
consists in the following proportions: 
    
         
           
Supplied by line j-i, and 
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Supplied by line k-i. In same direction, the sharing for the line i-l are as follows: 
    
         
           
Supplied by line j-i, and 
    
         
           
Supplied by line k-i. 
The Proportional Sharing principle treats all the incoming and outflowing flows in the 
same way. 
A topological distribution factors for generation and load was proposed in [Bialek-
1997] in order to apply the method at a computer level to facilitate the calculation of the 
sharing factors of generators in network lines and loads. The method determine the 
generators which are supplying a particular load, the amount of each generator is making of 
a transmission/distribution line and what is the contribution of each generator’s to the 
system losses. The method is not limited to incremental changes and is applicable for both 
active and reactive power. This method starts from a power flow solution; the first step of 
the method is to identify the buses reached by the power produced of each generator; then 
it determines the sets of buses supplied by the same generators. Through the proportional 
sharing assumption, it is then possible to calculate the contribution of each generator to the 
loads and flows. 
3.5.2. Problem Description 
The method presented in the previous subsection can be integrated into the 
simulation model of energy and AS joint market in order to prevent congestion problems of 
the lines by limiting the generation capacity of each individual generator at the level of 
energy and AS dispatch. 
The model structure proposed to solve the problem is illustrated in detail in Figure 
3.7. The optimization module has a complex optimization process, which considers all the 
constraints necessary to solve the problem. In the optimization module, the algorithm 
presents a general view of the problem. 
In order to better understand the algorithm implemented, the flowchart illustrating 
the functioning of the algorithm developed to solve the problem is explained step by step. 
The methodology for solving the problem starts by optimizing the energy service (first 
step). This first step consists in the energy resources dispatch for energy service in order to 
get the power flow which flows in the network. After the power flow and generators 
dispatch determination, one can obtain the Bialek topological factors. As described above, 
through the Bialek factors it is possible to obtain the sharing that each generator has in the 
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network power flow, as well as the sharing of each generator has to feed the load (second 
step). This makes it possible to determine the maximum generation that each generator 
can provide for the energy service, ensuring that the energy service dispatch is feasible 
(third step).  
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Figure 3.7 – Energy and AS joint market diagram considering Bialek topological factors. 
Based on the determined limits, one can perform the energy, Regulation Down and 
Regulation Up joint optimization. The RD service, for its particular features, does not cause 
congestion in the network, since it is a service indicated for the reduction of energy 
production and consecutive decrease in the network power flow; the RD service is 
calculated simultaneously with the RU service. Knowing that the contribution that each 
generator can provide for the energy service is limited by the previous step, it ensures that 
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the energy and RU joint optimization do not violate the thermal limitations of the network 
branches. 
In the fifth step, with the data related to the energy and RU dispatch and its power 
flow, the Bialek factors are again calculated. After the conclusion of the Bialek factors 
determination, it is estimated the contributions that each generator has in the network 
power flow for the energy and RU service, i.e., it is determined the maximum generation 
that each generator can provide in the energy and RU joint service optimization (sixth 
step). 
The seventh step is the energy, RU and SP joint optimization. In this optimization 
process, the sum of the energy and RU dispatch for each generator is restricted to the limits 
calculated in the previous step. Besides this constraint, the generators are limited by the 
other constraint determined in the third step of the algorithm (corresponding to the 
maximum limit of each generator production for the energy service). The eighth step 
consists in determining the Bialek factors in the energy, RU and SP joint optimization 
(seventh step). The ninth step is the determination of the sharing that each generator has 
in the network power flow on the energy, RU and SP joint optimization in order to conceive 
the maximum generation limits that each generator can dispatch. 
The tenth step refers to the energy and all ancillary services joint optimization. In 
the simulation process, the maximum limits that each generator can dispatch according to 
previous simulations of energy and ancillary services are considered. This way, this 
optimization includes constraints related to the third, sixth and ninth steps. Thus, the 
dispatch obtained in the previous step reflects the final dispatch of energy and ancillary 
services, being perfectly feasible. 
This model of energy and ancillary services optimization supported by the topological 
methodology developed by Bialek, provides credible simulations for the joint market in what 
is considered real constraints related to the physical characteristics of the transport and 
distribution of electricity. All constraints considered in this model are presented at a very 
detailed level in the next subsection. 
3.5.3. Mathematical Formulation 
The proposed problem formulation considers the energy and AS market simulation in 
a liberalized environment. 
The formulation includes the use of method to identify the contribution of each unit 
generation on the network branches congestion. Based on this method, it is possible to 
simulate each energy and AS dispatch, ensuring that the schedule dispatch is feasible. In 
order to achieve a proper and adequate perception of the implied formulation problem in 
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this section it is exposed the formulation engaging the entire problem discussed in the 
introduction section of the problem. 
The algorithm presented below for the calculation of generators sharing in the active 
power flow of each network branch is based on the example discussed in the introductory 
section of the problem of topological Bialek factors. 
Therefore, the following equations are fundamental for solving the problem. The sum 
of the actual demand of a particular load, plus the allocated part of the total transmission 
loss is referred to as the gross demand. Assuming that   
 
 is an unknown gross nodal power 
flow through node i, and    
 
 is an unkown gross line flow in line i-j, the gross power balance 
equation at node i, when looking at the inflows is defined as [Bialek-1997]: 
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(3.30) 
Where   
  is set of nodes supplying directly the node and     is the generation in 
node i. As    
       
  , the flow     
   can be replaced by     
    
      
 
. If the transmission 
losses are small, it can be assumed that    
    
           , where     is the actual flow from 
node j in line j-i and    is the actual total flow through node j. Under this assumption 
equation (3.30) can be rewritten as presented in equation (3.31) or (3.32): 
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(3.31) 
  
u gross GA P P   
(3.32) 
Where        is the unknown vector of gross nodal flows,    is the vector of nodal 
generations and the distribution matrix. This matrix is sparse and non-symmetric with its 
(i,j) elements equal to: 1 for i=j;           for     
 . If there is   
   then          
      and 
its element is presented in the next equation. This equation shows how i-th gross nodal 
power is supplied from all the generators in the system. 
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The gross outflow in line i-j can be calculated, using the proportional sharing, as 
presented in the equation (3.34). 
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In the equation,   
 is the set of nodes supplied directly from node i and 
     
      
   
       
     . This equation represents the topological generation distribution 
factor that is a portion of generation due to r-th generator that flows in line i-j. 
Standard formulation for preventing congestion on a energy and ancillary 
services basis. 
This algorithm is used to calculate the generator sharing in each network branch. In 
this way, the calculation of the limits necessary to restrict generation of each generator was 
developed as follows: 
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(3.37) 
The equations (3.35), (3.36) and (3.37) refer to the calculation of the limits imposed 
in the simulation model joint market for resources r.          
  is the effective dispatch of 
resource r obtained in the simulation market, for service k in each period t.         
    is the 
maximum capacity of active power in line i-j.     refers to the power flow in line i-j.    
    
 
refers to the sharing of power generated by resource r on the line i-j. 
3.6. Joint Market model applied by VPP 
The continued increase of DER penetration in distribution systems raises the need to 
adopt new market models which considers the particular characteristics of the inherent 
resources in distribution systems.  
In this context, the concept of VPP is important as it allows the aggregation of DER 
(mainly composed of DG, DR and storage units). Therefore, the VPP optimal management 
of its resources may enable small players to participate in the market with low risk related 
to their bids. Thus, the VPPs are able to participate and organize a variety of available 
markets such as the energy and AS markets. 
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The AS applied to the Smart Grid concept, in the scope of the distribution network is 
still a subject under study. However, some authors have theories about AS best suited to be 
traded in the market, as well as the development of new AS suited to a distribution network 
in order to ensure system stability [Braun-2007, Buehner-2010]. 
In this context, this section proposes an energy and AS joint market model which 
considers the several players aggregated by VPPs. This model enables the VPP optimization 
of its resources and the trading between them and the small players. In order to perform 
such trade, complex contracts were designed to allow both players and VPPs to trade 
between them with special conditions established in the contracts. 
3.6.1. Problem Description 
The energy and AS joint market simulation problem in the context of the distribution 
system behaves identically to that established for the transmission system. Thus, any 
methodology developed in this section contemplates the methodology developed in the 
previous model in order to ensure always a viable and feasible solution of the energy and 
AS dispatches. 
The methodology developed in this section includes the bidding of ancillary services 
for regions of the network, based on several resources technologies, in which the DR 
programs and storage charge and discharge bids are included. Besides this, the relaxation 
variables are considered in each region of the distribution system. 
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Figure 3.8 – Energy and AS joint market diagram in distribution systems. 
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Complex contracts are considered in the scope of the energy dispatch, in order to 
enable a greater range of trading between players and the VPP. The architecture of the 
developed model is illustrated in Figure 3.8. The input data module comprises all kinds of 
players bids, the conditions related to complex contracts, technical data relating to the 
distribution network, and AS requirements previously established by the VPP. 
The VPP optimization module is based on the optimization model of section 3.5 with 
the inclusion of constraints related to the model presented in this section. 
The results module illustrates the dispatches of each service inherent to market 
model and its market clearing prices. 
3.6.2. Mathematical Formulation 
The proposed problem formulation considers the use of market aggregator’s agents 
(VPPs) for the management of several type of resource in the network. Through contracts 
between the VPP and the players, the VPP has a total ability to manage the aggregated 
players’ resources, in order to ensure the control and stability of the network. The VPP are 
capable of aggregate all kind of DER, mainly DG based on renewable energy resources, and 
other DER, including DR and storage units. In this way, through the formulation the VPP can 
simulate the management according to its objectives. 
The model allows trading between players and VPPs based on complex contracts 
which may be beneficial for small players that could participate in the market through the 
aggregation of a VPP, and also be beneficial for the VPP to ensure the aggregation of 
players that gives the best benefits in its optimal management. 
The objective function presented in (3.38) has the main goal of minimizing the VPP 
operation costs taking into account several kinds of complex contracts between the VPP and 
the players, while satisfying the consumer needs. The following costs are separated into two 
distinct parts: energy and ancillary services. 
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(3.38) 
Equation (3.39) shows the objective function costs concerning the energy part, in 
which are considered the following costs: DG costs, costs with energy acquisition to 
external suppliers, storage discharge and charge costs, DR program costs for reduction and 
curtailment, costs of Non-Supplied Demand (NSD) and Generation Curtailment Power (GCP) 
costs for DG units. 
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(3.39) 
The objective function costs concerning the ancillary services parts contain some 
differences when compared to the energy part. The costs associated with ancillary services 
are represented in equation (3.40) and they are: DG costs, costs with power acquisition to 
external suppliers, storage discharge and charge costs, DR program costs for reduction and 
curtailment and relaxation variables penalties. 
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(3.40) 
Equation (3.41) refers to the active power balance constraint (Kirchhoff’s first law) in 
each bus i, including ancillary services k, for each period t.  
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(3.41) 
Equation (3.42) refers to the reactive power balance constraint for energy service 
(k=5) in each bus i, for each period t. 
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(3.42) 
Bus voltage magnitude and angle limits are the same as presented in the previous 
model represented by equation (3.19). The line thermal limits constraint is the same as 
presented in the previous model represented by equation (3.20). 
The constraint concerning the minimum and maximum amount of active power 
generation offered by each external supplier for service k is represented on equation (3.43). 
Equation (3.44) concerns the reactive power limits for each supplier. This equation also 
considers the reactive power percentage factor regarding the active power. This implies that 
each resource is related to a generation limit of reactive power, according to its active 
power limit. In the same perspective, equations (3.45) and (3.46) refer to the minimum 
and maximum active and reactive power generation offered by DG units. 
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Equations (3.47) and (3.48) refer to the Direct Load Control (DLC) demand response 
capacities, namely the reduction – DR_A – curtailment – DR_B – programs, respectively. 
The reduction program (DR_A) corresponds to a decrease in the consumption and the 
curtailment program (DR_B) corresponds to the curtailment of the whole consumption of a 
determined load l. For the RD service constraints (3.47) and (3.48) are true whenever the 
maximum limit of each Type of DR is equal to 0. This happens to be considered DR of type 
DLC, which lacks the flexibility to participate in the RD service. 
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(3.48) 
The storage technical limits in each period t are restricted by several distinct 
constraints. These constraints are shown from equation (3.49) to equation (3.61) for all 
services. For services of increased generation (energy, RU, SP and NS) are considered 
constraints from (3.49) to (3.56). For the energy and RD joint balance are considered 
constraints from (3.57) to (3.61). Regarding equation (3.49), it refers to the non-
simultaneity of the storage charge and discharge energy. 
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(3.49) 
The battery balance (energy, RU, SP and NS) is established in equation (3.50) with 
the energy remaining from the previous period and the charge/discharge in the period t for 
each storage unit. 
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(3.50) 
The charge limit for each storage unit considering the battery charge rate is given by 
equation (3.51). 
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(3.51) 
Equation (3.52) indicates the storage charge limit considering the battery balance. 
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The discharge limit for each storage unit considering the battery discharge rate is 
presented in equation (3.53). 
     
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 
     
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(3.53) 
Equation (3.54) shows the storage battery discharge limit considering the battery 
balance. 
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(3.54) 
The maximum battery charge limit for the services of increasing generation is shown 
in equation (3.55). This equation relates the flexibility of the storage units in the AS of 
increase generation (RU, SP and NS) can reduce the charge that acquire in the service 
energy. For this, the sum of the charge storage variable of these ancillary services must not 
exceed the value of the charge variable scheduled in energy service. 
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(3.55) 
The maximum battery discharge limit for the services of increasing generation is 
shown in equation (3.56). 
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(3.56) 
The battery balance for energy and RD is determined in equation (3.57). 
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(3.57) 
Equation (3.58) indicates the storage charge limit considering the energy and RD 
battery balance. 
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Equation (3.59) concerns the storage battery discharge limit considering the energy 
and RD battery balance. 
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The maximum battery charge limit for the energy and RD is shown in equation 
(3.60). 
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(3.60) 
The last constraints on the storage units, concerns to the maximum battery 
discharge limit for the energy and RD is shown in equation (3.61). This equation relates the 
flexibility of the storage units in the RD service can reduce the discharge that was 
scheduled in the service energy. For this, discharge storage variable of RD service must not 
exceed the value of the discharge variable scheduled in energy service. 
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(3.61) 
Equation (3.62) relates to each AS requirement in a given region z, in period t. In 
order to be able to simulate the AS in a network and obtain the corresponding power flow, it 
is necessary to locate where is the AS requirement bus. Towards the AS requirement be 
divided by network regions, it was established that each load l belonging to a particular 
region z, composes part of the AS requirement of the region z. In this way, the sum of each 
AS requirement of each load l, must match the regional requisite set by the SO. Thus, it 
becomes possible to determine the power flow for each ancillary service. 
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(3.62) 
Equation (3.63) refers to the minimum amount that each load l can consume in each 
AS, i.e., is the maximum individual requirement of ancillary services in period t. 
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(3.63) 
The constraint that concerns the balance of each AS is equation (3.64). For all AS 
region, the sum of resources relating to external suppliers, DG and DR is sufficient to meet 
the requirement of all regional ancillary service, in period t. 
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(3.64) 
Through equation (3.65) it is guaranteed that internal resources of a given region 
must ensure at least a percentage factor of the AS requirement of the region. This rule is 
ensured by the variable percentage factor. All resources of the region z must be able to 
guarantee at least half of the requirement that region. However, if this is infeasible, the 
service can be purchased through the relaxation variables with a respective economic 
penalty. 
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(3.65) 
Typically, the RLXD variable corresponds to the relaxation variable of the problem 
used by the VPP in order to make the dispatch simulation always feasible. This variable 
corresponds to a certain amount of power which is provided directly by the VPP, which may 
be available through bilateral contracts with large power plants. In order to simulate the 
physical location of that variable it is proposed that this variable comprises the network 
resources allocated in a region w different from the problematic region z, since the thermal 
constraints of the lines allows that. In equation (3.66) the methodology adopted is 
implemented. 
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(3.66) 
Equation (3.67) represents the maximum upward limit of generation of external 
suppliers and DG units, related to energy and ancillary services. 
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Considering that the VPP can establish contracts with the owners of the resources 
and consumers installed in the network, several kinds of contracts are presented in 
equation (3.68) to equation (3.72). 
The minimum generation in the time horizon contract is represented in equation 
(3.68). This contract concerns the minimum limit of energy (considering energy, RU, SP and 
NS services) produced by the generator in a 24-hour period, i.e., the contract ensures that 
the producer, if dispatched, produces at least the minimum limit defined a priori. 
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(3.68) 
The minimum remuneration contract in the time horizon imposes a minimum limit of 
remuneration for the whole 24 hours, ensuring a minimum remuneration, regardless the 
energy produced in each hourly period, considering the energy, RU, SP and NS services. 
This contract is represented by equation (3.69). 
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(3.69) 
The variation of generation contract between periods refers to the gradient of 
generation in each period. This contract sets for each period of one hour a limit for the 
increase/decrease power generation according to the previous period. This contract 
considers the energy, RU, SP and NS services and it is represented by equation (3.70). 
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(3.70) 
The contract’s minimum of periods t functioning in time horizon T refers to a 
minimum period of generation during the overall period of 24 hours. Producers with this 
type of contract are dispatched for a number of consecutive periods; thereby, they can 
reduce start-up costs. This contract is represented by equation (3.71) and it is considered 
for energy, RU, SP and NS services. 
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(3.71) 
The maximum entries in service contract consist in a maximum number of entries in 
service throughout the 24 hours. This contract is applied to the energy, RU, SP and NS 
services. In this context, the producer is forced to ensure stability from generation to avoid 
being excluded from the selection of production for the period established. This contract is 
represented by equation (3.72). 
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(3.72) 
The constraints presented in equations (3.73) and (3.74) represent the limits of each 
resource obtained through Bialek factors. At this stage, the limits considered relate to the 
calculation of sharing that each resource has on the network, considering only the energy 
dispatch and its network power flow. Through the limits set it is possible to know from the 
outset that in any energy and AS joint simulation, the network dispatch becomes feasible. 
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(3.74) 
Equations (3.75) and (3.76) consider the maximum limits of DG and external 
suppliers, obtained through Bialek factors. In this case the factors are calculated based on 
the energy and Regulation Up optimal dispatch, as well as the network power flow to the 
optimal dispatch. Thus, the energy and the services (RU and SP) joint optimization, the sum 
of the production of a particular resource for energy and RU must be less than or equal to 
the threshold obtained through the Bialek factors. 
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(3.76) 
The maximum limits for each resource unit which restricts the generation related to 
services of energy, RU and SP are present in equations (3.77) and (3.78). Based on the 
dispatch of energy, RU and SP services, the methodology described in the problem in the 
introduction section, allows simulating the energy and all ancillary services joint market, 
knowing that constraints between (3.73) and (3.78) limit each resource in order to obtain 
an dispatch with the features and not to violate the physical network constraints, i.e., not 
causing network congestion. Therefore, by optimizing the solution becomes perfectly 
feasible. 
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(3.78) 
3.7. Conclusions 
Throughout the evolution of the electric market in a liberalized environment, the 
modeling of markets has varied according to the characteristics inherent in the structure of 
power systems in the region in which the market are included. 
The models presented in this thesis, and more specifically in this section, address 
the simulation of energy and ancillary services joint market. 
Through the models studied it is possible to understand the operation of real 
markets, as the models based on information inherent in several real market models. 
The energy and AS joint market simulation is a model that can match the highlight 
the economic efficiency, as explained in this section. In this context, several real markets 
use this methodology to obtain the lowest possible cost in the management of energy 
resources. 
The concept of AS procurement by network regions is new in the perspective of the 
MASCEM markets simulation. Thus, the third model is an added value in the continuous 
development of this simulation tool. 
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Certain real markets use a simulation model of ancillary services market by regions, 
wherein the ISO divides the network into several regions. Thus, the regional AS are 
dispatched according to regional requirements. However, not always the existing resources 
in a given region are sufficient to meet the required demand, which implies the use of 
generators outside the region and interties lines between regions in order to cope with the 
demand required. These scenarios are used for critical cases of congestion emphasized in 
the system over the experience of operation of the SO, resulting in different market prices 
between regions. 
The joint model with AS bidding regions contemplates the AS simulation by regions 
and have a variable which allows the SO to ensure that is sufficient generation to provide 
the region. Moreover, the model guarantees that at least 50% of the output provided by 
generator units of this region in order ensures good competitive resources, as well as the 
reliability of the system, relieving the congestion of interties between regions. 
The joint market model considering bialek factors presented in this chapter proposes 
a joint market methodology able to get the best economic solution, ensuring the feasibility 
of the solution of the all services on the market. That is, the model is based on the 
methodology of the Bialek topological factors to ensure the feasibility of the dispatch of 
each service in market trading. Through this model both the ISO and VPP can simulate the 
market, ensuring from the beginning a viable and feasible solution. Whereas through the 
market, the conventional methodology performs a provisional dispatch of all services, to 
further verify the feasibility of the dispatch. Then, the dispatch is adjusted according to the 
technical features of the network in order to achieve a feasible solution. 
In this way, the proposed model has the advantage of ensuring a feasible dispatch 
for all services traded in the market, presumably faster and without the need for 
adjustments. 
On the continuous increase in the introduction of technologies based on the concept 
of renewable energy, require a different management of network resources. In this way, the 
aggregation of resources for a VPP becomes increasingly central to the participation of these 
resources in the market. In this point of view, resource management can be performed by 
VPP in order to participate in the market, which focuses on global management of all 
resources. In this context, the studied models are able to adapt to the required 
management level either by the VPP or by the ISO. 
The joint model applied by VPP focuses on resource management by the VPP, 
considering the constraints of congestion caused by power flow in the network. The model 
contemplates an innovative approach able to provide dispatches for all services which does 
not violate any network technical constraint. Thus, the method always provides feasible and 
viable dispatches of the energy and ancillary services joint market. 
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4. Case Studies 
This chapter presents several case studies which illustrate the application of the 
proposed models (presented in chapter 3) and their respective performance. The presented 
case studies have been chosen to cover a diversity of situations and involved players, 
allowing demonstrating the proposed models. The results obtained are presented and 
discussed for each model. At the end of the chapter some general conclusions are made. 
4.1. Introduction 
A large diversity of the features of the developed models leads to the need of 
creating several individual case studies. After this introduction section, which explains the 
organization of the present chapter, the following sections report the case studies 
concerning each model presented in chapter 3. Finally, the conclusion section presents the 
main conclusions of this chapter. Table 4.1 summarizes the scenarios developed for each 
case study. Each developed scenario has its own characteristics that distinguish it from the 
other scenarios. In the first column of Table 4.1 are presented several parameters which 
characterize the models and make distinctions between them. 
The Case study 1 – Ancillary Services Market model, refers to a generic AS market 
simulation model with incorporation of the ancillary services cascading process. This case 
study was divided into three scenarios. The first scenario considers the AS market 
simulation in its most simplified way. The second scenario considers the market simulation 
with the recourse to relaxation variables in order to return a feasible solution. The third 
scenario considers a comparison between the market simulation of AS with the cascading 
process and the first scenario developed in order to verify the benefits of the AS cascade 
process. 
The Case study 2 – Energy and AS Joint Market model is based on energy and AS 
joint market simulation. This case study is composed of two scenarios and a subsection 
which performs a comparison of both scenarios. The first scenario shows the simulation 
results of the separated market, in which simulates the energy dispatch separately from the 
AS dispatch. The second scenario shows the simultaneous simulation of the joint market. A 
comparison of the two scenarios described above is presented in the last subsection of the 
case study. 
The Case study 3 – AS bidding regions considers the joint market simulation with the 
bids for ancillary services to be performed by network regions. In this case study, the 
proposed method is compared with a reference method. This case study is divided into 
three scenarios. The first scenario considers the joint market simulation in which the power 
flow resulting for energy service and AS is in the same direction. On the other hand, the 
second scenario considers the market simulation in which the power flow resulting for 
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energy service and AS flows in opposite directions. The third scenario considers the market 
simulation with AS cascade process, showing the advantages of this methodology. 
Table 4.1 – Case studies characterization. 
Characteristics 
Model 
Ancillary Service 
Market 
(Case Study 1) 
Energy and AS 
joint market 
(Case Study 2) 
Joint market 
considering AS 
bidding regions 
(Case Study 3) 
Joint market 
considering 
Bialek 
Coefficients 
(Case Study 4) 
Joint Market in 
DNO/VPP 
operation 
(Case Study 5) 
Market model AS market Joint Market Joint Market Joint market Joint Market 
Bids 
Asymmetric 
Market  
Symmetric 
Market 
Symmetric 
Market 
Symmetric 
Market 
VPP/players 
contracts 
AS cascading 
process 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Network 
operation 
No No 
Transmission 
Network with 4 
buses 
considering AC 
OPF 
Transmission 
Network with 7 
buses 
considering AC 
OPF 
Distribution 
Network with 33 
buses 
considering AC 
OPF with Bialek 
topological 
factors 
Resource 
management 
goal 
Minimization of 
ISO operation 
costs 
Market Clearing 
Price 
Market Clearing 
Price 
Market Clearing 
Price 
Minimization of 
VPP operation 
costs 
AS bidding 
regions 
No No 
AS bids and 
requirement by 
two regions of 
the network  
No 
AS bids and 
procurement by 
four regions of 
the network 
Relaxation 
variables 
Ensured by ISO 
through bilateral 
contracts 
Ensured by ISO 
through bilateral 
contracts 
Ensured by ISO 
through bilateral 
contracts 
Ensured by ISO 
through bilateral 
contracts 
Ensured by the 
energy 
resources of 
other regions, 
including 
external 
suppliers 
Complex 
Contracts 
No No No No 
Five types of 
complex 
contracts 
between players 
and VPP 
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The Case study 4 – Bialek coefficients considers the joint market using the 
innovative methodology for solving network congestion. The methodology is based on the 
Bialek topological factors. The case study is divided into two scenarios. The first scenario 
presents the results of market simulation without consideration of the methodology of 
solving the network congestion. The second scenario considers the use of Bialek topological 
factors together with the joint market simulation. The results of this scenario are compared 
with the results of the first scenario. In this way, there is the great advantage of use the 
developed methodology, which always ensures a feasible solution. 
The Case study 5 – Joint Market model applied by VPP considers the joint market 
simulation applied regarding a distribution network operation. Therefore, the operation is 
controlled by a VPP which manages the energy resources available in the distributed 
network. In this case study it is applied the developed methodology of the energy and AS 
joint market simulation which considers the contribution of all services in the network 
congestion. The developed methodology based on the Bialek topological factors is evidenced 
in all scenarios in this case study. Thus, the case study is divided into four distinct 
scenarios. The first scenario consists in the joint market simulation in the scope of a VPP 
management with application of the developed methodology to ensure viable and feasible 
solutions. The second scenario is based on the first scenario with the introduction of bids of 
distributed energy resources be made for network regions (the network was divided into 
four distinct regions). The third scenario is based on the second scenario in which adds the 
introduction of DR and relaxation variables in the ancillary services for the network regions. 
The fourth scenario considers all the inherent characteristics of third scenario with the 
inclusion of storage units in the ancillary services provision for each network region. The 
fifth and final scenario maintains the ideology of the previous scenarios with inclusion of 
complex contracts between players and VPP. These contracts were associated with DG units 
for the energy service. 
4.2. Case study 1 – Ancillary Services Market model 
This case study refers to the model developed in section 3.2. After a brief 
introduction to the considered scenarios with the corresponding input data, the results are 
presented and some conclusions are made. 
Three scenarios compose the case study. The first scenario corresponds to the base 
scenario of the case study and refers to the market simulation. The usefulness of the 
relaxation variables is proven in the second scenario, in which the ISO has an obligation to 
contract other resources through bilateral contracts, ensuring the feasibility of ancillary 
services dispatch. An ancillary services market simulation with the inclusion of the AS 
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cascade process is presented in the last scenario. Moreover, this scenario also provides a 
comparison between the AS market simulation with and without AS cascade process. 
4.2.1. Outline 
The ancillary services model described in section 3.2 considers simultaneous 
optimization of AS market. In order to simulate the developed model, a set of input data 
relevant to the type of problem was used. 
In this case study, three scenarios are considered in order to observe carefully the 
results from the proposed methodology. 
Therefore, the input data for each scenario are available in the Annex A, tables A1, 
A2 and A3, and they include essential features for the simulation. These features include 
the following aspects: 
 Bids that each player performs in the market 
 AS requirements imposed by the System Operator (SO) 
The input data for the first scenario consists of real data available at the CAISO web 
site [CAISO-2007b]. 
4.2.2. Results 
The results of this case study are based on the referred scenarios and approaches. 
The first scenario is the baseline scenario of the case study, which besides being analyzed 
individually, is compared with another scenario in order to know the benefits of the 
implemented methodology. 
4.2.2.1. Scenario 1 – Baseline case 
AS cascading is important in order to make the market more competitive, and 
achieve lower overall cost in contracting power required for the AS dispatch. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the AS dispatch, to the simplest methodology of the 
AS market simulation. 
Regarding to the RD dispatch, the Regulation Down requirement is about 150 MW, 
from which 111 MW are dispatched by “Bid 5” and the remaining 39 MW are supplied by 
“Bid 8”. “Bid 8” has a bid price of 4.8 m.u./MW, corresponding to the market clearing price 
for this service. Although “Bid 4” contains a bid price of 4.0 m.u./MW, the generation 
minimum limit of this bid is 60 MW. Thus, the “Bid 4” is not dispatched for not fitting the 
requirement of 39 MW, resulting that a bid with a higher price to be dispatched. 
Each of the AS dispatches is related to the market clearing price. This market 
clearing price is used to calculate the final cost of the market. Each player is remunerated 
at the market clearing price of each ancillary service. 
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Table 4.2 – Ancillary services dispatch in scenario 1 of AS model. 
Bids 
Regulation Down Regulation Up Spinning Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Total 
(MW) 
MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh 
1 0 10.0 0 5.0 0 10.5 0 10.0 0 
2 0 8.0 70 4.5 0 9.2 0 11.0 70 
3 0 8.0 0 5.2 0 8.5 0 10.2 0 
4 0 4.0 50 5.0 65 8.3 0 10.6 115 
5 111 3.5 0 6.3 0 8.9 59 9.0 59 
6 0 9.0 0 6.0 0 8.8 0 11.0 0 
7 0 7.0 0 7.5 0 9.3 0 10.5 0 
8 39 4.8 0 6.5 0 8.6 0 10.4 0 
9 0 9.0 0 5.5 0 8.3 0 10.3 0 
10 0 10.0 80 4.0 85 8.0 91 9.0 256 
Contracted 
Service (MW) 
150 200 150 150 650 
Service 
Requirement 
(MW) 
150 200 150 150 650 
Market 
Clearing Price 
(m.u./MWh) 
4.8 5.0 8.3 9.0 
Total 
(m.u.) 
Total Cost 
(m.u.) 
720 1000 1245 1350 4315 
 
Section 4.2.2.3 shows a comparison between scenarios in which it is evidenced the 
differences between the method with or without AS cascading. 
4.2.2.2. Scenario 2 – Relaxation variables 
This scenario demonstrates the use of certain variables directed to the relaxation of 
the dispatch problem when there are special negative events for market stability, in which 
the forecast capability of these events is poor. 
The variables RLXD and RLXU are penalties to the optimization problem for not 
meeting the AS requirements imposed by the SO. Therefore, the RLXD penalty is applied 
when the minimum power requirement of an increase generation AS is higher than the sum 
of maximum power offer by all agents in AS market, i.e., when there is a lack of power to 
achieve the requirement. In turn, the RLXU penalty is applied when the maximum power 
requirement of increased generation AS is less than the minimum power of the agent with 
lower minimum limit of power, i.e., when there is the limit of minimum power of the most 
lower agent is higher than the maximum AS requirement. 
The penalty for each variable has a very high price. For this case study it was 
established for both variables a penalty of 100 m.u./MW. 
The results of the AS simulation considering the use of the relaxation variables are 
presented in Table 4.3. In this table, it is possible to see the use of RLXD variable by NS 
service, as well as the contribution of the RLXU variable to the SP dispatch. 
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Table 4.3 – AS dispatch considering relaxation variables. 
Bids 
Regulation 
Down 
Regulation Up 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Total 
(MW) 
MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh 
1 0 10.0 0 15.0 0 5.0 30 7.0 30 
2 0 8.0 0 10.0 0 9.0 25 4.0 25 
3 0 8.0 0 8.2 0 8.5 30 6.0 30 
4 0 4.0 76 5.0 0 7.2 36 4.6 112 
5 100 3.5 0 7.0 0 4.0 15 9.0 15 
6 0 9.0 0 14.6 55 8.0 19 11.0 74 
7 0 7.0 0 8.5 0 7.3 20 10.5 20 
8 0 4.8 0 10.6 0 6.6 62 4.0 62 
9 0 9.0 39 6.5 0 4.3 35 5.3 74 
10 0 10.0 85 4.0 0 9.0 60 5.0 145 
Contracted 
Service 
(MW) 
100 200 55 332 687 
RLXD - 0 100.0 0 100.0 68 100.0 68 
RLXU - 0 100.0 5 100.0 0 100.0 5 
Service 
Requirement 
(MW) 
100 200 50 400 750 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
(m.u./MWh) 
3.5 6.5 8.0 11.0 
Total 
(m.u.) 
Total Cost 
(m.u.) 
350 1300 400 4400 6450 
Cost penalty 
for players 
(m.u.) 
0 0 500 6800 7300 
 
The power of these penalties is contracted by the SO to special agents, with special 
contracts for this kind of emergency service. 
When penalties are applied, they are not included in the cost of each service to be 
hired by the SO, i.e., not increasing even more the market clearing price. These penalties 
are applied to all agents who participate in the service. In several real markets, these 
penalties costs are accounted for each AS, in which the SO share the cost by the number of 
agents participating in that service [CAISO-2009]. 
4.2.2.3. Scenario 3 – Ancillary Services Cascade process 
This scenario shows the results of simultaneous optimization of all AS. The 
simulation model provides the possibility of AS cascading when it is economically more 
efficient, which implies that a high quality reserve can replace a lower quality one. 
In this context, the present subsection compares the scenario presented in section 
4.2.2.1 (Scenario 1) related to the scenario shown in Table 4.4 (Scenario 3) of this present 
section. 
In this way, it is clear the use of AS cascade shown in Table 4.4. Through Table 4.4, 
one can verify that the RU service hired more power than the necessary to meet their 
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needs. This happened as it was triggered the AS substitution through the slack variables. 
This implies that players who offered their bids in the RU service, have partially satisfied the 
SP service and fully satisfied the NS service, thus making the AS joint dispatch more 
economical for the SO. Therefore, to meet their own needs and those of other services, the 
RU service (SP and NS), resulted in a higher market clearing price for the RU service, than 
if it had just met their own needs. However, as the bids for SP service and especially for NS 
service are clearly more expensive, the increase in the market price of the RU service 
reward makes the system more economically advantageous, regarding the market price 
that would be charged on NS service if there was no possibility of AS cascade. 
Table 4.4 – Ancillary services dispatch considering AS cascade mechanism. 
Bids 
Regulation Down Regulation Up 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Total 
(MW) 
MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh 
1 0 10.0 80 5.0 0 10.5 0 10.0 80 
2 0 8.0 85 4.5 0 9.2 0 11.0 85 
3 0 8.0 80 5.2 0 8.5 0 10.2 80 
4 0 4.0 70 5.0 50 8.3 0 10.6 120 
5 111 3.5 0 6.3 0 8.9 0 9.0 0 
6 0 9.0 0 6.0 0 8.8 0 11.0 0 
7 0 7.0 0 7.5 0 9.3 0 10.5 0 
8 39 4.8 0 6.5 0 8.6 0 10.4 0 
9 0 9.0 0 5.5 0 8.3 0 10.3 0 
10 0 10.0 85 4.0 50 8.0 0 9.0 135 
Contracted 
Service (MW) 
150 400 100 0 650 
AS Cascading 
(Slacks) 
- 
RU to SP SP to NS 
- - 
50 5.2 0 8.3 
RU to NS 
- 
150 5.2 
Service Used 
(MW) 
150 200 150 150 650 
Market 
Clearing Price 
(m.u./MWh) 
4.8 5.2 8.3 0.0 
Total 
(m.u.) 
Total Cost 
(m.u.) 
720 2080 830 0 3630 
 
The only difference regarding to input data of both scenarios available in Annex A 
refers to the maximum and minimum requirements for each service, which for the third 
scenario, these requirements are not equal to the ones presented in the first scenario. With 
this, there is leeway for the slacks to be used. The results in Table 4.4 show the AS dispatch 
with clearances resulting in a total cost of approximately 3630 m.u., while the total cost of 
the AS dispatches without slacks is around 4315 monetary units, as shown in Table 4.5 to 
compare the scenarios. 
As seen in Table 4.5 the information of dispatch and market clearing prices was 
obtained for each AS and each simulated scenario. Comparing the two scenarios it is 
noticeable the difference between the total cost of both scenarios. This comparison 
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validates the formulation implemented, taking into account that the AS cascade process can 
obtain a lower final cost, which meets the main goal to SO for ancillary services, that is to 
guarantee AS quality at the lowest possible cost. 
Table 4.5 – AS dispatch comparison related to scenarios 1 and 3 of AS model. 
Market 
Dispatch 
Regulation Down Regulation Up Spinning Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Total 
Cascade 
No 
Cascade 
Cascade 
No 
Cascade 
Cascade 
No 
Cascade 
Cascade 
No 
Cascade 
Cascade 
No 
Cascade 
Contracted 
Service 
(MW) 
150 150 400 200 100 150 0 150 650 650 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
(m.u./MWh) 
4.8 4.8 5.2 5.0 8.3 8.3 0.0 9.0 - 
Total Cost 
(m.u.) 
720 720 2080 1000 830 1245 0 1350 3630 4315 
 
From the results obtained it can be concluded that the model considers the AS 
substitution, which enables a more economical global AS dispatch, without affecting the 
reliability of power systems. 
4.2.3. Results analysis 
In this case study, the simultaneous simulation model of AS market was applied. The 
main goal of the problem is to minimize costs for the SO. The optimization was performed 
in GAMS using the MINLP model. In order to know the characteristics and abilities of the 
model, three scenarios able to express the advantages and disadvantages were developed. 
In the first scenario shows the simulation model in a simple way, which lies in a AS 
simulation, considering only the players involved in these service. 
In the second scenario, importance was given to the use of relaxation variables of 
the problem. These variables guarantee that the AS requirement is satisfied and related to 
a penalty, regardless the ability of the players who participate in the service. 
The third and final scenario shows the AS simultaneous optimization model 
considering the advantage of using the AS cascade process outlined in implemented model. 
Also in the section, on the last scenario, it is established a comparison between the results 
obtained in the first scenario and the last scenario. In this way, one can verify the 
difference between the possible variations of the model, in which it is clear that considering 
the AS substitution results in a more economic optimization for the SO. 
4.3. Case study 2 – Energy and AS Joint Market model 
This subsection presents a case study which illustrates the implementation of the 
proposed methodology described in section 3.3, in order to perform the energy and AS joint 
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market model. This case study was published in [Soares-2011] and it has been 
implemented in a multi-agent electricity market simulator (MASCEM) with the objective of 
providing the simulator with greater flexibility on electricity markets simulation. The main 
objective of this model is the minimization of costs of joint market for the SO. This 
subsection includes an outline of the problem, as well as the input data necessary for the 
simulation model. The results are reported together with some conclusions related to the 
problem. 
4.3.1. Outline 
An energy and ancillary services joint market model is implemented in this case 
study, which is based on the model presented in section 3.3. In order to simulate the 
developed model a set of input data necessary for the operation of the simulation program 
has been used. 
In this case study are tested two scenarios for the model developed in order to 
properly understand the main issue to solve the problem. 
Annex B provides Table B.1 which contains the input data for solving the problem. 
These input data include the power and AS seller bids for a set of 10 players based on real 
offers proposed in CAISO, the buying bids for a set of 10 players, and the values of the 
required power reserve for each service. Table B.1 also presents the minimum and 
maximum capacity requirement for each service, constant forecast losses, rigid demand 
contracted with ISO and energy prices. 
4.3.2. Results 
This subsection presents the results of this case study. Two scenarios were drafted 
to give an overview of the possibilities to solve the individual energy and ancillary services 
market, as well as the joint market. The third subsection shows the comparison between 
the two scenarios mentioned above. 
In this context, the first scenario is based on the separate market simulation for 
energy and ancillary services. The second scenario concerns the joint market simulation. 
Finally, the last subsection presents a comparison between the two scenarios presented and 
draws some conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of using the joint market 
simulation model. 
4.3.2.1. Scenario 1 – Energy and AS markets (Not-joint) 
The scenario presented in this section concerns the separate optimization of the 
energy and ancillary services market. In this way, the results are the ones of a sequential 
process simulation. This process is given by the following steps: 
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 Optimization of the energy market 
 Determination of available power 
 Optimization of the AS market 
The first step results in the simulation of the energy market based on the initial input 
data from Table B.1 in Annex B. Table 4.6 presents the result of the energy dispatch and 
power purchase bids dispatched in the market. Besides the energy market ensures the load 
variable related to power purchase bids, it should ensure the supply of rigid demand and 
the forecast losses in the system, regardless of the market price. 
In this way, the rigid demand and forecasts losses correspond to the regulated 
supply which arises in the highest part of the demand curve using the price cap of the 
market. In order to include the rigid demand and the forecast losses in the simulation, the 
optimization algorithm assigns a very high price for these parcels on the demand curve in 
order to ensure that these parcels are provided in a market environment. 
Table 4.6 – Energy dispatch in scenario 1 of energy and AS joint model. 
Bids 
Sellers Buyers 
Quantity (MW) Price (m.u./MWh) Quantity (MW) Price (m.u./MWh) 
1 430 2.1 300 7.0 
2 350 3.6 0 5.0 
3 480 5.2 0 4.1 
4 450 5.8 300 7.7 
5 67 6.3 350 8.8 
6 270 3.5 350 9.9 
7 299 2.8 0 4.5 
8 0 9.2 0 3.9 
9 345 4.5 300 7.5 
10 369 3.9 0 5.5 
Rigid Demand - - 1300 - 
Forecasts losses - - 160 - 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the energy dispatch with all the considerations listed above. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Energy market clearing price in scenario 1 of energy and AS joint model. 
The second step of the simulation concerns the determination of the maximum 
capacity of generation bids for the participants in the AS market. In order to obtain the 
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maximum capacity of generation bids, it is necessary to calculate the difference between 
the power used by each bid in the energy market and the limit of “Max Power” set out in 
Table B.1 from Annex B. Therefore, Table 4.7 includes the values used for each bid in the 
AS market. The bids which participated with its full available capacity in the energy dispatch 
present values of “Residual Max Power” different from 0, as seen in Table 4.7. This is due to 
the threshold established in each bid for the energy which does not correspond exactly to 
their maximum capacity generation, as seen in Table B.1. 
Table 4.7 – Residual maximum power. 
Bid Residual Max Power (MW) 
1 20 
2 50 
3 20 
4 30 
5 233 
6 10 
7 21 
8 405 
9 55 
10 31 
 
The third step results in the AS market simulation considering the limits determined 
in the previous step. This way, results of the AS market considering a simple process and 
the inclusion of cascading process are presented. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the dispatch of each ancillary service according to the energy 
required by the system operator for these services. In this case, only the participant bids in 
each service can provide this service. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Ancillary services dispatch in scenario 1 of energy and AS joint model. 
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According to the ancillary services simultaneous market model with AS cascade 
process, it is possible to reduce the operation costs for the ISO. Therefore, Figure 4.3 
illustrates the AS dispatch when there is the ancillary services cascading. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Ancillary services dispatch with cascading mechanism in scenario 1 of energy and AS joint model. 
By comparing the results presented in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, one can concluded 
that the market clearing price of Spinning Reserve decreases from 9.0 m.u./MWh to 8.0 
m.u./MWh corresponding to a power decrease from 150 MW to 114 MW. In compensation, 
the Regulation Up provides more 36 MW (236 MW) with a market clearing price equal to 8.3 
m.u./MWh, in order to cascade energy to SP, thus reducing the overall costs of AS. The 
cascading allows a better optimization of AS, combining the three services (RU, SP and NS). 
In Table B.2 and Table B.3 are the exact values of the bids which participate in the AS and 
the market clearing price for each ancillary service. The variables of the cascading process, 
usually called slacks, and its respective price can be seen in Table B.3. 
4.3.2.2. Scenario 2 – Energy and AS joint market 
The implemented energy and AS joint market model is presented in this scenario. 
The joint market simulation considers the simultaneous dispatch of energy and 
Ancillary Services. From the perspective of the ISO, this model allows a better optimization 
of the power capacity of each agent participating in the markets. This limit does not affect 
the Regulation Down dispatch, since this service is a component for the frequency control 
when there is excess of generation. 
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In this context, Figure 4.4 presents the market clearing price of the energy market. 
It is considered that the market has to provide a rigid demand as well as the load bids. 
After satisfying this mandatory demand, the market price is determined, in accordance with 
the selling and buying bids. The rigid demand and forecasts losses are represented in the 
figure by the initial offer at high price (15 m.u./MWh) in the demand curve, knowing what 
impact these parameters have in obtaining the market clearing price. 
 
Figure 4.4 – Energy market clearing price in scenario 2 of energy and AS joint model. 
The simultaneous dispatch of the joint market is presented in Table 4.8. This table 
comprises information on the dispatch of each service with its respective market clearing 
price, as well as the transfer power in AS cascading process. 
Table 4.8 – Energy and AS joint market dispatch. 
Bids 
Regulation 
Down 
Regulation Up 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Energy Loads Total 
(MW) 
MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh 
1 0 10.0 0 15.0 10 5.0 0 7.0 430 2.1 300 7.0 440 
2 40 8.0 5 8.1 0 9.0 45 4.0 350 3.6 0 5.0 400 
3 0 8.0 44 7.1 0 8.5 0 6.0 456 5.2 0 4.1 500 
4 60 4.0 50 5.0 30 7.2 41 4.6 359 5.8 300 7.7 480 
5 100 3.5 65 7.0 24 4.0 0 9.0 191 6.3 350 8.8 280 
6 0 9.0 0 14.6 10 8.0 0 11.0 270 3.5 350 9.9 280 
7 40 7.0 0 7.2 0 7.3 21 4.0 299 2.8 0 4.5 320 
8 10 4.8 0 8.3 60 6.6 0 10.5 0 9.2 0 3.9 60 
9 0 9.0 2 6.5 10 4.3 43 5.3 345 4.5 300 7.5 400 
10 0 10.0 40 4.0 0 9.0 0 5.0 360 3.9 0 5.5 400 
Contracted 
Service 
(MW) 
250 206 144 150 3060 1600 2210 
Slacks - 
RU to SP SP to NS 
- - - - 
6 8.1 0 8.0 
RU to NS 
- 
0 8.1 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
(m.u./MW) 
8.0 8.1 8.0 5.3 6.3 6.3 
Total 
(m.u.) 
Total Cost 
(m.u.) 
2000 1668.6 1152 795 19278 10080 14813.6 
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Furthermore, it is possible to identify individual costs that each service represents 
for the system operator, as well as the overall cost of the market. The total cost of the 
market operation is determined based on the sum of the costs of energy and ancillary 
services dispatches. In order to better understand the simulated market, Figure 4.5 
graphically shows the ancillary services dispatch. The market clearing price is obtained 
through the intersection of supply curve and the AS requirement. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Ancillary services dispatch in scenario 2 of energy and AS joint model. 
4.3.2.3. Comparison of scenarios 
This section introduces a comparison of the scenarios described in the previous 
sections (4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2) for the energy and AS joint market model. 
Table 4.9 – Costs and market clearing price comparison related to scenario 1 and 2 of energy and AS joint model. 
Market Price (m.u./MWh) 
Service 
AS Market Energy 
Market 
Join 
Market 
Balance 
No slack Slack 
Regulation Down 8.0 8.0 - 8.0 0.0 
Regulation Up 8.3 8.3 - 8.1 0.2 
Spinning Reserve 9.0 8.0 - 8.0 0.0 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
9.0 9.0 - 5.3 3.7 
Energy - - 6.3 6.3 0.0 
Total Cost (m.u.) 6360.0 
6220.8 9198.0 
14813.6 605.2 
15418.8 
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In this way, Table 4.9 shows the market clearing price for each service for both 
scenarios, as well as the market total cost involved in the scenarios. In this context, it is 
presented an overview on the differences between the scenarios in order to highlight the 
economic performance of each scenario. 
The total cost for the AS market in the separated market model without considering 
the AS cascade process is 6360.0 (m.u.). The value corresponds to the quantities presented 
in section 4.3.2.1, Figure 4.2. The values 6220.8 m.u. (AS cascading process) and 9198.0 
m.u. (energy dispatch) are obtained in the same way, but using the values which 
correspond to AS cascade process presented in Figure 4.3 (a Table B.3 of the Annex B) and 
to the energy market presented in Table 4.6. 
According to these results the AS costs are less expensive when it is activated the 
AS cascade process. In this point of view, the total cost of the separate market which 
considers the AS cascade process is smaller when compared to the more simplistic separate 
market. In this market it was obtained an overall cost of 15418.8 (m.u.). This process was 
carried out in order to be compared with the joint market scenario. It can be concluded that 
the joint market ensures a better solution than the individual optimization of energy and 
ancillary services markets. This case study presents a difference of 605.2 m.u. This 
difference arises from the comparison of costs between the joint market (14813.6 m.u.) 
and the sum of the costs of separated energy and AS market (15418.8 m.u.). This is due to 
the market clearing price obtained in the joint market regarding the Regulation Up and Non-
Spinning services that are lower than the one obtained by the separate market simulation. 
4.3.3. Results analysis 
An energy and ancillary services joint market model is the methodological basis of 
the problem addressed in this case study. Thus, the problem lies in the energy and AS joint 
market simulation, with the main goal of minimizing the costs involved in the problem to 
the system operator. The optimization has been performed on GAMS optimization tool using 
their solvers. 
The case study was developed in accordance with the possibility of showing the 
intrinsic features of the model developed, and the case study is divided into three distinct 
parts. 
Firstly, a scenario capable of identifying step by step the characteristics in each 
market simulation was developed. This means that a simulation was developed for the 
individual energy market and the AS market. 
The second part of the case study refers to the energy and AS joint market 
simulation, in which it is consider the true essence of the proposed model. 
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The third part comprises a comparison of previous scenarios in order to highlight the 
advantages that the use of joint market may bring to the operation mode of markets. 
The main advantage of the joint market is the ability of the combination of several 
bids for energy and AS. Thus it is possible to combine the contribution that each bid has on 
all services dispatches (except the Regulation Down service), according to the “Max Power” 
capacity of the bid. The solutions presented by this market model may not be technically 
possible when considering technical constraints of the network. In this way, the system 
operator must verify that the solution presented meets the technical validation of network 
constraints. In case the dispatch provided by the model violates the technical constraints, it 
is subject to readjustments in order to become a feasible solution. 
4.4. Case study 3 – AS bidding regions 
A case study is proposed in this section to implement the market model exposed in 
subsection 3.4. The presented case study is based on the energy and ancillary services joint 
market considering different bidding regions. The case study performs a comparison 
between the model described in section 3.4 and the model published by [Wu-2004]. The 
developed model considers an Alternate Current (AC) Optimal Power Flow (OPF) while the 
reference model is based on a Direct Current (DC) OPF. By using an AC OPF, it is possible to 
determine the active and reactive power flow on the network, as well as the losses 
associated to the system. In this way, the market simulation presents the results of the 
dispatches closer to the reality, which is an advantage of the proposed method relative to 
the reference method. 
The main goal of the model is to minimize the costs of the joint market dispatch, in 
which the AS requirements imposed by the ISO are defined by network regions. A brief 
introduction to the problem and the required input data, as well as the simulation results 
and the respective conclusions are presented in this section. 
4.4.1. Outline 
This case study illustrates the implementation of the energy and AS joint market 
model considering different bidding regions. To simulate this case study it is necessary a set 
of input data capable of demonstrating the comparison between the proposed method and 
the reference method. 
Therefore, the case study is compared with [Wu-2004], which uses a 4-node 
network with four branches. Based on this network, [Wu-2004] uses an DC OPF in this 
methodology to determine network power flow. To obtain a more realistic simulation, an AC 
OPF, is proposed. In this way, it was considered the network shown in Figure 4.6 with a few 
changes. 
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Figure 4.6 – 4-buses network with four branches [Wu-2004]. 
The features included in the network are presented in Table 4.10, and correspond to 
the resistance and inductance characteristics of the network. To include the network 
characteristics in this case study it has been used the lines characteristics of Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 14 Bus test case [Group-1973]. 
Table 4.10 – 4-buses network features. 
Bus i Bus j Resistance (p.u.) Inductance (p.u.) Line Capacity (MVA) 
1 4 0.05695 0.17388 40 
2 3 0.05403 0.22304 50 
2 4 0.04699 0.19797 50 
3 4 0.05811 0.17632 50 
 
Table 4.11 presents the bids related to the energy and the AS of the reference 
paper, without considering the requirements of the AS and their contingencies which give 
rise to the AS regions identified in [Wu-2004]. 
In this way, the simulation of the proposed methodology not considering the AS 
requirements and contingencies is performed, in order to obtain the energy optimal 
dispatch. Three scenarios were simulated involving the energy dispatch according to the 
exposed in the reference method. The execution of several operation contexts was 
performed so that the developed methodology obtains solutions according to several 
situations that can arise during the network operation. In this way, four operation context 
containing different parameters at the generation unit contribution of generation were 
simulated. The first operation context summarizes the base case which assumes that all 
generators may be in service. The second operation context considers that the generation 
unit G1 is out of service, while the third operation context considers that the generation unit 
G2 is out of service. The last operation context considers that the branch 1-4 is disabled. 
These operation contexts were performed for Scenario 1. 
Based on [Wu-2004], the loads L1 (export), L2, L3 have fixed schedules of 20 MW, 
30 MW and 100 MW, respectively. 
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Table 4.11 shows the bids made by each generation unit for all services. The bids 
information provided by Table 4.11 are a fundamental part of the basis of the scenarios 
studied in this case study. 
Table 4.11 – Energy and AS bids. 
Methodology Reference [Wu-2004] Proposed methodology 
Resources G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Energy Bid price (m.u./MWh) 10 30 45 10 30 45 
RD Bid price (m.u./MW) - - - 10 15 20 
RU Bid price (m.u./MW) - - - 10 20 30 
SP Bid price (m.u./MW) 5 15 35 5 15 35 
NS Bid price (m.u./MW) - - - 15 10 40 
Total Bid Capacity (MW) 100 200 300 100 200 300 
 
The AS requirements considered in the control area are listed below. RD requirement 
was established in 50 MW. The RU requirement has a range of values between the 
minimum and maximum of 50 MW to 100 MW. Following the same principles of the RU 
cascade, the SP requirement has a range from 100 MW to 150 MW, while the NS 
requirement has a fixed value of 50 MW. 
In order to establish the regions and their requirements, it was assumed the same 
constraints established in [Wu-2004] for each AS, which implies that the imports between 
regions may not exceed 50% of each AS requirement of this region. Thus, in each AS 
requirement, Region 1 may not provide more than 50% of AS requirements of Region 2. 
The total production of all regions should ensure at least the supply of each AS 
requirement. Based on [Wu-2004] the resources of the Region 3 must ensure at least 85% 
of the AS requirement. 
In this way, the contingencies discussed above gave rise to the following AS regions: 
Region 1 contains Node 1, Region 2 contains all network nodes, Region 3 contains Node 3. 
For SP reserve: 
 Region 1: G1 ≤ 50 
 Region 2: G1 + G2 + G3 ≥ 100 
 Region 3: G3 ≥ 85 
For other AS: 
 Region 1: G1 ≤ 25 
 Region 2: G1 + G2 + G3 ≥ 50 
 Region 3: G3 ≥ 42.5 
The results are divided into three scenarios. The first scenario considers the joint 
market simulation with the Ancillary Services power flow in the same direction as the 
energy power flow predetermined in the case study. 
In the second scenario certain changes are imposed in the input data, in order to 
obtain a power flow simulation concerning the energy and AS are in opposite directions. 
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The third and final scenario discusses the ability of AS cascade by the proposed 
model, since the reference model does not incorporate this versatility in its methodology. 
4.4.2. Results 
4.4.2.1. Scenario 1 – Energy and AS in the same direction 
An energy and AS joint simulation approach with the same direction in the power 
flow is carefully explained in this scenario. 
This case considers all the energy and AS bids shown in Table 4.11, based on [Wu-
2004]. In this way, by analyzing the data from Table 4.11 it is possible to see that G1 is the 
cheapest producer in several services. 
When comparing the dispatches between the proposed methodology and the 
reference method, it seems that a discrepancy between the two methods is mainly due to 
the consideration of lines losses and reactive power, as can been seen in Table 4.12. 
Considering the reactive power in the line implies that the energy that flows in line contains 
an active and reactive share. Thus, the capacity of active power flowing in the line is 
smaller compared to the reference method. 
Regarding the comparison of the operation contexts, it is verified in last operation 
context that in the reference method generator G1 do not participate in the dispatch, in 
which it is considered the disabling of branch 1-4. Once the branch is disabled, generation 
unit G1 can supply the load allocated to its bus, which does not appear in reference 
method. Thus, this scenario cause some mismatch between the dispatches, with the 
dispatch related to the reference method does not provide all the required loads. 
Table 4.12 – Energy dispatch by operation context in scenario 1 of joint market model considering AS bidding 
regions. 
Energy Schedule (MWh) Reference [Wu-2004] Proposed methodology 
Base Case 60.0 85.0 5.0 58.7 79.9 11.9 
G1 outage 0.0 115.0 35.0 0.0 109.7 40.8 
G2 outage 60.0 0.0 90.0 57.8 0.0 92.7 
Branch1-4 outage 0.0 105.0 25.0 20.0 99.7 30.8 
 
Table 4.13 shows the results of the base case simulation, with the comparison of the 
results obtained based on reference [Wu-2004]. Thus, as can see the energy and AS 
dispatch results are identical. The generator G1 uses the full capacity of branch 1-4 to 
dispatch the energy; however, it can provide the RD service, as this service does not enter 
directly into the competition with energy and others AS, because it is a decrease service 
production and not the opposite. 
The LMP obtained in the methodology is rather different to the reference method. In 
the developed methodology the determination of the LMP considers not only the active 
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power, but also the system losses and congestion in the network. In this way, these 
characteristics are the causes of deviations of the comparison between LMP. 
Table 4.13 – Base case results of energy and AS in same direction. 
Methodology Reference [Wu-2004] Proposed methodology 
Resources G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Energy Schedule (MWh) 60.0 85.0 5.0 58.7 79.9 11.4 
RD Bid Award (MW) - - - 7.5 0.0 42.5 
RU Bid Award (MW) - - - 0.0 7.5 42.5 
SP Bid Award (MW) 0.0 15.0 85.0 0.0 15.0 85.0 
NS Bid Award (MW) - - - 0.0 7.5 42.5 
LMP (m.u./MWh) 10.0 30.0 45.0 10.0 32.9 41.4 
 
The contingencies G1 outage and G2 outage provide different energy and AS 
dispatches, as shown in Table 4.14. In G1 outage generators G2 and G3 are required to 
provide the load in node 1. In this way, there is the high LMP of 39.3 m.u./MWh at node 1, 
as evidenced when G1 is not available, the node 1 LMP increases about 20 m.u./MWh. In 
what concerns the contingency G2 outage, one can verify a similar trend to the previous 
LMP in node 2. This is due to the fact that the G3 is more expensive to provide energy and 
AS. 
Table 4.14 – G1 and G2 outage results. 
Methodology 
Proposed methodology  
(G1 outage) 
Proposed methodology  
(G2 outage) 
Resources G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Energy Schedule (MWh) 0.0 109.7 40.3 57.8 0.0 92.2 
RD Bid Award (MW) 0.0 7.5 42.5 7.5 0.0 42.5 
RU Bid Award (MW) 0.0 7.5 42.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 
SP Bid Award (MW) 0.0 15 85 0.0 0.0 100.0 
NS Bid Award (MW) 0.0 7.5 42.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 
LMP (m.u./MWh) 39.3 35.0 43.6 10.0 40.7 40.8 
Branch 1-4 outage contingency implies that the network is divided into two distinct 
operation areas. The G1 only has to ensure that L1 is provided. Thus, node 1 LMP 
corresponds to the G1 energy bid price, as shown in Table 4.15. 
In the context of island operation, generators G2 and G3 compete between 
themselves to provide the loads and meet the AS requirements. 
Table 4.15 – Branch 1-4 outage results. 
Methodology Proposed methodology 
Resources – Branch 1-4 outage G1 G2 G3 
Energy Schedule (MWh) 20.0 99.7 30.3 
RD Bid Award (MW) 0.0 0.0 50.0 
RU Bid Award (MW) 0.0 7.5 42.5 
SP Bid Award (MW) 0.0 15 85 
NS Bid Award (MW) 0.0 7.5 42.5 
LMP (m.u./MWh) 10.0 35.0 43.6 
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The network regions applied to ancillary services helps ensuring the system 
reliability in the desired control area. The stipulated control area comprises buses 2, 3 and 
4. All AS requirements are designed to the control area. 
With the constraint related to region 1, it is intended to limit the import of power 
from Bus 1 to the control area. With the region 3 the internal generation unit of this region 
(the generator G3) has a strong role in contributing to ancillary services. Since this 
generation unit is, in general, the most expensive unit, one way to ensure the stability of 
the power flow in the control area is through the ancillary services. By defining the AS 
procurement by regions, it is possible to establish rules for supplying with resources for 
each region. 
With Table 4.13 one can verify that the market simulation establishes the AS 
dispatch for generator G3, to the minimum as possible generation required by the 
constraint of region 3. This is because the network is stable at that point. In the case where 
generator G2 is outage and affect the energy dispatch (Table 4.14), the ancillary services 
which increase generation are fully guaranteed by generator G3, thus ensuring the stability 
of the control area. 
Operation costs and the execution time for each contingency scenario are shown in 
Figure 4.7. It seems that the scenario in which G1 is outage, the scenario is the most 
expensive in the overall energy and AS operation costs, since generator G1 has the energy 
and three of the four AS most inexpensive, regarding the competing generators. 
 
Figure 4.7 – Operation costs and execution time in the contingency cases. 
4.4.2.2. Scenario 2 – Energy and AS in opposite direction 
This scenario considers specific changes in order to condition power flow in opposite 
directions of energy and AS. 
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In this context, in order to simulate the previously described situation, it becomes 
necessary to change some assumptions used in the previous scenario. Therefore, the 
changes are related to the generators bids and the capacity of the network branches: 
 The energy bid of G1 is increased to 80 m.u./MWh; 
 The capacity of Branch 1-4 is reduced to 10 MVA in both directions. 
The simulation results based on changes described above are shown in Table 4.16. 
The evidenced results show that the G1 energy bid is too expensive to participate in energy 
dispatch; however, this bid is forced to supply in energy service due to the fact that the 
maximum export capacity of Bus 4 to the Bus 1 is limited to 10 MVA (branch 1-4). So, G1 
must generate at least 10 MW in energy service, since the load on Bus 1, has 20 MW of 
energy requirement. On the other hand, the generator G1 can generate up to 20 MW on 
ancillary services, in order not to exceed the limit set in branch 1-4 of 10 MVA. In the 
Spinning reserve service, generation unit G1 is the cheapest resource supplying 15 MW, 
since the constraint of Region 3 implies the participation of generation unit G3 at least 85% 
of the service requirement, in this case corresponding to 85 MW. 
Table 4.16 – Base case results of energy and AS in opposite direction. 
Methodology Reference [Wu-2004] Proposed methodology 
Resources G1 G2 G3 G1 G2 G3 
Energy Schedule (MWh) 10.0 110.0 30.0 10.7 104.3 35.0 
RD Bid Award (MW) - - - 7.5 0.0 42.5 
RU Bid Award (MW) - - - 0.0 7.5 42.5 
SP Bid Award (MW) 10.0 5.0 85.0 15.0 0.0 85.0 
NS Bid Award (MW) - - - 0.0 7.5 42.5 
LMP (m.u./MWh) 80.0 30.0 45.0 73.8 35.0 43.6 
Figure 4.8 shows the power flow of the network at the end of the market simulation 
getting the dispatch of all services (energy and ancillary services). 
G1
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Node #3
Node #2
5.4
-11.1
5.7
43.9
G2
Energy - 30 MW
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NS - 10 MW
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Energy - 100 MW
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SP - 80 MW
NS - 40 MW
Energy - 20 MW
 
Figure 4.8 – Power flow of energy and AS dispatch. 
The constraint of region 3 ensures that the internal generation units of the region 
must provide at least 85% of the AS requirements of control area. Therefore, it seems that 
the export of generator G1 is limited not only by the branch, but also by the ancillary 
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services bidding regions. Otherwise, generator G1 would have a major contribution in the 
ancillary services dispatch. 
4.4.2.3. Scenario 3 – Energy and AS cascade optimization 
This scenario deals with the possibility of AS cascade. AS cascade has as the basic 
principle the possibility of using RU as SP and/or NS after the RU requirement is met. In the 
same direction, the SP can be used as NS after the SP requirement is met. 
In order to simulate the AS cascade dispatch, it is necessary to change the AS bids 
price. In this way, it was amended the following condition: 
 The RU bid of G3 is decreased to 5 m.u./MWh. 
Considering the simulation based on the previous scenario simulation data (section 
4.4.2.2), it is easy to understand that the RU service can partially replace the SP and NS 
requirements. In this case, the RU service provides 5 MW to the SP service and 10 MW to 
NS service, as shown in Table 4.17. This can happen when the high quality service dispatch 
is less expensive than a lower quality service dispatch. In practice, this situation is very 
unusual, since usually a high quality reserve is more expensive than a lower quality 
reserve. 
Table 4.17 – AS cascade results. 
Methodology Proposed methodology with AS Cascade mechanism 
Resources G1 G2 G3 
Energy Schedule (MWh) 10.7 104.3 35.0 
RD Bid Award (MW) 7.5 0.0 42.5 
RU Bid Award (MW) 0.0 0.0 62.5 
SP Bid Award (MW) 10.0 0.0 85.0 
NS Bid Award (MW) 0.0 0.0 42.5 
LMP (m.u./MWh) 73.8 35.0 43.6 
4.4.3. Results analysis 
This case study was developed regarding the possibility of showing the intrinsic 
characteristics of the model developed in comparison with the case study of the reference 
method published in [Wu-2004]. The case study is divided into three different scenarios. 
The first scenario reports the comparison of the proposed methodology with the 
reference methodology, considering the energy and AS power flow in the same direction. In 
this scenario the AS dispatch is simulated according to certain situations that may occur 
from the energy operation context. Some generation units as well as the network branches 
can be outage, affecting not only the energy dispatch, but also the ancillary services. In this 
way, the joint dispatch considering “G1 outage” is the scenario more expensive which 
imposes an addition of about 14% in the operation costs, comparing to the base case. With 
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the generation unit “G1 outage”, the LMP of bus 1 is considerably higher (about 75%) than 
the base case. 
The second scenario of this case study compares two methods with regard to the 
energy and AS power flow in opposite directions. This scenario is not so common, because 
the AS is usually supplied by generators of large capacity on the network. However, it can 
happen on certain contexts of the power systems operation. In this way, one can evaluate 
the responsiveness of the model for such cases. The results show that in some branches the 
power flow related to the AS runs in the opposite direction to the energy, resulting in the 
mathematical annulment of power flows in the branch. It can be concluded that generator 
G2 located in the bus 2 exports 10 MW through branches 2-4 and 1-4 to the bus 1, while in 
the spinning reserve dispatch, the generation unit G1 exports 10 MW through branch 1-4 to 
bus 4. This confirms an opposite flow between energy and AS. Thus it is shown that the 
method allows the energy and ancillary services dispatch with opposite power flow. 
The third and last scenario refers to the simulation model considering the possibility 
of the AS cascade process being actuated, thus reducing operation costs for the ISO. 
Through the cascade process, the operation costs in this scenario decreased approximately 
2% regarding the base scenario. It can be concluded that this methodology may show an 
advantage in the economic efficiency of the market. 
All methods have their advantages and disadvantages inherent to the particular form 
of solving the problem. In comparison to reference methods, the main advantages of the 
proposed methodology are: considering the AC power flow on the network; the inclusion of 
all AS (namely, RD, RU, SP and NS) procurement by the ISO in competitive market 
environment, as well as the possibility of AS cascade substitution optimization, if there is 
more economically advantages. Another important advantage identified is the differences in 
the formulation to solve the problem between both methods, in which the proposed model 
is presented in section 3.4. Therefore, the scenarios presented highlight the differences 
between the two methods at the level of LMPs at each network node. It is somewhat 
significant, implying that operating costs are lower in those particular cases in the reference 
method. However, the reference methodology considers only the energy and network 
contingencies in the LMP calculation, while the proposed method in the LMP calculation 
considers the energy, losses and network contingencies. Thus, through the LMP calculation 
of the proposed methodology has a clearly closer approximation to the reality of the power 
systems operation. 
The main disadvantage identified is mainly due to the simulation time to solve the 
problem. Although the execution time of the reference method is not available, it should be 
faster, in order to the reference methodology be less complex and also implemented in 
linear programming. In this context, the proposed methodology may have some difficulties 
to be fast enough for the real-time market with a huge number of input data. 
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Regarding the ancillary services bids being made through the regions of the network, 
it is verified that this methodology does not necessarily imply a prejudice in the ISO 
operation costs. In a normal operation context (the energy base case dispatch), the use of 
AS increases the ISO operation costs. However, in critical operation context of 
contingencies presented when "G2 outage" or even "Branch 1-4 outage", it is clear that 
bidding by region and the respective constraints associated to each region makes the 
system more robust and prepared to deal with inconveniences cases of generation outage, 
which may be little predictable. In this way, the ancillary service market simulation 
considering different bidding regions prevent the system to have much import energy, 
reinforcing the benefit of the internal generation units in the network operation to ensure 
high levels of system reliability. 
Briefly, the presented case study is based on the reference method and was 
compared with the proposed methodology, demonstrating how the proposed methodology is 
effective to solve the envisaged problem, and showing its applicability to real markets. 
4.5. Case study 4 – Bialek coefficients 
This section presents a case study regarding the model proposed in section 3.5. It 
considers the simulation of a joint market with an AC OPF and a new methodology based on 
Bialek topological factors for solving of network constraints and congestion caused by all AS 
scheduling. 
4.5.1. Outline 
The case study is divided into two scenarios. One of the scenarios considers the join 
market simulation using an AC OPF for simulating the characteristics of the network.  
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Figure 4.9 – 7-buses network. 
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The second scenario is based on the previous scenario with the inclusion of the 
methodology developed using the method of Bialek topological factors. The scenarios 
presented in this chapter use a transmission network with 7 buses illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
The characteristics related to resistance, inductance and thermal limit of each branch 
used in the network are presented in Table 4.18. 
Table 4.18 – 7-buses features. 
Bus i Bus j Resistance  (p.u.) Inductance (p.u.) Line Capacity (MVA) 
1 5 0.05695 0.17388 40 
2 4 0.05403 0.22304 50 
2 7 0.04699 0.19797 50 
3 4 0.05530 0.21430 50 
3 5 0.05559 0.18837 50 
4 5 0.04866 0.20977 20 
4 6 0.04999 0.20654 50 
4 7 0.05722 0.18656 50 
6 7 0.05811 0.17632 50 
Table 4.19 shows the characteristics of generators and loads connected on the 
network, where Qt is the quantity of power and Pe is the bid price. 
Table 4.19 – Generators input data. 
Resources 
Energy Regulation Down Regulation Up Spinning Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Maximum 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Qt 
(MW) 
Pe 
(m.u./MW) 
Qt 
(MW) 
Pe 
(m.u./MW) 
Qt 
(MW) 
Pe 
(m.u./MW) 
Qt 
(MW) 
Pe 
(m.u./MW) 
Qt 
(MW) 
Pe 
(m.u./MW) 
1 100 10 100 10 100 20 100 10 100 15 100 
2 200 15 200 15 200 10 200 15 200 20 200 
3 300 20 300 20 300 15 300 20 300 10 300 
 
Table 4.20 presents the energy and Ancillary services requirements for each load on 
the network. The requirements of ancillary services (Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-
Spinning Reserve) for Loads 1 and 2 were set to 10 MW, in order to provide situations of 
opposites power flow caused by the dispatches of all services for increased generation. 
Thus, it is possible to highlight the main advantages and disadvantages of the models used 
in each scenario of this case study. 
Table 4.20 – Energy and AS requirements. 
Loads 
Energy 
Regulation 
Down 
Regulation Up 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) 
1 20 2 10 10 10 
2 30 3 10 10 10 
3 100 10 10 10 10 
4 50 5 5 3.5 3.5 
5 77 7.7 7.7 5.39 5.39 
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4.5.2. Results 
4.5.2.1. Scenario 1 – Baseline case 
This subsection shows the simulation results of the energy and ancillary services 
joint market using an AC OPF (baseline case). 
Table 4.21 shows the results relating to each service dispatch obtained in the 
market. The solution proposed is only possible if all services are been dispatched at the 
same time. 
In fact, the dispatch of all services has a hierarchy in which the energy service is the 
first to be dispatched. In this way, one must ensure that the dispatch of energy service is 
feasible. In the results presented, it seems that energy dispatch alone is not feasible. For 
the generator G2 was awarded a dispatch of about 149.70 MW; however, the branches 
which connect Bus 2 (where generator G2 is coupled) to other buses is limited to 50 MVA in 
each branch. The load coupled to Bus 2 has a consumption of 30 MW. In seems that there 
is congestion on the branches (149.70-50-50-30=19.70), making the energy dispatch 
infeasible. 
Table 4.21 – Energy and AS dispatch in scenario 1 of joint market model considering Bialek coefficients. 
Generator 
Energy 
Regulation 
Down 
Regulation Up 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) 
1 41.05 27.7 0 0 0 
2 149.70 0 0 0 0 
3 86.25 0 42.82 38.89 38.89 
 
In this way, the energy dispatch only becomes feasible when it is considered the 
power flow resulting from the energy, Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning 
dispatches. This happens because the Load related to Bus 2 has a considerable requirement 
for Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning services, and the requirements of these 
services are supplied by the generation unit G3. This implies that for each ancillary service 
the generation unit G3 causes a opposite power flow regarding the energy dispatch power 
flow, which decreases mathematically the power flow that flows in branches between Bus 2 
and Bus 3. Moreover, with a simultaneous market simulation, the optimization process 
allows the combination of the services dispatch, so that the simultaneous dispatch of all 
services does not violate the thermal limits of the branches. However, when analyzing the 
dispatch independently, it seems that the energy dispatch is unfeasible. 
In the context of independent analysis of the energy dispatch, Table 4.22 represents 
the power flow of energy service imposed on network. Thus, it is possible to verify that the 
particular energy dispatch is infeasible, since it violates the thermal limits of the branch 2-4 
and the branch 2-7. 
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Table 4.22 – Power flow of energy service and joint market, in scenario 1 of joint market model considering Bialek 
coefficients. 
Bus i Bus j 
Power flow for energy service Overall power flow Line Capacity 
(MVA) Active (MW) Apparent (MVA) Active (MW) Apparent (MVA) 
1 5 21.05 22.42 -8.95 11.51 40 
2 4 65.15 65.64 44.20 48.76 50 
2 7 54.55 55.18 45.50 48.51 50 
3 4 -2.17 6.18 48.30 48.31 50 
3 5 -11.58 11.65 28.55 28.88 50 
4 5 -9.47 11.83 -19.59 20.00 20 
4 6 33.09 34.60 48.58 49.90 50 
4 7 -10.68 10.69 1.47 4.05 50 
6 7 -43.83 45.43 -46.92 50.00 50 
 
Therefore, one can conclude that the simultaneous dispatch of all services traded in 
the market may not be feasible in the power systems operation. 
4.5.2.2. Scenario 2 – Base case with Bialek factors 
The scenario described in this subsection considers the energy and ancillary services 
joint market simulation according to the methodology developed in section 3.5. Through 
this method it is possible to ensure the dispatch feasibility for each service, and the results 
presented in this subsection related to the desired simulation. The simulation is performed 
according to the hierarchical structure of the services considered in the market. 
Table 4.23 shows the simulation results of the joint market which include the 
innovative methodology. The solution presented reports that each dispatch is feasible. 
Through Table 4.23 it is possible to verify that the power flow of the energy dispatch 
obtained through the developed methodology follows the same direction of power flow from 
the energy dispatch shown in the previous scenario. However, it seems that through this 
new methodology, the joint or individual services dispatches are feasible. 
Table 4.23 – Energy and AS dispatch in scenario 2 of joint market model considering Bialek coefficients. 
Generator 
Energy 
Regulation 
Down 
Regulation Up 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) Qt (MW) 
1 49.09 27.7 0 0 0 
2 129.41 0 10.27 10.14 7.13 
3 98.50 0 32.54 28.75 31.76 
 
In this scenario and following the reasoning of the previous observation, generator 
G2 was awarded a dispatch of 129.41 MW for energy service as it can be seen in Table 
4.23. In this way, considering the characteristics of the network, the generator G2 does not 
cause congestion in the network. Generator G2 obtained an energy dispatch of 129.41 MW, 
about 30 MW of its generation was used to supply the load L2. This generator contributed 
approximately 49.81 MW for branch 2-4 with thermal limit of 50 MVA and also 
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approximately 49.60 MW for branch 2-7 with a thermal limit of 50 MVA. Thus, it is clear 
that the obtained dispatch for energy service is feasible. However, the feasibility of the 
presented solution is very close to the maximum limit allowed by the network features, as it 
can be seen in Table 4.24, which presents the values of the power flow resulting from the 
market simulation. Table 4.24 shows the power flow in network regarding the energy 
dispatch and to all services, simultaneously. In this way, it seems that in some branches of 
the network, the power flow has reached the maximum limit of the power allowed to flow 
on the branch. Branch 4-5 is exploited to its limits due to generator G1 allocated on Bus1, 
that is a generation unit cheaper for energy service compared to other generators, as well 
as the thermal limits of the branch that are more restricted than in other branches. 
Table 4.24 – Power flow considering Bialek topological factors. 
Bus i Bus j 
Power flow for energy service Overall power flow Line Capacity 
(MVA) Active (MW) Apparent (MVA) Active (MW) Apparent (MVA) 
1 5 29.08 30.23 -0.91 3.14 40 
2 4 49.81 50.00 48.68 50.00 50 
2 7 49.60 50.00 48.27 49.26 50 
3 4 9.00 11.85 40.71 41.05 50 
3 5 -10.00 10.69 20.84 21.24 50 
4 5 -19.07 20.00 -19.91 20.00 20 
4 6 35.70 37.59 47.62 48.41 50 
4 7 -8.45 9.25 -0.35 1.64 50 
6 7 -41.31 42.53 -47.88 49.45 50 
4.5.3. Results analysis 
This case study was developed in order to demonstrate the advantages of the 
developed methodology. The case study is divided into two distinct scenarios. 
The first scenario describes a joint market simulation based on the use of an AC OPF, 
in which it is verified the infeasibility of the solutions presented by the method, due to all 
services considered in the power flow. 
The second scenario presents the simulation results of the market based on the 
developed methodology which considers the use of an AC OPF and the Bialek topological 
factors, in order to ensure a feasible dispatch for each service on the market. In this way, 
the sequential dispatch of energy, Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning reserve are 
feasible regardless of the hierarchical structure of the services. 
The main advantage of the method developed compared to the methodology in the 
first scenario is the guarantee of obtaining feasible solutions, regardless of the services 
considered in the market. 
The main disadvantages are related to the execution time of the market clearing 
price process, for which in first scenario there is a execution time of around 3 seconds, 
while in the second scenario, the execution time of simulation is about 9 seconds. This 
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disadvantage tends to prevail more when increasing the complexity of the problem, when 
considering more complex constraints in the market simulation. 
Another disadvantage concerns to the operation costs. The first scenario has an 
operational cost of around 7626 (m.u.), while the second scenario involves operation costs 
of around 8014.75 (m.u.). This implies an increase of 5% in operation costs. 
In networks with greater amount of resources, it is assumed that the market 
clearing price is considerably more preponderant, thus yielding different operation costs 
which are considerably significant to the ISO. 
4.6. Case study 5 – Joint Market model applied by VPP 
Based on the model proposed in section 3.6, this section presents a case study 
illustrating the proposed problem. 
The case study presents the results of simulation of an energy and ancillary service 
joint optimization, in which are implemented the following particular characteristics of the 
model: 
 The use of an AC power flow for energy and ancillary services, considering 
the Bialek topological factors; 
 The division of the network into regions for the AS; 
 The introduction of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), namely Distributed 
Generation (DG) units which contemplates technologies related to wind, 
photovoltaic, small hydro units, Combined Heat and Power (CHP), Municipal 
Solid Waste (MSW), Biomass and Fuel Cell, as well as Direct Load Control 
Demand Response (DR) types (Reduce and Cut) and storage units; 
 Complex contracts between the VPP and the owners of generation units.  
Besides contemplating a brief introduction of the problem addressed, this section 
presents all the input data used for the simulation model. 
Several scenarios are considered in order to provide the reader with all the 
characteristics surrounding the problem and its resolution method adopted. At the end of 
this section important conclusions are drawn, showing the usefulness and feasibility of the 
developed model. 
4.6.1. Outline 
In the context of Smart Grid operation, an energy and AS joint market optimization 
considering different bidding regions and complex contracts are discussed in this case 
study. In order to obtain representative results of the desired simulation, it was considered 
the use of input data based on [Faria-2010], with some modifications described throughout 
this section. These changes were developed in order to better display the impact of the 
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proposed algorithm in the simulation performed. The results are divided into five distinct 
scenarios. 
The first scenario contemplates the energy and AS joint market considering the use 
of Bialek topological factors, in order to prevent congestion on the network branches. 
In second scenario are considered the AS network regions. This implies that players 
make bids for their region, although they may participate in other regions if they have the 
availability to do so after the requirement be fulfilled in their region, and that are 
economically advantageous for the VPP. 
The third scenario demonstrates the potential use of DR in regional AS dispatch. 
Besides the DR this scenario shows the use of a relaxation variable. This variable is 
associated with a high penalty, which is only activated when there is a lack or excess of 
generation for AS negotiated in regional market environment. All resources available in 
network regions may participate in the dispatch of this kind of variable. 
The fourth scenario comprises the flexibility of the storage units in the ancillary 
services delivery. It is considered the possibility of decreasing the power charge or 
discharge in ancillary services, taking into account the power scheduled in the energy 
service. 
In the fifth and final scenario, complex contracts in negotiations between the players 
and the VPP for energy service are introduced. The complex contracts covered in this 
scenario are the minimum limit of remuneration or power generation, as well as the 
minimum number of consecutive hours in operation among other contracts. 
The case studies presented in this chapter use a distribution network with 33-bus 
that can be found in [Baran-1989, Faria-2010]. Figure 4.10 shows the projection of 33-bus 
distribution network in 2040 with Distributed Generation (DG) spread over the network 
[Faria-2010]. In this figure, the solid lines represent the branches that are used, and the 
dashed lines represent the branches that can be used in a reconfiguration scenario. In 
Annex C, Table C.1 presents the resistance, inductance and thermal limit of each branch 
used in this distribution network. 
In Figure 4.10 the DG units are represented by different colors, which identify the 
used generation technology. Additionally, the installed power is indicated. For the year 
2040, this network includes 66 DG units (32 photovoltaic, 15 CHP, 8 fuel cell, 5 wind farms, 
3 biomass, 2 small hydro and 1 MSW). For the case studies presented in this chapter, it is 
considered that the VPP has the obligation of buying all the generation power from 
photovoltaic units. The input data relating to the characteristics of the DG and the prices 
applied for the energy service are provided in Annex C, Table C.2. In this context, Annex C 
also provides data for each AS, decomposing into two tables. Table C.3 and Table C.4 
contains illustrative prices for each ancillary service.  
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Figure 4.10 – 33-buses distribution network configuration in 2040 scenario [Faria-2010]. 
All input data presented below are related to the first scenario. The maximum limit 
that each resource can provide to the ancillary services corresponds to a percentage of the 
maximum limit of resource production. The values considered in the base case study are 
presented in Table 4.25. Thus, for Regulation down service each resource has the capacity 
to reduce power until the limit of maximum power reduction, which is equivalent to 5% of 
the maximum limit of overall selling bid, for Regulation Up each resource is limited to 
produce up to 5% of the maximum limit of global production, while for the other ancillary 
services (SP and NS) each resource is limited to produce up to 10% of the maximum limit 
of global production. 
Table 4.25 – Energy and AS upper limits in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Services Percentage of maximum overall production (%) 
Energy 100 
Regulation Down 5 
Regulation Up 5 
Spinning Reserve 10 
Non-Spinning Reserve 10 
 
Additionally, the network contains 32 loads distributed by each bus. Each of the 32 
loads contains specific requirements. Likewise, each load is related to Direct Load Control 
(DLC) DR, which contains the Reduce and Cut types. The Reduce type considers the 
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possibility of gradual decrease in the consumption of the load, while the Cut type involves a 
load curtailment with a fixed power. The DR is associated with energy service for all 
scenarios, although in scenarios three to five the DR is considered for the ancillary services. 
The input data related to the DR are in Annex C, Table C.5. 
Regarding to the AS bids related to the DR, these bids are assigned based on the 
characteristics of DR energy bids. For both types of DR (Reduce and Cut), the amount of 
power of the bids available for RD and RU services corresponds to 10 % of the total 
required demand. While for SP and NS services corresponds to 7% of the total required 
load. The price for each type of DR and for each AS corresponds to 80% of the price of DR 
for energy service, provided in Annex C, in Table C.5. 
Besides the features mentioned above, storage units are included in the network. In 
Annex C, Table C.6 illustrates the characteristics relating to these resources. The 
characteristics inherent in the storage units consist in battery capacity, charge and 
discharge power rate, amount of energy stored in batteries in previous state (the amount of 
initial energy in the batteries) and its charging and discharging prices. 
The AS requirements imposed by the VPP are provided in Table 4.26, an element of 
the case studies presented. These requirements were obtained through the consideration of 
percentage of energy peak load in each time period. The percentages of initial values 
considered are established to be in line with the best view of the characteristics of the 
presented scenarios. The minimum and maximum values of AS requirements shown in the 
Table 4.26, consider the time horizon of 24 periods. 
Table 4.26 – AS requirements in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Ancillary Services 
Requirement 
Minimum (kW) Maximum (kW) Peak Load (%) 
Regulation Down 139.7 181.1 2.5 
Regulation Up 139.7 181.1 2.5 
Spinning Reserve 279.4 362.3 5.0 
Non-Spinning Reserve 279.4 362.3 5.0 
 
The second scenario aims to simulate the energy and ancillary services joint market 
considering different AS bidding regions. 
In this way, it is described below the implied changes to the input data base in order 
to be able to obtain simulation results for the proposed scenario. The base distribution 
network underwent some minor changes. These changes are due to the possibility of 
considering the AS dispatches for individual network regions and they are described below. 
As one can see in Figure 4.11, the network is divided into four distinct regions. (Region 1 – 
red background; Region 2 – blue background; The Region 3 – yellow background; finally, 
the Region 4 – green background).  
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In the context of the dispatch by network regions, the VPP should provide AS 
requirements for each region, in order to be possible to obtain the dispatch for each region. 
The AS requirements for each region are shown in Table 4.27. 
 
Figure 4.11 – AS regions on the 33-buses distribution network. 
However, in AS dispatch to a particular region, other regions can participate in the 
dispatch, but the participation of other regions is limited to 50% of region requirement. 
Table 4.27 – AS requirements by regions, in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Regions Ancillary Services 
Requirement (kW) 
Minimum Mean Maximum 
1 
Regulation Down 18.186 21.810 24.367 
Regulation Up 18.186 21.810 24.367 
Spinning Reserve 36.371 43.620 48.734 
Non-Spinning Reserve 36.371 43.620 48.734 
2 
Regulation Down 53.307 62.798 68.992 
Regulation Up 53.307 62.798 68.992 
Spinning Reserve 106.614 125.595 137.985 
Non-Spinning Reserve 106.614 125.595 137.985 
3 
Regulation Down 35.145 41.588 46.039 
Regulation Up 35.145 41.588 460.39 
Spinning Reserve 70.291 83.177 92.078 
Non-Spinning Reserve 70.291 83.177 92.078 
4 
Regulation Down 33.051 38.306 41.730 
Regulation Up 33.051 38.306 41.730 
Spinning Reserve 66.102 76.611 83.461 
Non-Spinning Reserve 66.102 76.611 83.461 
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The maximum limit that each resource (DG and external supplier) can provide for a 
particular service underwent some changes, being these changes are related to the increase 
of the maximum limit of generation for the Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning 
services. The maximum limit of the overall production doubled, and the limits for each 
resource of each service are shown in Table 4.28. Thus, this change allows increasing the 
probability of obtaining feasible solutions. 
Table 4.28 – Energy and AS upper limits in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Services Percentage of maximum overall production (%) 
Energy 100 
Regulation Down 5 
Regulation Up 10 
Spinning Reserve 25 
Non-Spinning Reserve 15 
 
The third scenario is based on energy and the AS joint market simulation considering 
the introduction of DR and relaxation variables on ancillary services dispatch, is presented 
in this section. In order to obtain the desired scenario, one can proceed to some change of 
the input data regarding the input data of the case study presented in the second scenario. 
In this way, one can consider some significant changes on AS requirements by 
region. Table 4.29 shows the ancillary services requirements for each region imposed by the 
VPP. By comparing Table 4.29 with Table 4.27 of the previous scenario, there is an addition 
in the requirements for the RU and SP services in each region. Although it was possible to 
change the prices of the DR resources in order to become more competitive, it was 
preferred to make changes in the power requirements. The change of values of power 
requirements was chosen because the DR contribution has a major impact in the dispatch, 
and because it is possible to activate the relaxation variables, for lack of sufficient 
generation to provide the service dispatch in a particular region. 
Table 4.29 – AS requirements by region, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Regions Ancillary Services 
Requirement (kW) 
Minimum Mean Maximum 
1 
Regulation Down 18.186 21.810 24.367 
Regulation Up 45.465 54.525 60.918 
Spinning Reserve 109.113 130.860 146.202 
Non-Spinning Reserve 36.371 43.620 48.734 
2 
Regulation Down 53.307 62.798 68.992 
Regulation Up 133.268 156.995 172.480 
Spinning Reserve 319.842 376.785 413.955 
Non-Spinning Reserve 106.614 125.595 137.985 
3 
Regulation Down 35.145 41.588 46.039 
Regulation Up 87.863 103.970 115.098 
Spinning Reserve 210.873 249.531 276.234 
Non-Spinning Reserve 70.291 83.177 92.078 
4 
Regulation Down 33.051 38.306 41.730 
Regulation Up 82.628 95.765 104.325 
Spinning Reserve 198.306 229.833 250.383 
Non-Spinning Reserve 66.102 76.611 83.461 
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The maximum production limits of each resource (DG and external supplier) for each 
service have been changed. These changes are shown in Table 4.30, which imposes the 
maximum limit production of each DG and external suppliers for each service, depending on 
the overall limit of resource production. In this way, the percentage values for each existing 
service in Table 4.30 correspond to a percentage of the overall value which the resource 
can provide for a certain service. These values assume that the maximum limit of global 
production corresponds to the sum of all services which produce energy (energy, Regulation 
Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning reserve). 
Table 4.30 – Energy and AS upper limits, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Services Percentage of maximum overall production (%) 
Energy 100 
Regulation Down 5 
Regulation Up 5 
Spinning Reserve 5 
Non-Spinning Reserve 10 
 
In order to obtain a considerable dispatch of DR for ancillary services, was 
established for each load the maximum limits for DLC DR types (Reduce and Cut) regarding 
each ancillary service. Table 4.31 shows the range of values that fall within the DR 
resources for each service. In this way, the main changes relate to services (RU and NS), in 
which the capacity of each resource can offer in the market is equivalent to the portion of 
energy service. Thus, these resources will have greater participation and influence in the 
dispatch of their respective services. Furthermore, it was established that the Spinning 
Reserve requirement would be three times higher than the used in the base case. In the 
same direction, the Regulation Up requirement suffered an increase equivalent to 250% of 
the values presented in the base scenario mentioned in this case study. 
Each value shown in the Table 4.31 refers to the maximum limit that each type of 
DR can achieve in terms of limits for the DR energy service. Therefore, the dispatch of the 
DR of type Reduce may involve this resource up to a maximum limit equivalent to the used 
in the energy service. 
Table 4.31 – Demand response types for each service. 
DR 
Percentage of maximum limit of DR in energy service (%) 
Reduce Cut 
Regulation Up 100 100 
Spinning Reserve 10 10 
Non-Spinning Reserve 100 100 
 
The fourth scenario considers an energy and AS joint market simulations with the 
inclusion of storage units bids in the ancillary services procurement. Beyond these 
considerations, this scenario comprises all the features developed in previous scenarios. 
However, several changes were implemented in the input data, as well as the increment of 
new data necessary to perform this scenario. 
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Table 4.32 shows the requirement for each ancillary service according to the regions 
of the network. By comparing this table with Table 4.27, one can verify that the difference 
between these two AS requirements tables happens for Regulation Down service. For this 
scenario it was established the change of the RD requirement in order to verify the 
possibility of contribution of storage resources in this dispatch. In this way, the RD 
requirement is five times higher than the stipulated in the base case which corresponds to 
12.5% of the load power service value. 
Table 4.32 – AS requirements by region in scenario 4 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Regions Ancillary Services 
Requirement (kW) 
Minimum Mean Maximum 
1 
Regulation Down 90.929 109.050 121.836 
Regulation Up 18.186 21.810 24.367 
Spinning Reserve 36.371 43.620 48.734 
Non-Spinning Reserve 36.371 43.620 48.734 
2 
Regulation Down 266.535 313.988 344.962 
Regulation Up 53.307 62.798 68.992 
Spinning Reserve 106.614 125.595 137.985 
Non-Spinning Reserve 106.614 125.595 137.985 
3 
Regulation Down 175.727 207.942 230.195 
Regulation Up 35.145 41.588 46.039 
Spinning Reserve 70.291 83.177 92.078 
Non-Spinning Reserve 70.291 83.177 92.078 
4 
Regulation Down 165.255 191.528 208.652 
Regulation Up 33.051 38.306 41.730 
Spinning Reserve 66.102 76.611 83.461 
Non-Spinning Reserve 66.102 76.611 83.461 
 
The prices of charge and discharge energy from the storage units for AS were based 
on the power service price. These values are available in Table C.7, Annex C. 
4.6.2. Results 
4.6.2.1. Scenario 1 – Baseline case 
In the energy and AS joint market, the power flow that each service implies in the 
network must be adapted to the technical constraints of the network and services. In this 
regard, the energy and AS market simulation is sequentially executed in order to ensure the 
feasibility and reliability of the power system. 
The simulation process comprises the phases described in the introduction model of 
the section 3.5. Thus, for energy, RU and SP services Bialek methodology is used to 
determine the Bialek topological factors based on the power flow of each service, restrict 
network resources with the purpose of preventing network congestion. The final dispatch 
results of the joint simulation are based on the calculated limits during the process. 
Hereupon, Figure 4.12 illustrates the energy dispatch for the 24-hour period and the 
subsequent portion of the resources used in the dispatch. 
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The percentage of influence that each resource type comprises the energy dispatch 
is given by Figure C.1 of Annex C. This figure provides a simplistic overview of the share 
that each kind of resource has in dispatch. In the energy dispatch the share supplied by DG 
resources is significant, although much of the energy is provided by the external supplier. 
 
Figure 4.12 – Energy dispatch by type of resource, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
As it is known, the DG comprises several production technologies. Therefore, Figure 
4.13 illustrates the amount of energy which was supplied by each DG technology to the 
energy dispatch, while Figure C.2 of Annex C illustrates the percentage contribution of each 
DG technology to be more easily perceptible the importance that each technology has on 
energy dispatch for each hour period. 
 
Figure 4.13 – Energy dispatch by distributed generation technologies contribution, in scenario 1 of joint market 
model applied by VPP. 
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The DR is an important resource which contributes to the balance of the system. As 
seen in Figure 4.12, the DR was activated, reducing the amount of load to be supplied. 
However, this resource is divided into two types, as mentioned in the previous subsection. 
In this way, Figure 4.14 shows the dispatched amount of each type of DR, and the portion 
of resulting load being supplied by the generators and external suppliers. The resulting load 
is obtained by subtracting the sum of DR against the requirement of load initially required 
by the VPP. 
 
Figure 4.14 – Type of DR for energy dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
In Annex C, Figure C.3 presents the percentage contribution of the type of DR in 
energy dispatch for each period. In what concerns the ancillary services, the dispatch of 
each service is represented by Figure 4.15, Figure 4.16, Figure 4.17 and Figure 4.18.  
Figure 4.15 represents the Regulation Down dispatch in accordance with the service 
required by the VPP. The contribution that each resource gives to the RD dispatch is shown 
in Figure C.4. In periods 17 to 20, there is a large contribution of external suppliers in the 
RD dispatch. This contribution is due to the fact that in these periods the price of external 
suppliers is lower for upstream and downstream periods of this range. Also in this context it 
seems that CHP units price (main DG technology providing the dispatch) are higher when 
compared with other periods.  
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Figure 4.15 – Regulation down dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Regarding the Regulation Up service, Figure 4.16 illustrates the RU dispatch for each 
hour. In this figure it is possible to see the participation which DG resources have in service 
dispatch. Considering the total energy dispatched in 24 periods of one hour, based on 
Figure C.4 it is known that DG satisfies the requirement of Regulation Up required by the 
VPP in the market, about 28%, which implies that the remaining part is provided by the 
external supplier. 
 
Figure 4.16 – Regulation up dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
The dispatch regarding the SP reserve is represented by Figure 4.17. In Annex C, 
Figure C.4 presents the percentage of energy that each resource type supplies to the 
Spinning Reserve requirement. 
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Figure 4.17 – Spinning reserve dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
Figure 4.18 represents the NS dispatch. The overall contribution which DG and 
external supplier provides for the service is shown in Figure C.4 of Annex C. 
 
Figure 4.18 – Non-spinning reserve dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
With these figures which represent the dispatch for each service, it is possible to 
highlight some variations in the energy and AS dispatch, since the maximum capacity of 
each bid is conditioned according to the maximum power limit constraint for the services of 
production addition, concerning the model of section 3.6. 
4.6.2.2. Scenario 2 – Base case with different bidding 
regions 
The division of AS requirements by network regions has as primary goal the 
prevention of any congestion in the network. Therefore, the areas of the network where 
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their lines have high probabilities of congestion are delimited. In this way, the methodology 
implemented becomes important, preventing from network problems. However, the solution 
becomes more expensive from the viewpoint of the dispatch of resources, since at least 
50% of each AS requirement must be provided for the resources of this region. Thus, in 
order to be able to compare the results obtained with the base case in section 4.6.2.1, the 
dispatch of each AS for each region can be exposed in a global view. 
The energy dispatch for the scenario described in this subsection is shown in Figure 
4.19, in which it is possible to verify that there was a decrease in the resource use of DR 
and discharge of storage units, compared to the scenario presented in the previous 
subsection. This is due to the simple fact that the maximum limit of overall production has 
been changed in this scenario, in which the maximum limit of overall production 
corresponds exactly to the sum of the maximum limit of each service of increase 
generation. In this way, the DR and storage resources are typically more expensive than 
some of the DG resources. Thus, it originates a bigger contribution of the DG resources to 
the energy dispatch than the DR resources. 
 
Figure 4.19 – Energy dispatch by type of resource, in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
In Annex C, Figure C.5 represents the percentage that each type of resource has in 
the energy dispatch. Figure C.6 and Figure C.7 show the contribution and importance that 
each type of DG technology has in energy dispatch, respectively. These graphs allow 
identifying in detail the variation of the generation cycle of each kind of resource over the 
period of one day. The amount of types of DR dispatched is given by Figure C.8 and Figure 
C.9 in which it is visible the low priority that this kind of resource has in this scenario. This 
is due to the increase in the maximum limit of global generation, which allows the use of 
larger amounts of power in energy dispatch on the part of generators. 
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Regarding the AS dispatch, the market simulation is performed for each of the 
regions, in order to obtain the global AS dispatch in the network. This implies that each 
region has its own AS dispatch. Accordingly, in order to be able to observe the impact which 
this methodology has in the scope of global ancillary services, Figure 4.20 illustrates the 
amount of generation dispatched by the generators of the different regions for Regulation 
Up service. In turn, the Regulation Down dispatch is provided in Annex C, Figure C.10. 
 
Figure 4.20 – Overall regions regulation up dispatch. 
In each region, the generators from the region are forced to provide at least 50% of 
the RU requirement for this region. This implies that regions in which the production cost is 
lower than other regions, will have a tendency to produce more than the necessary for their 
service in order to deliver energy to other regions according to the network technical limits. 
These events are easily visible in Figure 4.21. 
 
Figure 4.21 – Regulation up dispatch by each region. 
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For periods 1 to 8 and 24, the generation of all resources in Region 1, dispatches 
more output than the limit required by the VPP for this region. However, the opposite 
happens in periods between period 12 and period 22 in which the power generation by the 
generators of the Region 1 is roughly half of the requirement required by the VPP, implying 
the need to import from other regions. For the remaining periods (period 9 to 11, and 23), 
the respective requirement is mostly supplied by internal generation units of Region 1. 
However, it needs some imports from other regions. Region 2 in all periods need to import, 
since in most periods the internal resources only supply little more than 50% of the AS 
requirement. The greatest part of the import of the Region 2 refers to export of the Region 
4. This is because Region 4 has some CHP units with a generation capacity significantly 
higher than CHP units from Region 2. As this kind of resources are generally the cheapest 
resources, they assume a large contribution in the AS dispatch in the network. This 
difference of generation in each region could be clearly superior to that achieved, if it was 
not considered a constraint concerning a certain amount of regional AS requirement be 
provided by internal resources of the region. With this rule, the VPP ensures that the 
interties between regions suffer less congestion, thus ensuring a lower dependence on 
certain resources and, as a consequence, a greatest reliability of the system. 
It should be emphasized that exporting energy in any region is only available for 
resources, in case that the requirement of their respective region is fully satisfied by 
internal resources. 
The global dispatch related to the resources of DG technologies and external supplier 
for the RU service is given in Figure C.11 of Annex C. 
 
Figure 4.22 – Overall regions spinning reserve dispatch. 
Following the same principle of presentation and explanation of the Regulation Up 
reserve, the Spinning and Non-Spinning reserves are simulated in the same way. For the 
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Spinning reserve, the overall dispatch is represented by Figure 4.22. The dispatch which 
concern the AS requirement imposed by the VPP for each region is shown in Figure 4.23. 
In the Spinning reserve dispatch, the external supplier is not dispatched at any 
period of the simulation. This is due to the combination of possibilities inherent to the 
optimization process. For this service, it seems that Regions 3 and 4 are exporting regions 
with a large impact, mainly in the supply of Region 2 requirement, which remains a typically 
import region. 
 
Figure 4.23 – Spinning reserve dispatch by each region. 
The global Spinning Reserve dispatch is shown in Figure C.12 of Annex C. 
With regards to Non-Spinning service, the global dispatch for this service is 
illustrated by Figure 4.24, while the dispatch for each region and its requirement is 
represented in Figure 4.25. 
 
Figure 4.24 – Overall regions non-spinning reserve dispatch. 
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Regarding the Non-Spinning reserve dispatch, the results show that a considerable 
part of the energy necessary to dispatch this service between periods 2 to 7 is provided by 
the external suppliers. This is due to a set of specific situations. First, the limit of production 
implemented in the model based on Bialek factors, which do not allow that the production 
of each energy resource for Non-Spinning reserve exceeds the limits calculated in order to 
make the energy and ancillary services joint dispatch unfeasible. Another frequent situation 
arises when the overall maximum limits of a generator is reached (the sum of production 
dispatched to services of energy, RU, SP and NS reach its maximum production capacity). 
These two conditions combined give rise to the need for dispatching external suppliers and, 
expensive generators with some freedom of production to meet the service requirements 
for each region. 
 
Figure 4.25 – Non-spinning reserve dispatch by each region. 
In Annex C, Figure C.12 illustrates the global dispatch of the service considering the 
types of resources surrounding the dispatch of the referred service. 
4.6.2.3. Scenario 3 – DR resources and RLXD variable on AS 
dispatch 
In this scenario the results for the introduction of the types of DR and relaxation 
variables of the problem for the ancillary services are presented. From the point of view of 
energy service, this scenario does not involve significant changes in the energy dispatch, 
this occurs due to the maximum limits of resources for the energy service that has not 
changed. In this way, the results and conclusions of this scenario focus on the AS 
dispatches. 
The Regulation Down dispatch does not consider the use of types of DR established 
in the model. The types of DR consider only the load reduction, which is infeasible for the 
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RD service. This service hires resources to reduce generation or increase the consumption 
in the network. Thus, the proposed types of DR are not suitable for this service. 
In this context, Figure C.13 and Figure C.14 in Annex C provide the dispatch and 
their percentage of contribution of each resource to the RD service. 
With regards to the Regulation Up service, the contribution of Demand Response is 
quite considerable. In Figure 4.26 it is possible to see a large participation of DR in regional 
dispatch of RU. In this way, the types of DR are fairly useful for the RU dispatch, thereby 
reducing the operation cost compared to the service requirement, if provided only by DG 
technologies and external suppliers. In Annex C one can find the global dispatch of the RU 
reserve in Figure C.15. 
 
Figure 4.26 – Regulation up dispatch considering DR resources. 
In the context of the widespread use of DR for RU service and for each region of the 
network, Figure 4.27 presents the contribution of each Type of DR in each region for this 
service. 
Depending on the region, the contribution of each Type of DR may vary 
considerably. For example in Regions 1, 2 and 3 there is a greater participation of DR 
Reduce type, while in Region 4, the DR Cut is clearly superior to the DR Reduce. Briefly, the 
Demand Response Cut type to the loads of Region 4 is less expensive, and has, therefore, a 
greater contribution in the regulation up dispatch. 
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Figure 4.27 – Types of DR dispatch in each region for RU service. 
With regards to the Spinning Reserve dispatch, Figure C.16 of Annex C illustrates the 
global dispatch of SP service, in which can be seen the impact that the DG, DR and external 
suppliers has in the dispatch. Following this perspective, the contribution of each type of 
resource by network region is shown in Figure C.17 of Annex C. 
The maximum capacity of each DR resource in this service is equivalent to 10% of 
the maximum capacity for the same resource for the Regulation Up service. In this way, for 
the SP service the DR was fully used, implying that to satisfy the regional requirement it is 
required more power of the DG and external suppliers, as compared to the RU service. 
Thus, based on Figure C.16, it is concluded that the DR and external suppliers are a crucial 
part of the SP dispatch, since the maximum capacity generation of DG resources in both 
services (RU and SP) is similar. 
 
Figure 4.28 – Types of DR dispatch in each region for SP service. 
 
Electricity Markets Modeling Considering Complex Contracts and Aggregators 
October 2013  137 
Figure 4.28 illustrates the DR dispatch by network regions for the SP service. 
Comparing Figure 4.28 with Figure 4.27 (concerning the RU dispatch) one can see an 
increased contribution of the DR Cut type in regions 2 and 3. 
In this context, the use of almost the total generation capacity of DG and DR 
resources leads to the availability of using relaxation variables when resources fail to 
generate enough energy to supply the load. 
The use of relaxation variables are typically used in two different ways. Firstly, the 
relaxation variables can only be used in the optimization process as a means for the VPP to 
identify the situation in which the dispatch is infeasible, creating a problem to VPP towards 
solving the problem of infeasible solution. 
Secondly, the VPP knows through the relaxation variables what are the problems of 
the dispatch, and through bilateral contracts with generation units it ensures the feasibility 
of the dispatch. This is the way normally used by the ISO or VPP to solve the problem of the 
infeasible dispatch. 
The model developed presents a third way of looking at the problem, which consists 
in the procurement of resources in the market optimization that could contribute to the 
feasibility of the dispatch regarding all regions. However, from the beginning one does not 
know in which regions of the network these situations can happen. In this way, it is possible 
to implement a constraint on the model which uses the resources of other regions of the 
network to meet the requirement of a particular region. 
In this context, Figure 4.29 shows the Spinning Reserve dispatch of region 2 in 
which is evident the use of the relaxation variable RLXD. 
 
Figure 4.29 – SP dispatch in region 2, by each resource. 
In this case, the relaxation variable will be entirely provided by the external supplier, 
because the DG and DR were completely used in all regions of the network. All internal 
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resources of region 2 have insufficient capacity to provide at least 50% of the Spinning 
requirement of its region. In this way, the generation provided by the external supplier for 
the variable is remunerated at a high price, in which the relaxation variable is only used to 
achieve the 50% of the regional AS requirement, since it is mandatory to offset at least 
50% of requirement be provided by the internal resources of the region. It can be 
concluded that the relaxation variable complements the needs of generation in case of 
internal resources of the region being insufficient to provide partial or full regional AS 
requirement. 
The respective regional dispatch to the remaining network regions can be found in 
Annex C, Figure C.18, Figure C.19 and Figure C.20. 
Regarding to the Non-Spinning reserve dispatch, one can verify that the DG and DR 
generation are practically sufficient to meet the load in all time periods except for the period 
corresponding to hour 3. 
In this way, the regional NS service dispatch is illustrated in Figure 4.30 (the global 
dispatch of the service by all kind of resources is shown in Figure C.21 and presented in 
Annex C). 
 
Figure 4.30 – NS dispatch by network regions, considering DR resources. 
Regarding the contribution of DR in this service dispatch (Figure 4.31), it seems that 
regions 3 and 4 cover a greater sharing of types of DR while regions 1 and 2 contemplates 
greater involvement of DG in these regions dispatch. This is mainly due to the price and 
generation capacities provided by DR resources in certain regions of the network. 
The types of DR can be very useful in the stability of power systems. Through the 
scenario presented is clear the need to consider these resources in the complex managing 
of ancillary services. 
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Figure 4.31 – Types of DR dispatch in each region for NS service. 
These resources may reach a more economical management of the energy and AS 
joint market. However, it is important to note that the excessive use of a particular 
resource type is not good for the stability and management of all kind of resources in the 
power systems. Briefly, this scenario shows the potentiality of DR in a efficient ancillary 
services dispatch, as well as the use of generators in special cases, such as situations in 
which the internal energy generation in a region is not enough to satisfy the AS 
requirements  imposed by the VPP. In these cases, the implemented relaxation variables 
are a way to ensure the feasible dispatch of ancillary services. 
4.6.2.4. Scenario 4 – Storage units on AS dispatch 
The introduction of storage units in the energy and AS joint procurement is critical to 
the proper management of network resources. Due to its particular characteristics, the 
storage units can adapt properly to the AS. Their ability to charge and discharge energy 
allows a careful management by the VPP regarding the load curve. These resources can be 
used to charge energy in times of energy excess, as well as discharge energy in peak load 
situations. In this context, its adaptability to ancillary services is an added value to the VPP 
management. Therefore, the main function of storage units in the smart grid paradigm is to 
ensure ancillary services. In this way, the results and conclusions presented in this scenario 
are mainly directed to the management of these resources in the ancillary services 
procurement. 
The energy dispatch results obtained in this scenario can be found in Annex C, 
Figure C.22 and Figure C.23. In these figures it is visible a small storage charge in off peak 
hours, which shows that the energy stored in these hours can be used in ancillary services 
in other periods. 
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Regarding the Regulation Down service dispatch, the storage units contribution may 
be important for increasing consumption levels. Knowing that the RD service is 
characterized for being a service of decreasing generation that it is required when there is 
excess generation in the power service, the storage charge variable fits to increase the 
power consumption. Thus, the storage units fit perfectly the RD service characteristics. 
In Figure 4.32 it is possible to see a small contribution of this kind of resource in the 
service dispatch between periods 19 and 23. In this way, the daily storage units’ 
contribution to this service reaches 0.6% of the daily total requirement necessary. 
 
Figure 4.32 – Regulation down dispatch considering storage units. 
Regarding the Regulation Up service, the participation of storage units highlights the 
usefulness of this energy resource in the VPP management. 
 
Figure 4.33 – Regulation up dispatch considering storage units by network regions. 
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Figure 4.33 shows the contribution of these resources in the RU dispatch by network 
regions. In periods 21 and 22, it is visible the storage units contribution from regions 2 and 
4 in the service dispatch. Thus, it appears that there is a large set of several kinds of 
energy resources from different regions that compete with each other. In these two periods, 
it was also observed that the external suppliers do not participate in the dispatch. Figure 
C.24, Annex C illustrates in detail the storage unit participation by network regions, as well 
as the amount of charge and discharge of these resources in this service. 
The storage share in SP service follows the same methodological principle of RU 
service. Figure 4.34 illustrates the SP service dispatch, considering the DG, DR, external 
suppliers and storage resources by network regions. In this figure it is possible to see a 
considerable share of storage in SP dispatch in several periods of the day. This kind of 
resources contributes in around 10% of the global generation necessary to meet the daily 
service requirement. The largest share of this resource occurred in period 21 with around 
46%, while period 3 corresponds to the period with lower share of around 0.5%. The 
maximum contribution of storage units in period 21 is justified by the price of external 
suppliers during this period to be higher than the storage price. The period 21 corresponds 
to the maximum peak of the external suppliers price in relation to all period range. Thus, it 
appears that the contribution of external suppliers is lower when compared to other periods. 
 
Figure 4.34 – Spinning reserve dispatch considering storage units by network regions. 
The amount of energy per network region may be seen in detail in Figure 4.35. One 
of the ways of storage units to participate in this service involves the discharge of energy. 
Another way is by decreasing the charge of the storage acquired in energy service; i.e. the 
storage unit which charge in energy service may participate in the SP service, by reducing 
the charge that acquired in energy service. This occurred for storage units from region 2 
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between the periods 3 and 6, with greater emphasis in periods 5 and 6. The storage 
contribution through discharge energy tends to become more noticeable during peak 
periods (periods of increased energy consumption). Furthermore, the storage units from 
region 2 were those which participated with more power to satisfy the service. 
 
Figure 4.35 – Storage charge and discharge share by network regions for SP dispatch. 
Regarding the Non-Spinning Reserve service, Figure 4.36 illustrates the storage, DG, 
DR and external suppliers’ resources participation by network regions in the scope of the NS 
service dispatch. The storage contribution in the daily service dispatch reached 5% of the 
total supply of the service. The use of the storage units in the service reduces the need for 
external suppliers to participate in it. 
 
Figure 4.36 – Non-spinning reserve dispatch considering storage units by network regions. 
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Through Figure 4.37 it is noticeable the involvement of the storage resources from 
period 9 to period 23, with greater preponderance in the range between 20 and 23. In 
general, the region which occupies most of these resources to meet the service requirement 
is region 2. Nearly 43.9% of the total energy supplied by the storage comes from region 2, 
43.6% comes from region 4 and the remaining 12.5% are provided by region 3, while the 
storage of region 1 have no share in the dispatch. In period 21 there is a higher share of 
storage in the hourly service dispatch – about 32% of the total energy supplied. 
 
Figure 4.37 – Storage charge and discharge share by network regions for NS dispatch. 
4.6.2.5. Scenario 5 – Complex Contracts 
The increasing use of distributed energy resources, namely DG, DR and storage units 
in the power system, requires a continuous adaptability of the management of these 
resources. In this way, the aggregation of small players with a VPP is especially important 
for these resources in the competitive environment of the electricity market. However, the 
aggregation of all kinds of resources is important for the VPP which can have greater 
amplitude in its strategies during the trade in a competitive environment increasingly 
complex. 
In order to achieve a proper management of the available resources and the goals, 
the VPP must match the contract conditions established with the resources. However, 
players can choose from the available set of VPPs which are interested in their aggregation, 
or to act individually in the smart grid context. In order to encourage the aggregation of the 
most interesting players, the VPPs need to propose competitive contracts conditions that 
guarantee competitive benefits to these players [Vale-2011]. 
This scenario includes all the methodology involving the model presented in section 
3.6. Besides the methodology used in the previous scenario, this scenario adds the 
involvement of several specific and complex contracts, namely the minimum generated 
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energy in period t and in time horizon T, the power gradient between periods, the minimum 
remuneration in time horizon T, the number of working hours and a maximum number of 
times that each generator enters in the service. 
The application of these contracts is reflected in the scope of the electricity market 
for the energy and ancillary services. In order to demonstrate the issues that the contracts 
mentioned above provide to the energy and ancillary services, it was developed a set of 
simulations capable of illustrating the usefulness of these contractual conditions within the 
market for both perspectives of the VPP and the owners of power generation units 
addressed in the distribution network of this case study. 
The simulations are based on the input data regarding the base case, with a few 
changes for each simulation of each type of contract. The set of simulations has the purpose 
of providing a better perception and understanding of the capacity of each contract of 
influencing the resource management, thereby accommodating the objectives of the 
producers and the needs of the VPP. 
The first type of contract introduced in this scenario concerns the minimum limit of 
energy produced by the generator in a 24-hour period, i.e., the contract ensures that the 
producer, if dispatched, produces at least the minimum limit defined a priori. 
To simulate this contract, it was established a minimum limit of energy throughout 
the day by portions of maximum capacity production of the day. 
 
Figure 4.38 – Dispatched energy and operation cost for contract type 1. 
Figure 4.38 shows the impact of minimum daily scheduled energy contracts used by 
wind farms in the VPP operation cost and in the total energy dispatched for producers with 
this type of contract. The minimum daily energy values imposed in the contracts are based 
on the wind generation forecast. As it can be seen in Figure 4.38, the scheduled wind 
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energy in the base case already uses a large percentage of available wind energy (almost 
50%). However, when it requires the total use of generating capacity of wind energy, it 
causes a radical increase in the VPP operation costs. 
At 75% of the imposed minimum schedule energy, the operation cost does not 
increase significantly. This is beneficial to the owners of wind turbines, since the 
considerable increase in power generation (about 17.3%) does not imply a large increase in 
the VPP operation costs (about 0.48%). Thus, the wind players are quite favoured with this 
situation. 
The second type of contract refers to the gradient of generation in each period. This 
contract sets for each period of 1 hour a limit for the increase/decrease power generation 
according to the previous period. 
To simulate this contract, one can change the data relating to external suppliers. In 
this way, it was established a value of power generated by the external supplier for the 
period prior to the beginning of the simulation. 
Knowing that the simulation is performed for the period of 1 hour with a time 
horizon of 24 hours, the amount of power established for the initial period (t-1) corresponds 
almost to the power dispatched by the external supplier in t=1 related to the base case. 
Each simulation comprises a value of the gradient of generation relatively small in 
order to limit very high levels of variation of generation. In this way, the gradient values of 
generation used for contract simulation vary between 0.25% and 5% of the power 
dispatched at (t-1). 
The results of the simulations considering maximum generation gradient contracts 
applied to the external supplier are shown in Figure 4.39. In this figure it is possible to see 
the development of the total energy generated throughout the period, and the VPP 
operation costs, according to the imposed maximum gradient. 
It can be concluded that for this scenario the contracts imposing maximum gradient 
values over 2.50% have a strong impact on the perspective of the operating costs of VPP. 
For these cases a variation of the energy produced by the external supplier means a 
substantial increase in the operation costs. This is caused by the need of the VPP to contract 
more expensive resources to compensate the generation decrease of production of external 
suppliers. However, when reducing the generation gradient of external supplier at low 
levels, the difference in operation costs is not that much relevant because the external 
suppliers lose importance in the dispatch, since it is necessary to hire more expensive 
generation units with greater flexibility in variation of the generation between operating 
periods. This leads to the reduction of the global generation of external supplier. 
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Figure 4.39 – Dispatched energy and operation cost for contract type 2. 
The third type of contract imposes a minimum limit of remuneration for the whole 24 
hours, i.e., it ensures a guaranteed minimum remuneration, regardless the energy 
produced in each hourly period. 
In order to simulate the desired contract, it is necessary to amend the input data of 
the base case presented below. The simulation of the contract is divided into several 
simulations by parcels of the desired minimum remuneration. In this way, in the simulation 
it is imposed the minimum remuneration desired by percentage of the maximum possible 
remuneration. 
The considered contract is established between a Fuel Cell unit and the VPP. This 
contract types imposes a minimum remuneration for the Fuel Cell unit throughout the time 
horizon. The minimum remuneration levels were determined for each Fuel Cell unit, 
according to its maximum generation capacity and the hourly energy price. The results are 
shown in Figure 4.40. 
In Figure 4.40 it seems that with the gradual increase of the charge of minimum 
remuneration, there is a slight variation in the VPP operation cost. This happens due to the 
influence the capacity of power generation of Fuel Cell units has in the VPP resource 
management. In other words, the capacity of power generation of the Fuel Cell units is 
relatively small when compared to all the available resources in the network. The last two 
levels of imposed remuneration provide a growing increase in the VPP operation costs. 
However, the variation of the VPP operation costs between the minimum and maximum 
level of remuneration does not exceed 1.2%. 
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Figure 4.40 – Dispatched energy and operation costs for contract type 3. 
The fourth type of contract establishes a minimum period of generation during the 
overall period of 24 hours. Producers with this type of contract are dispatched for a number 
of consecutive periods, thereby reducing start-up costs. 
In order to simulate the proposed contract, the following changes of input data 
regarding the base case are considered. First, the energy price from the CHP technology 
generators has risen to 0.5 m.u./kWh. It is also considered that in period (t-1) the 
generators related to this contract were operational, i.e., the generators in the period prior 
to the period when the simulation started (t-1) is connected and it is supplying power to the 
network. 
 
Figure 4.41 – Number of working periods for contract type 4. 
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Figure 4.41 and Figure 4.42 show the results of the simulations considering the CHP 
generators contracts that impose a minimum number of working periods. Generally, the 
CHP presents low generation costs, therefore most CHP units are dispatched during many 
time periods. If it is set an increase in the energy price generated by CHP, of course, the 
number of working periods decreases considerably. Setting a minimum number of working 
periods by scale illustrated in Figure 4.41, one can conclude that the CHP units related to 
the buses between 1 and 17 are considered more expensive generators, when compared to 
other neighbours resources of these CHP units. 
In Figure 4.42 it is noticeable that the inclusion of this contract in the resource 
management is not expensive, because the increase in VPP operation costs with the total 
introduction of the contract (stipulating that all CHP generators participate in the market in 
the 24 periods) is less than 1.8% over the base case. 
 
Figure 4.42 – Dispatched energy and operation cost for contact type 4. 
This contract is particularly suited to certain distributed generation technologies, 
capable of generating a constant amount of energy over a time horizon of 24 hours. The 
CHP technology is tailored for this type of contract, because besides getting a constant 
production, this technology has a slow cold startup which does not allow its system 
operation to be in constant intermittency (on/off). Moreover, the system startup has a 
considerable cost in managing this system. 
The fifth and final contract consists in a maximum number of entries in service 
throughout the 24 hours. In this context, the producer is forced to ensure stability from 
generation to avoid being excluded from the selection of production for the period 
established. 
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In order to a simulation of the contract be capable of reproducing results easily 
understood, some changes were made to the input data of the base case which influence 
the results of the problem. This type of contract imposes a maximum number of times that 
each generator enters in service. In this scenario it has been applied to the CHP generators. 
In this context, the energy price of all generating units related to the CHP technology 
increases to 0.4 m.u./kWh. 
Figure 4.43 and Figure 4.44 show the obtained results. Figure 4.43 shows the 
number of service entrances of each CHP generator in accordance with the imposed limit. 
 
Figure 4.43 – Maximum number of entries into service. 
Figure 4.44 shows the evolution of the total CHP generated energy and the VPP 
operation cost, regarding the established contracts. 
 
Figure 4.44 – Dispatched energy and operation cost for contract type 5. 
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Comparing the results of the base scenario (without contract – “None”), with the 
more rigid enforcement of this contract, the global energy dispatch of CHP generators 
increased about 0.16%, while the VPP operation costs increased about 0.52%. 
Generally, the VPP can use this kind of contract to apply to CHP plants players, 
which also may want to set this kind of contract with the VPP in order to obtain generation 
stability, reducing the costs related to the system startup, and sometimes the need to work 
in the minimum load limit possible to maintain its system in a state of “readiness” to be 
ready to supply power at any time. Thus, this contract could be a feature or complement to 
other contracts. 
4.6.3. Results analysis 
The amount of distributed energy resources in power systems has increasing 
significantly in the past years. In the future, power systems will have to deal with large-
scale integration of DG, types of DR and storage units. These resources can be crucial for 
the energy dispatch and for participation in ancillary services, in order to ensure the 
stability and security of supply requirements from the network and consumers. 
In this context, the case study developed presents a perspective on the value and 
complexity of the proposed model. With this purpose, the case study was divided into five 
distinct parts, in which the complexity of each scenario gradually increases. 
Firstly, it was developed a base scenario which considers the simulation of energy 
and ancillary service joint market implemented in a distribution network with extensive 
introduction of DER, using an AC optimal power flow. In this simulation, both the energy 
and ancillary services compete for power flow in the network. For this purpose, it has been 
used the Bialek topological factors method for solving this problem proposed in section 3.5. 
The method allows knowing the contribution of each generator in line congestion. Thus, it 
becomes possible to simulate which AS congestion causes in the network. In this way, it is 
known that the dispatch obtained for all services are feasible, implying that when AS are 
needed the prior dispatch is very close to reality, not requiring major readjustments, 
preventing a considerable increase in the operation costs of ancillary services for the VPP. 
The second scenario includes all the features of the first scenario, with the biddings 
of the players in the market related to AS that can be made by network regions. The 
players from each region propose their bids in the market for different regions. The ability 
of the VPP of acting with mutual function of economical and technical management allows 
the VPP to manage the resources according to the rule, in which the generation units of 
each region should ensure the supply of at least 50% of the necessary requirement of the 
region in which they are located. This model allows the VPP prevent from potential 
congested lines in the border regions. The regions are established according to a forecast of 
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possible congestion of an important supply zone, not causing energy not supplied, and also 
ensuring network stability. 
The third scenario includes the use of DR resources participating in the AS dispatch. 
The types of DR (namely Cut and Reduce) can be an important resource in the network 
stability. However, the DR is typically used a few times in a year, as the goal of the system 
is to produce and to supply energy and not excessively to reduce the load [Walawalkar-
2010]. In addition, this scenario includes the use of relaxation variables for each AS, and 
consequently for each region. This variable has the purpose of maintaining the network 
stability by lack or excess generation in each region. The presented model allows the 
generation units in regions with excess of generation (relaxation variable = 0) to participate 
in requirements in other regions. The VPP has to procure generation units which are capable 
of filling this variable without affecting network stability. 
The fourth scenario considers the use of storage units in AS provision. The particular 
features of this kind of resources allow a greater management flexibility of energy and 
especially the ancillary services by the VPP. Due to the storage units’ flexibility to charge 
and discharge along the time period, they can be used to store energy during low cost 
periods and discharge at peak periods. In this way, these resources can provide a good 
alternative for the diagram loads management compared to traditional resources. However, 
these resources have a greater impact in AS, because they are more expensive than 
traditional resources, thereby they do not regularly contribute to the energy service. 
Moreover, the energy storage capacity is limited, not having a large storage capacity. Thus, 
these resources are suited to the participation in the AS dispatch. 
The fifth and final part of this case study includes all the features of the previous 
parts and introduces complex contracts between the VPP and players. The implemented 
methodology considers several types of complex contracts which enable players to impose 
relevant constraints when they establish contracts. 
Complex contracts are very important to enable the aggregated players to achieve 
their goals. Although they make the energy resource management more complex, 
depending on the contract, its impact can be significant in the VPP operation costs. For the 
first contract types, the VPP operation costs increased about 20%; however, the last type of 
contract had an impact of about 1,2%. In this way, the VPP management should consider 
players’ contracts which have clear and tangible objectives, beneficial for both parties. 
In this case study, one can identify some advantages and disadvantages of the 
proposed methodology. Some of the clearest advantages of this methodology is the 
flexibility in adapting to several considerations which may arise in a energy and AS joint 
market, including: the possibility of splitting the AS procurement for regions of the network; 
the increasing importance of DR resources in the network management, and negotiating a 
good part of complex contracts existing in the market. However, the main advantage of this 
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methodology and contribution from the common markets is the ability to dispatch all 
services (energy and ancillary services) in a hierarchical way without compromising the 
stability of the network and the technical constraints related to the network. This advantage 
was only possible through the implementation of topological Bialek factors based on 
proportional sharing methodology. 
Regarding the disadvantages, it seems that the execution time of the method is 
slightly long, about 20 minutes of complete execution of the market. In this way, the 
methodology fits perfectly in the simulation of day-ahead market. 
Briefly, it can be concluded that the proposed methodology is effective to solve the 
envisaged problem and to be implemented in MASCEM. This model proposes an energy and 
AS joint market simulation considering the possibilities of AS bidding regions, the large 
introduction of DER, complex contracts and especially the use of AC power flow using the 
topological Bialek factors, which allows the simulator to have greater flexibility and to 
control strategies from the standpoint of the VPP and players. 
4.7. Conclusions 
This subsection presents the main conclusions of the case studies related to the 
simulation of AS market models. The case studies presented were carefully selected in order 
to demonstrate the most relevant features regarding to the market models studied. In this 
context, the case studies cover a diversity of possible situations in a competitive 
environment, in both perspectives of the ISO/VPPs and the remaining players participating 
in the energy and AS joint market. 
The first case study is the base model of the AS market simulation used in the 
development of the remaining models. In this case study, the results are shown regarding 
the simulation of the ancillary services (RD, RU, SP and NS) and the usefulness of the AS 
cascade system in the model. In this way, it is possible to verify that the simulation of the 
AS market, with the possibility of cascade process between services, may result in economic 
savings in the scope of the market optimization developed by the ISO. The last scenario of 
this case study shows the economic advantage of considering the AS market model with the 
possibility of ancillary services cascading. The economic savings presented in the scenario 
are about 16% compared to the simple simulation of the AS market in which the AS 
cascade is not considered. 
The results of an energy and AS joint market model are presented in the second 
case study. In this case study, it is easy to verify the economic advantage to the ISO 
through the simultaneous and compact simulation of energy and AS market. The third 
scenario of this case study shows the comparison of results obtained through the simulation 
of separate market and joint market. In this scenario, it seems that the joint market 
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simulation has an economic efficiency of about 4%, when comparing to the separate market 
for energy and AS market. 
The third case study presents the comparison results of the proposed model in 
section 3.4 with a reference method proposed in [Wu-2004]. The model developed 
considers the joint market with the AS bids to be offered by regions of the network. The 
major differences between the developed model and the reference method is the use of an 
AC OPF capable of determining the active and reactive power flow in the network, instead of 
the DC model used in reference methodology. The LMP calculation of each node in the 
model developed considers the LMP of energy, system losses and network congestion, while 
in the reference method only considers the LPM of energy and network congestion. 
Furthermore, the possibility of AS cascade existing in the model developed is not considered 
in the reference model. In this way, the results of this case study show that the developed 
methodology introduces a clear approach to the reality of the power systems operation. 
The fourth case study considers the electricity market model developed in section 
3.5, based on the principle of Bialek topological factors methodology. In order to 
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methodology it was used a transmission 
network with 7 buses in this case study. The major advantage of the method is the 
demonstration of the feasibility by considering all services (energy and ancillary services) in 
the network congestion. The disadvantages are summarized by the execution time of the 
optimization process of the method, as well as the increased of operation costs for the ISO. 
The last case study considers the innovative methodology developed in section 3.6 
which uses the Bialek topological factors in order to obtain the feasibility of services 
dispatches included in the model, as well as the introduction of complex constraints related 
to the players/VPPs established contracts. The case study considers a distribution network 
of 33 buses and the use of DER, consisting mainly in DG (namely, photovoltaic, wind, CHP, 
Biomass, MSW, small hydro and Fuel Cell), DR and Storage units. 
Firstly, this case study presents the results of joint market simulation which 
considers the use of an AC OPF and Bialek topological factors so that the solutions 
presented are feasible throughout the simulation process for each service. The energy 
dispatch shows that the DR has an important contribution in this schedule, about 12%, 
while the DG is about 29% and the storage unit has a minimal effect of about 1% in the 
dispatch. 
After the energy dispatch, through the Bialek topological factors it is possible to 
determine the contribution that each resource has in the network flow. This contribution 
limits the resources for the remaining services according to the contribution which can still 
offer in view of the technical constraints of the network, at the level of congestion of 
network branches. This provides an optimization initially more expensive regarding the 
objective function value; however, this method ensures the feasibility of the dispatch for 
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each service, thus benefiting a final anticipated dispatch in respect to the usual processes in 
real markets. 
Regarding the use of DR resources to participate in the AS, they comprise a large 
part of the dispatch, and in some regions of the network they may reach 50% of the 
dispatch of an ancillary service to the respective region. This happens in cases when these 
resources are less expensive, or when the DG resources and external suppliers are limited 
to supply loads due to lines’ congestion. 
The storage units’ participation in AS provision illustrates the versatility that this kind 
of resource can have when ensuring the balance and stability of power system. In this way, 
the obtained results show that the major purpose of the resources, from the VPP 
standpoint, involves the power systems stability. Thus, their participation emerges in 
periods of greater preponderance namely the periods between 20 and 22. 
With regards to complex contracts, these are used to allow the VPPs establishing 
contracts with players in order to define beneficial conditions for both parties. In this case 
study, the VPP operating costs increased about 20%. However, this increase was not 
detected for all contracts established. In this way, the results of the last contracts studied in 
the case study have an impact of 1,2% in the VPP resource management. 
All the simulations of the case studies presented in this chapter were developed in 
GAMS software using a deterministic approach, the Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Programming 
(MINLP). This technique ensures obtaining the global optimal in each optimization, which 
means that throughout the process simulation the best possible solution was always 
obtained. The execution time of most of the models presented in this work does not exceed 
3 minutes of simulation. However, the methodology simulated in the last case study is quite 
complex, in which the dispatch of energy and each AS, considering AS bidding in different 
network regions, the introduction of all kind of resources in markets participation, as well as 
the use of complex contracts between players related to DG resources with the VPP, 
originate a quite long execution time of the sequential process of complete determination of 
this model, reaching 20 minutes of the total model simulation. 
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5. Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter presents the most significant conclusions of the work developed. It 
includes a critical analysis of the proposed methodology and the obtained results in order to 
highlight the objectives achieved and the contribution to the state of the art and, most 
importantly, to the future electricity market mechanisms. Furthermore, some perspectives 
related to future work are introduced. 
5.1. Main conclusions and contributions 
Ancillary Services (AS) are crucial to maintain and control the stability of power 
systems. Currently, and more in the future, AS markets will be influenced by a large set of 
different Distributed Energy Resources (DER). These new players can participate directly in 
the market or aggregated to some agents, such a Virtual Power Players. Due to the 
continuous increase of players with several kinds of DER, the development of new 
methodologies becomes necessary to provide flexible mechanisms to the energy and AS 
negotiation. 
This dissertation focuses on the development and implementation of new market 
mechanisms for energy and AS, considering several players involved in the electricity 
market. A comprehensive work has been developed in order to address several objectives 
and different perspectives of AS management. In this way, the AS management from the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) and Virtual Power Player (VPP) standpoint were 
considered, taking into account the features of the players involved in each model. 
The development of a model capable of simulating the joint market using a Alternate 
Current (AC) Optimal Power Flow (OPF) model for the simulation of technical constraints of 
the network; the introduction of an innovative method (Bialek topological factors) 
considering the ancillary services dispatch in the network congestion calculation, in order to 
prevent network congestion during the dispatch of all ancillary services considered in the 
market; and complex contracts implemented in order to enable the negotiation between 
players and VPPs, results in a complete and complex simulation model very close to current 
markets, as well as the main contribution of this dissertation. 
The proposed models are based on California Independent System Operator (CAISO) 
market rules. CAISO is a nonprofit public entity subject to the FERC regulation, which 
operates the transmission facilities of all participants in power systems, and dispatches the 
generation units and the loads. The CAISO market includes several competitive and 
liberalized market mechanisms. An interesting market mechanism in the development of 
this dissertation is the energy and AS joint optimization. Therefore, in this work it was 
studied and adapted some of the innovative aspects of the CAISO market. The following 
CAISO rules were implemented and tested in joint energy and AS market: 
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 The use of relaxation variables in optimization problem, which always ensures 
obtaining results of the AS dispatch, regardless of the operation context; 
 AS cascading mechanism; 
 Energy and AS joint optimization; 
 AS bidding by operation network regions. 
All the models developed include the Regulation Down (RD), Regulation Up (RU), 
Spinning reserve (SP) and Non-Spinning Reserve (NS). The models also include several 
market mechanisms with different objectives for improving the market model. The 
relaxation variables are used to obtain an economic dispatch regardless of the operation 
context. Other mechanism is the AS cascading process, which is used to improve the 
economic efficiency of AS management. 
The establishment of AS bids by network regions is a market mechanism used by the 
ISO in order to mitigate/avoid network congestion. For each region, part of the AS 
requirements (about 50%) is provided exclusively by internal energy resources of that 
region. The main advantage of this market mechanism is to decrease the probability of 
having network congestion in regions tendentiously problematic, as well as to improve the 
reliability and quality of the energy service. However, this mechanism does not ensure the 
technical and economical best solution. 
The energy and AS joint market model do not ensure the solution feasibility. The 
main problem is that the model does not consider the impact that the AS may have on the 
network congestion. In order to solve this issue, an innovative methodology was developed 
to solve the network congestion caused by the simultaneous market clearing process of the 
joint market. 
This methodology is based on Bialek topological distribution factors. The major 
contribution of this methodology is to always ensure a feasible solution of the energy and 
AS dispatch in any operation context. In what concerns the model runtime, it suits the ISO 
operation requirements. This methodology allows finding a better solution than the 
traditional methodology, guaranteeing the feasibility of the system, avoiding any network 
congestion that may occur in the traditional methodology. 
The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is reflected in the results, since the 
operation costs are lower when compared with the traditional market methodology which 
needs further network congestion analysis to solve the congestion that the AS can cause in 
the network. 
Other important contribution proposed in this dissertation is the inclusion of DER in 
AS such as Regulation Down, Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-Spinning reserve. In this 
way, an aggregator agent was proposed in order to manage and interact with a wide variety 
of DER, like Distribution Generation (DG) (mainly based on renewable energy sources), 
Demand Response (DR), and storage systems. The VPP is an agent that aggregates all kind 
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of DER, and acts as network operator, providing AS to the system operator. The VPP has 
the ability to participate in the electricity market, taking into account the contracts 
established with the aggregated resources. 
Based on these assumptions, a distribution network AS management methodology 
considering a large penetration of small players was developed. The methodology includes 
complex contracts between VPP and small players, so that the DER may participate in local 
AS management, as well as in AS market. The proposed contracts can consider features 
related to minimum limits of generation intended for the players, remuneration conditions, 
and the number of consecutive hours in generation, among others. The major advantage of 
this approach is the AS management by a VPP at the distribution network level with 
operation features related to the future of the power systems. On the other hand, the 
inclusion of DER allows easier on-site monitoring system stability. The establishment of 
complex contracts between the VPP and the players allows a careful and responsible 
management by power system entities. 
The proposed methodology shows interesting results regarding the usefulness and 
ease of the DER participation in the AS procurement and dispatch. The results show that 
DER (especially storage systems) are indicated for the AS provision, due to their flexibility 
to participate in any AS addressed in the model. Furthermore, the results show that 
complex contracts cover a wide range of DER, providing greater capacity to the VPP to meet 
their internal needs and sell power in the market. 
Several scenarios regarding the simulation of the developed AS models were 
implemented in each case study. These scenarios included several future power systems 
characteristics, such as the intensive use of DG, DR and storage resources, the 
consideration of the ISO/VPP management in liberalized environment, among other 
characteristics. The set of case studies included in this dissertation illustrates the use of the 
proposed methodologies, and demonstrates the applicability and advantages of the 
proposed models. 
The analysis conducted from the ISOs and VPPs standpoints are included in the 
presented set of case studies. The submission of AS bids by regions of the network, 
especially by storage systems, is also presented. In this case, the use and usefulness of the 
ability of storage units to charge and discharge for each ancillary service type is illustrated. 
Moreover, a set of complex contracts between DER and VPP are illustrated. 
All the models simulated were developed using the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS) optimization tool, based on the model of deterministic optimization 
approach (Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Programming – MINLP). Based on this technique, the 
more complex model proposed in the development of this work reached 20 minutes of 
simulation. In this way, the proposed model fits the Day-Ahead Market (DAM) simulation. 
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Lastly, all the methodologies proposed and implemented were included in the Multi-
Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets (MASCEM). MASCEM is a simulator which 
depicts the study of complex restructured electricity markets operation. In this way, the 
methodologies developed in this dissertation provide additional methodological bases to 
MASCEM, for the simulation of the present and future operation of the energy and AS 
market. 
5.2. Perspectives for future work 
Throughout the development of this work, several ideas have arisen to potentially 
proceed with the evolution of the present work. Some of the envisaged concepts are closely 
connected to new FCT projects which were recently initiated, namely the following projects: 
 IMaDER – Intelligent Short Term Management of Distributed Energy 
Resources in a Multi-Player Competitive Environment (PTDC/SEN-
ENR/122174/2010); 
 MAN-REM – Multi-Agent Negotiation and Risk Management in Electricity 
Markets (PTDC/EEA-EEI/122988/2010). 
Among the many advances that the development of this work gave opportunity to, 
allowing future works and scientific findings, some future developments can be referred: 
 Improvement of AS optimization methodologies considering the several levels 
of AS management (ISO, TSO, DSO and VPP); 
 Introduction of all kind of DER in the market or in the VPP, mainly consisting 
of DG technologies, Electric Vehicles (EV), types of DR considering different 
kind of consumers (Large and medium Industrial, Large, medium and small 
Commerce, and Domestic consumer) and storage units; 
 Enable players to submit more complex bids, taking into account in the 
dispatch process, the constraints related to startup costs of some 
technologies, minimal load costs regarding the state of readiness of a 
generator to enter in service at a certain time to fill a gap of generation, and 
generation ramps related to features of each AS; 
 Develop and implement a AS management tool where it is possible to identify 
and evaluate the risk of the bids that a VPP can run in the market; 
 The ability of the tool has appropriate methodologies of learning the 
knowledge of the market in which the VPP operates. 
The suggestions for improving the energy and AS market simulation, indicated as 
future work, are part of the objectives to continuously improve MASCEM simulator, with the 
objective of providing the users of the simulator with a wide range of simulation tools which 
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can be adapted to the different characteristics of each market, as well as the consideration 
of new trends that might arise in the competitive market environment. 
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Data from the Case Study – AS model 
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Table A.1 shows the input data for the first scenario of the case study in section 4.2. 
In this table arise features concerning the quantities and prices of each AS that each player 
offers to the market, as well as the requirements of each AS imposed by the SO. 
Table A.1 – Input data for scenario 1 of AS model. 
 
Table A.2 shows the input data used in the case study of section 4.2 for the second 
scenario. 
Table A.2 – Input data for scenario 2 of AS model. 
  
Table A.3 shows the input data used in the case study of section 4.2 for the third 
scenario. 
Table A.3 – Input data for scenario 3 of AS model.  
 
 
 
Electricity Markets Modeling Considering Complex Contracts and Aggregators 
October 2013  B.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex B  
 
Data from the Case Study – Energy and 
AS joint market model 
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Table B.1 shows the input data necessary for the case study of the section 3.3. 
Table B.1 – Energy and AS joint market data. 
 
Table B.2 shows the AS dispatch without AS cascade, as well as the market price 
associated to each AS and their cost to the SO. 
Table B.2 – AS market results in scenario 1 of joint model. 
Bids 
Regulation Down Regulation Up 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Total 
(MW) 
MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh 
1 0 10.0 0 15.0 10 5.0 10 7.0 20 
2 0 8.0 0 8.1 5 9.0 45 4.0 50 
3 40 8.0 0 7.1 20 8.5 0 6.0 20 
4 60 4.0 4 5.0 11 7.2 15 4.6 30 
5 100 3.5 65 7.0 24 4.0 14 9.0 103 
6 0 9.0 0 14.6 10 8.0 0 11.0 10 
7 40 7.0 0 7.2 0 7.3 21 4.0 21 
8 10 4.8 100 8.3 60 6.6 0 10.5 160 
9 0 9.0 0 6.5 10 4.3 45 5.3 55 
10 0 10.0 31 4.0 0 9.0 0 5.0 31 
Contracted 
Service (MW) 
250 200 150 150 750 
Market 
Clearing Price 
(m.u./MWh) 
8.0 8.3 9.0 9.0 
Total 
(m.u.) 
Total Cost 
(m.u.) 
2000 1660 1350 1350 6360 
Table B.3 Shows the AS dispatch with AS cascade, and moreover shows the market 
clearing price of each AS, and the cost associated with each ancillary service, and the 
overall cost to the SO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tiago André Teixeira Soares 
B.4  October 2013 
 
Table B.3 – AS market results with cascading mechanism in scenario 1 of joint model. 
Bids 
Regulation Down Regulation Up 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
Total 
(MW) 
MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh MW m.u./MWh 
1 0 10.0 0 15.0 10 5.0 10 7.0 20 
2 0 8.0 5 8.1 0 9.0 45 4.0 50 
3 40 8.0 5 7.1 0 8.5 15 6.0 20 
4 60 4.0 30 5.0 0 7.2 0 4.6 30 
5 100 3.5 65 7.0 24 4.0 14 9.0 103 
6 0 9.0 0 14.6 10 8.0 0 11.0 10 
7 40 7.0 0 7.2 0 7.3 21 4.0 21 
8 10 4.8 100 8.3 60 6.6 0 10.5 160 
9 0 9.0 0 6.5 10 4.3 45 5.3 55 
10 0 10.0 31 4.0 0 9.0 0 5.0 31 
Contracted 
Service (MW) 
250 236 114 150 750 
Slacks - 
RU to SP SP to NS 
- 
36 8.3 0 9.0 
RU to NS 
- 
0 8.3 
Service Used 
(MW) 
250 200 150 150 650 
Market 
Clearing Price 
(m.u./MWh) 
8.0 8.3 8.0 9.0 
Total 
(m.u.) 
Total Cost 
(m.u.) 
2000 1958.8 912 1350 6220.8 
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Data from the Case Study – Joint Market 
model applied by VPP 
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Table C.1 shows the resistance, inductive reactance, capacitive susceptance and the 
thermal limit. 
Table C.1 – Branch data of the 33-bus distribution network. 
Branch 
number 
Bus Out Bus In R (Ohm) XL (Ohm) 
BC 
(Siemens) 
Thermal limit 
(MVA) 
1 0 1 0.1332 0.0471 0 4.5 
2 1 2 0.7122 0.2517 0 4.5 
3 1 18 0.2699 0.0954 0 4.5 
4 2 3 0.3890 0.1048 0 3.29 
5 2 22 0.6039 0.2134 0 4.5 
6 3 4 0.1911 0.0515 0 3.29 
7 4 5 0.7262 0.1957 0 3.29 
8 5 6 1.0514 0.2833 0 3.29 
9 5 25 1.0656 0.2872 0 3.29 
10 6 7 0.2007 0.0541 0 3.29 
11 7 8 0.3822 0.1030 0 3.29 
12 8 9 1.4984 0.4038 0 3.29 
13 9 10 0.5528 0.1488 0 3.29 
14 10 11 0.6033 0.1626 0 3.29 
15 11 12 0.7618 0.2053 0 2.29 
16 12 13 1.3157 0.3546 0 3.29 
17 13 14 0.7472 0.2014 0 3.29 
18 14 15 0.3280 0.0884 0 3.29 
19 15 16 3.0084 0.8107 0 3.29 
20 16 17 0.8190 0.2207 0 3.29 
21 18 19 1.0241 0.3620 0 4.5 
22 19 20 0.6518 0.2304 0 4.5 
23 20 21 1.2973 0.4585 0 4.5 
24 22 23 1.2944 0.4575 0 4.5 
25 23 24 0.1497 0.0529 0 4.5 
26 25 26 0.2901 0.0782 0 3.29 
27 26 27 1.0810 0.2913 0 329 
28 27 28 0.8209 0.2212 0 3.29 
29 28 29 0.5180 0.1396 0 3.29 
30 29 30 0.9946 0.2680 0 3.29 
31 30 31 0.3169 0.0854 0 3.29 
32 31 32 0.3481 0.0938 0 3.29 
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Table C.2 shows information regarding DG and external supplier’s resources to 
energy service to be used as input data base for the case studies discussed. 
Table C.2 – Distributed generation and external suppliers resources bids features. 
Type of 
generator 
Number 
of units 
Total installed 
power (kW) 
Energy price (m.u./kWh) 
Minimum Mean Maximum 
Photovoltaic 32 528 0.08 0.1398 0.254 
Wind 5 490 0.05 0.0652 0.08 
Hydro 2 70 0.032 0.0432 0.049 
Biomass 3 350 0.06 0.2653 0.65 
MSW 1 10 0.03 0.0484 0.056 
CHP 15 1,240 0.0001062 0.0179 0.065 
Fuel Cell 8 235 0.095 0.1021 0.11 
Total of DG 66 2,923 - - - 
External 
suppliers 
1 15,000 0.015 0.0434 0.07 
Total 67 17,923 - - - 
 
The input data relating to AS bids (Regulation Down and Regulation Up) are shown 
in Table C.3. 
Table C.3 – DG and external suppliers bids for RD and RU services. 
Type of 
generator 
Regulation Down price (m.u./kWh) Regulation Up (m.u./kWh) 
Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum 
Photovoltaic 0.088 0.15378 0.2794 0.088 0.15378 0.2794 
Wind 0.055 0.07172 0.088 0.055 0.07172 0.088 
Hydro 0.0352 0.04752 0.0539 0.0352 0.04752 0.0539 
Biomass 0.066 0.29183 0.715 0.066 0.29183 0.715 
MSW 0.033 0.05324 0.0616 0.033 0.05324 0.0616 
CHP 0.000117 0.01969 0.0715 0.000117 0.01969 0.0715 
Fuel Cell 0.1045 0.11231 0.121 0.1045 0.11231 0.121 
External 
suppliers 
0.0165 0.04774 0.077 0.0165 0.04774 0.077 
 
The input data relating to AS bids (Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve) are 
shown in Table C.4. 
Table C.4 – DG and external suppliers bids for SP and NS service. 
Type of 
generator 
Spinning Reserve price (m.u./kWh) 
Non-Spinning Reserve price 
(m.u./kWh) 
Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum 
Photovoltaic 0.096 0.16776 0.3048 0.1 0.17475 0.3175 
Wind 0.06 0.07824 0.096 0.0625 0.0815 0.1 
Hydro 0.0384 0.05184 0.0588 0.04 0.054 0.06125 
Biomass 0.072 0.31836 0.78 0.075 0.331625 0.8125 
MSW 0.036 0.05808 0.0672 0.0375 0.0605 0.07 
CHP 0.000127 0.02148 0.078 0.000133 0.022375 0.08125 
Fuel Cell 0.114 0.12252 0.132 0.11875 0.127625 0.1375 
External 
suppliers 
0.018 0.05208 0.084 0.01875 0.05425 0.0875 
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Table C.5 shows the input data of DR bids for energy service. 
Table C.5 – Demand response bids for energy service. 
DR 
Reduce (kW) Cut (kW) 
Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum 
0.0071 0.0222 0.2502 0.0071 0.0181 0.1475 
Reduce (m.u./kWh) Cut (m.u./kWh) 
Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum 
0.1 0.1312 0.8 0.09 0.223 1.2 
 
 
 
 
Table C.6 shows the storage units features. 
Table C.6 – Storage features. 
Storage 
features 
Initial 
state 
(kWh) 
Charge 
Capacity 
(kWh) 
Discharge 
Capacity 
(kWh) 
Maximum 
Capacity 
(kW) 
Price charge 
(m.u./kWh) 
Price 
Discharge 
(m.u./kWh) 
Minimum 0.03 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.45 
Mean 0.056 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.475 0.525 
Maximum 0.08 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.55 0.6 
 
 
 
 
Table C.7 illustrates the charge and discharge prices used by storage units for all 
ancillary services. 
Table C.7 – AS charge and discharge storage prices. 
AS Storage features Minimum Mean Maximum 
Price charge (m.u./kWh) 
Regulation Down 0.04 0.0475 0.055 
Regulation Up 0.02 0.0238 0.0275 
Spinning Reserve 0.028 0.0333 0.0385 
Non-Spinning Reserve 0.02 0.0238 0.0275 
Price Discharge (m.u./kWh) 
Regulation Down 0.045 0.0525 0.06 
Regulation Up 0.0225 0.0263 0.03 
Spinning Reserve 0.0315 0.0368 0.042 
Non-Spinning Reserve 0.0225 0.0263 0.03 
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Figure C.1 shows the percentage of power given by each kind of resource for energy 
dispatch. 
 
Figure C.1 – Percentage of power given by each kind of resource for energy dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market 
model applied by VPP. 
 
 
 
 
The percentage contribution of each DG technology has on energy dispatch is given 
by Figure C.2. 
 
Figure C.2 – Percentage of DG contribution for energy dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
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Figure C.3 shows the contribution of type of DR in energy dispatch. 
 
Figure C.3 – Type of DR contribution in energy dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
Figure C.4 shows the percentage of power given by each kind of resource for 
ancillary services dispatch. 
Regulation Down Regulation Up 
  
Spinning Reserve Non-Spinning Reserve 
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Figure C.4 – Resource contribution for RD, RU, SP and NS dispatch, in scenario 1 of joint market model applied by 
VPP. 
 
Figure C.5 shows the percentage of power given by each kind of resource for energy 
dispatch for scenario presented in section 4.6.2.2. 
 
Figure C.5 – Resource contribution for energy dispatch, in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
The contribution that each type of DG technology has in energy dispatch is given by 
Figure C.6. 
 
Figure C.6 – Energy dispatch by DG technologies contribution, in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
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Figure C.7 reflects the percentage of DG production in energy dispatch. 
 
Figure C.7 – Percentage of DG contribution for energy dispatch, in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.8 illustrates the sharing of each type of DR on energy dispatch as well as 
the load really dispatched. 
 
Figure C.8 – Type of DR for energy dispatch, in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
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The percentage of importance which DR resource has in energy dispatch is given by 
Figure C.9. 
 
Figure C.9 – Percentage of DR contribution for energy dispatch, in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
 
Figure C.10 shown the Regulation down dispatch considering different bidding 
regions. 
 
Figure C.10 - Regulation down dispatch, in scenario 2 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
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Figure C.11 shows the dispatch of the generators and external suppliers to 
Regulation Up reserve, without differentiating the region which generation corresponds. 
 
Figure C.11 – DG and external supplier dispatch for regulation up service, in scenario 2 of joint market model 
applied by VPP. 
 
 
 
Figure C.12 shows the dispatch of the generators and external suppliers to Spinning 
Reserve. 
 
Figure C.12 – DG and external supplier dispatch for spinning reserve service, in scenario 2 of joint market model 
applied by VPP. 
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Figure C.13 shows the Regulation Down dispatch relating to scenario of section 
4.6.2.3. 
 
Figure C.13 – Regulation down dispatch, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
 
Figure C.14 shows the percentage of power given by each kind of resource for RD 
dispatch for scenario presented in section 4.6.2.3. 
 
Figure C.14 – Resource contribution for regulation down service, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by 
VPP. 
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The RU dispatch for the third scenario (section 4.6.2.3), is represented by Figure 
C.15. 
 
Figure C.15 – Regulation up global dispatch, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.16 represents the global dispatch of Spinning Reserve for 24 hours period in 
respect to the third scenario presented in section 4.6.2.3. 
 
Figure C.16 – Spinning reserve global dispatch, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
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The Spinning Reserve dispatch for each network region is given by the Figure C.17. 
 
Figure C.17 – Spinning reserve dispatch by network region, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
 
 
The SP dispatch for Region 1, considering all kind of resources is given by Figure 
C.18. 
 
Figure C.18 – SP reserve dispatch for region 1, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
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The SP dispatch for Region 3, considering all kind of resources is given by Figure 
C.19. 
 
Figure C.19 – SP reserve dispatch for region 3, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
 
The SP dispatch for Region 4, considering all kind of resources is given by Figure 
C.20. 
 
Figure C.20 – SP reserve dispatch for region 4, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
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Figure C.21 represents the global dispatch of Non-Spinning Reserve for 24 hours 
period in respect to the third scenario presented in section 4.6.2.3. 
 
Figure C.21 – Non-spinning reserve global dispatch, in scenario 3 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
Figure C.22 illustrates the energy dispatch for 24 hours period. 
 
Figure C.22 – Energy dispatch, in scenario 4 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
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Figure C.23 presents all kinds of consumption assured by the energy dispatch 
(includes storage charge and active power losses). 
 
Figure C.23 – Consumption details of energy dispatch, in scenario 4 of joint market model applied by VPP. 
 
 
The storage unit contribution by network regions to Regulation Up service is given by Figure 
C.24 – Storage charge and discharge contribution by network regions for RU service. 
 
Figure C.24 – Storage charge and discharge contribution by network regions for RU service. 
 
 
